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ABSTRACT 
The extraordinary events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001, 
left Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers in New York, Boston, 
Washington, and Cleveland and their colleagues at the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), without precedent as to how to respond to the hijacking of 
four American commercial airliners.  Despite the chaos and confusion, the two agencies 
put forth a joint effort in order to decide when and how to scramble fighter aircraft to 
escort the airliners.  The collaboration that occurred between the agencies was recorded 
in radio transcripts between NORAD and FAA air traffic controllers.  The goal of this 
thesis is to utilize the September 11, 2001, NORAD/FAA channel three transcripts to 
offer a real-world example of how a team works together on a one-of-a-kind problem.  
Further, transcript of recorded audio were coded and analyzed in an effort to empirically 
validate the Office of Naval Research model of team collaboration.  The model focuses 
on individual and team cognitive processes used during team or agency collaboration 
with the goal of understanding how individuals and teams work together in order to reach 
a decision.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The following is a chronological list of events that occurred on Tuesday, 
September 11, 2001.  It is merely a loose timeline, compiled from several sources, 
including the Cable News Network (CNN).  It is neither official, nor all-inclusive.  
However, it illustrates the immediate impact of that day’s tragic events and the 
complexity faced by the collaborating government and civilian organizations.   
1. Chronology of Events 
0759   American Airlines flight 11 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA. 
 
0814   United Airlines flight 175 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA. 
 
0820   American Airlines flight 77 departs Washington Dulles International 
           Airport for Los Angeles, CA. 
 
0825   Boston Center is made aware of a hijacking. 
 
0837   Boston Center notifies NEADS of a hijacked aircraft. 
 
0842   United Airlines flight 93 departs Newark, NJ, for San Francisco, CA. 
 
0844   NORAD orders a fighter aircraft launch to escort a hijacked aircraft in  
           New York City (Bronner, 2006). 
 
0845   A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, 
flying from Boston to Los Angeles, crashes into the north tower of the 
World Trade Center (WTC), tearing a hole in the building and setting it on 
fire. 
 
0903   A second hijacked airplane from Boston, United Airlines Flight 175, 
           crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) and 
           explodes.  Now, both buildings are on fire. 
 
0917   The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shuts down all New York City 




0921   The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closes all bridges and 
           tunnels in the New York area. 
 
0930   President Bush, speaking in Sarasota, Florida, declares the country has 
           suffered an "apparent terrorist attack." 
 
0940   The FAA halts all flight operations at all United States (U.S.) airports, for 
           the first time in U.S. history. 
 
0943   American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, flying from Washington's 
Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles, crashes into the Pentagon.  
Evacuation begins immediately. 
 
0945   The White House is evacuated. 
 
1005   The south tower of the WTC collapses. 
 
1010   A portion of the Pentagon collapses.  Additionally, United Airlines Flight 
93, another hijacked airplane, crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, 
southeast of Pittsburgh. 
 
1013   The United Nations (UN) building evacuates. 
 
1022   In Washington D.C., the State and Justice Departments are evacuated, as 
           well as the World Bank. 
 
1024   The FAA begins diverting all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the 
           U.S. to Canada. 
 
1028   The WTC's north tower collapses from the top down. 
 
1045   All federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. are evacuated. 
 
1053   New York's primary elections, scheduled for Tuesday, are postponed. 
 
1057   New York Gov. George Pataki closes all state government offices. 
 
1102   New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges all New Yorkers to stay at 
           home and orders an evacuation of the area south of Canal Street. 
 
1116   CNN reports that the Center for Disease Control and Prevention is 
           preparing precautionary emergency-response teams. 
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1126   United Airlines confirms that United Flight 93, from Newark to San 
Francisco, has crashed in Pennsylvania.  The airline also claims it is 
"deeply concerned" about Flight 175. 
 
1159   United Airlines confirms that Flight 175, from Boston to Los Angeles, has 
crashed into the WTC's south tower. 
 
1204   Los Angeles International Airport, the destination of three of the crashed 
           airplanes, is evacuated. 
 
1215   San Francisco International Airport, the destination of United Airlines 
           Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, is evacuated. 
 
1215   The Immigration and Naturalization Service says U.S. borders with Canada 
           and Mexico are on the highest state of alert, but not closed. 
 
1230   The FAA reports that 50 flights are in U.S. airspace, but none are reporting 
           any problems. 
 
1304   Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, says that all 
appropriate security measures are being taken, including placing the U.S. 
military on high alert worldwide.  He asks for prayers for those killed or 
wounded in the attacks and says, "Make no mistake, the United States will 
hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts." 
 
1327   The city of Washington, D.C. declares a state of emergency. 
 
1344   The Pentagon says five warships and two aircraft carriers will leave the 
U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect the East Coast from 
further attacks, also reducing the number of military vessels in port. The 
two carriers, USS George Washington and USS John F. Kennedy, will 
head for the New York coast. The other ships that will head to sea are 
frigates and guided missile destroyers, capable of shooting down aircraft. 
 
1400   Senior FBI officials tell CNN they assume that the four crashed airplanes 
were hijacked as part of a coordinated terrorist attack. 
 
1430   The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until 1200 
EDT Wednesday. 
 
1449   At a news conference, Mayor Giuliani announces the partial restoration of 




1555   A White House counselor says the President is at an undisclosed location, 
later revealed to be Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and is conducting a 
National Security Council meeting by phone.  Additionally, Mayor Giuliani 
now says the number of critically injured in New York City is up to 200 
with 2,100 total injuries reported. 
 
1600   CNN reports that U.S. officials say there are "good indications" that Saudi 
militant Osama bin Laden, suspected of coordinating the bombings of two 
U.S. embassies in 1998, is involved in the attacks. 
 
1606   California Governor Gray Davis dispatches urban search-and-rescue teams 
to New York. 
 
1610   Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex is reported on fire. 
 
1625   The American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) say they will remain closed Wednesday. 
 
1715   CNN reports that fires are still burning in part of the Pentagon. No death 
figures have been released yet. 
 
1720   The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex, which was 
damaged and evacuated when the twin towers across the street collapsed 
earlier in the day, collapses.  Other nearby buildings remain on fire. 
 
1730   CNN reports that U.S. officials say the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania 
could have been headed for one of three possible targets: Camp David, the 
White House or the U.S. Capitol building. 
 
1800   Explosions are heard in Kabul, Afghanistan, hours after terrorist attacks 
targeted financial and military centers in the United States.  Afghanistan is 
believed to be where bin Laden, who U.S. officials say is possibly behind 
Tuesday's deadly attacks, is located.  U.S. officials say later that the United 
States had no involvement in the incident whatsoever. The attack is 
credited to the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban group fighting in the 
country's ongoing civil war. 
 
1840   U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, holds a news conference in 
the Pentagon, stating that the building is still operational. 
 
1902   CNN reports the Marriott Hotel near the WTC is on the verge of collapse 
and says some New York bridges are now open to outbound traffic. 
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1945   The New York Police Department claims that at least 78 officers are 
missing, and that as many as half of the first 400 firefighters on the scene 
were killed. 
 
2030   President Bush addresses the nation, saying "thousands of lives were 
suddenly ended by evil.  These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the 
steel of American resolve."  The President says the U.S. government will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and 
those who harbor them. He adds that government offices in Washington are 
reopening for essential personnel Tuesday night and for all workers 
Wednesday. 
 
2122   CNN reports the fire at the Pentagon is still burning and is considered 
contained but not under control. 
 
2157   Mayor Giuliani says New York City schools will be closed Wednesday and 
no more volunteers are needed for Tuesday evening's rescue efforts. He 
says there is hope that there are still people alive in rubble. He also says 
that power is out on the west side of Manhattan and that health department 
tests show there are no airborne chemical agents about which to worry. 
 
2249   CNN reports that Attorney General Ashcroft told members of Congress 
that there were three to five hijackers on each plane armed only with 
knives. 
2. National Defense Response 
On September 11, 2001, the defense of U.S. air space depended on close 
interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 
Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), the regional headquarters for the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).  NORAD is a joint U.S. and 
Canadian organization that employs a network of space-based, aerial-and ground-based 
sensors, refueling capabilities and fighter aircraft to detect and deter any airborne threats 
to North America.  NEADS is the regional headquarters for NORAD located at Griffiss 
Air Force Base in Rome, New York.  It is responsible for protecting one of three 
NORAD regions, which covers half of a million square miles of North American airspace 
over the U.S. and Canada.  NEADS was the key command and control (C2) center for the 
U.S. military response during the terrorist attacks. 
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Despite the fact that no specific protocols existed concerning suicide hijackers 
who used commercial planes as weapons of mass destruction, the civilian and military 
personnel at the FAA and NEADS attempted to rapidly improvise an effective home-land 
defense against an unprecedented attack.  The conduct of NEADS personnel that day is 
commendable.  Individual FAA controllers and command center managers proactively 
sought as much information and intelligence as they could process, and made seemingly 
sound decisions.  The standard response to an aircraft hijacking is to launch fighter 
aircraft from the nearest military installation to follow the aircraft in order to observe and 
take the appropriate action when necessary (Bronner, 2006).   
However, poor communication between more senior levels of the chain of 
command rendered this standard response, as well as the collective national response, 
ineffective (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  Since the President, Secretary of 
Defense, and other senior military and FAA officials were not communicating effectively 
with each other, Air National Guard units with differing rules of engagement and 
standard operating procedures were launched without NORAD’s consent or knowledge.  
Then, once airborne, they received conflicting instructions.  Further illustrating this 
confusion is the fact that the order to shoot down the final hijacked airplane, United 
Flight 93, was not relayed to NEADS until almost thirty minutes after the plane crashed 
in Pennsylvania (Bronner, 2006). 
Ultimately, the FAA realized it had lost situational awareness and control of U.S. 
air space, and ordered the grounding of all civilian aircraft.  This decision unfortunately 
came after the hijackers intentionally crashed all four hijacked airplanes.  It is NEADS 
standard procedure to record all internal and external radio communications on multi-
channel tape recorders. This thesis analyzes a transcript of one of those channels, 
focusing on the team collaboration and cognitive processes that occurred between the 
different government agencies that day. 
3. Emergency Response 
The emergency response to the casualties suffered on September 11, 2001, not 
unlike the national defense response, had to be improvised.  The Fire Department of New 
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York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, as well as the employees and occupants of the affected buildings coordinated their 
efforts to the best of their ability.  They were able to minimize the effects of surprising 
and destructive events, the brunt of which spanned a period of roughly 100 minutes (The 
9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  
Almost all personnel casualties occurred at or above the point where the hijacked 
airplanes impacted the buildings.  Most immediate responders, who intentionally 
remained on scene in order to try to save as many lives as possible, were lost.  Despite the 
lack of disaster preparation, absence of a unified incident command, and inadequate 
interagency communications, the responding agencies were able to save the lives of all 
but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians working below the impact 
zone (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  Additionally, the Pentagon handled their 
emergency response far more effectively than they handled the national defense response.  
The unaffected parts of the building were never shut down and continued to attempt to 
provide C2 to the larger response effort. 
B. THESIS GOALS 
The primary goal of this thesis is to empirically evaluate the model of team 
collaboration, developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored 
Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) Program, using the September 11, 2001, 
NEADS/FAA channel 3 transcripts.  A secondary goal is to apply the model to real-world 
team collaboration domains.  The model of team collaboration focuses on how 
individuals use cognitive processes to develop information and knowledge to make an 
informed decision.  For this research, we applied the macro-cognitive process definitions 
to the team communications in the transcripts, to determine whether these definitions 
accurately represent how teams collaborate to make real world decisions, or if the model 
is more suitable for analyzing controlled, laboratory situations.  Additionally, this thesis 
provides suggestions for enhancements and additions to the existing list of definitions. 
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The audio from one of the primary communications channels used by the mission 
control commander (MCC), channel three MCC Operations (channel 3), was 
professionally transcribed.  The resulting transcript provides a realistic example of an 
inter-agency collaborative team’s response to a real-world emergency.  Each speech turn 
in the transcript was coded, in whole or in part, by each coder using definitions included 
in the model of team collaboration.  Several definitions were clearly designed for use in 
controlled, laboratory experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, 
real-world scenario.  However, this is not evidence that these definitions should be 
excluded from the model.  Additional codes were included to represent additional team 
communications that occur in real-world task domains. 
C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Previous research was conducted with a similar goal of validating the initial 
structural model of team collaboration, including a thesis by Ensign Maura Garrity, 2007; 
a thesis by Lieutenant Luis Socias, 2008; a thesis by Lieutenant Commander Catherine 
Donaldson and Lieutenant David Johnson, 2008; and multiple studies by Hutchins and 
Kendall from a series of both field and laboratory experiments in which teams 
collaborated during air warfare and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) scenarios 
(Garrity, 2007), (Socias, 2008), (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008), (Hutchins and Kendall, 
2008). 
Garrity applied the definitions of the macrocognitive processes included in the 
initial version of the model of team collaboration to analyze the Fire Department of New 
York’s (FDNY) response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, offering suggestions for 
improving both the performance of the FDNY and the model (Garrity, 2007).  The Socias 
thesis focused on audio channel 4 from the NEADS response to the hijackings on 
September, 11 (Socias, 2008), while Donaldson and Johnson focused on audio channel 2.  
Their research was also aimed toward validating the structural model of team 
collaboration; however they used a second version of the model (Donaldson and Johnson, 
2008).  Their individual research efforts, like ours, are autonomous.  However, pairing 
them with this thesis and potential future analysis of all the audio channels should create 
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a comprehensive account of the inter-agency team collaboration that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, between the military and civilian individuals and organizations. 
MIOs are U.S. Navy-conducted operations that delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy 
forces or supplies en route to the battle area before they are in a position to harm friendly 
forces.  During MIOs, suspicious vessels are often boarded by a trained military team to 
ensure compliance with embargos and other maritime laws.  Hutchins and Kendall 
employed the structural model of team collaboration to analyze transcripts from a series 
of simulated MIOs and communications from air warfare teams on two U.S. warships, 
equipped with the Aegis fire control system, to observe how teams collaborated in 
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II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
A. THE FAA AND ITS COLLABORATION WITH NORAD  
The airspace of the continental U.S. is monitored and protected by two main 
entities: the FAA, who is charged with navigating and controlling air traffic, and 
NORAD, who is charged with protecting the North American continent against air attack.  
In discharging its responsibilities, NORAD utilizes the airspace that is monitored by the 
FAA and must conduct their operations according to FAA regulations and with their 
active participation (Memorandum of understanding between FAA and NORAD, 1987).  
Thus, close coordination between the FAA and NORAD is required in order to maintain 
safety of the U.S. airspace. In order to interpret how the FAA and NORAD collaborated 
on the morning of September 11, 2001, this thesis will examine their missions and 
working relationships.   
B. FAA MISSION AND STRUCTURE  
As stated in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the FAA was granted authority to 
regulate and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in the U.S.  Among its responsibilities 
the FAA is to regulate U.S. commercial air space by navigating and controlling air traffic 
(FAA, 2009).  Twenty-two air route traffic control centers have been established to 
monitor the U.S. airspace.  Controllers at these centers provide information to, and 
receive feedback from, the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center in 
Herndon, Virginia, which is tasked with overseeing daily traffic flow within the entire 
airspace system.  However, ultimate responsibility for the National Airspace System lies 
with FAA headquarters located in Washington D.C. (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  The operations center within the FAA 
headquarters will receive notifications of all major incidents, including hijackings and 
accidents.   
The aircraft hijacked, on the morning of September 11, 2001, were monitored by 
the FAA control centers located in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis as 
depicted in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.   FAA Air Traffic Control Centers (From The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004) 
Although every center obtained some general knowledge of the happenings in the 
national airspace, each of the control centers involved received its information 
independently.  Consequently, what was known to the controllers in the Boston command 
center was not necessarily known to those in New York, Cleveland, Indianapolis and vice 
versa. 
C. NORAD MISSION AND STRUCTURE 
NORAD was established in 1958 through a bi-national agreement between the 
U.S. and Canada.  The primary goal of NORAD is to defend the North American airspace 
and protect the continent.  Specifically, NORAD is charged with the missions of 
aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America (NORAD, 2009).  Included 
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in the mission of aerospace warning is the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and 
the detection, validation, and warning of attack against the continent whether by aircraft, 
missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements made between 
commands (NORAD, 2009).  The job of aerospace control includes ensuring air 
sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD, 2009).  The 
NORAD mission does not make a distinction between national and international threats.  
However, since its establishment was a counter measure to protect U.S. airspace from a 
Soviet threat, it came to define its objective as defending against external attacks 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
Since the end of the cold war brought about a decreased threat of a Soviet air 
strike, the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from twenty-six to seven.  The 
seven alert sites are called upon by one of NORAD’s three sectors: the Canadian 
NORAD Region, the Alaskan NORAD Region, and the Continental United States Region 
(CONR).  It is important to note that the CONR region is further divided into two sectors: 
the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Northeast Air Defense Sector 
(NEADS).  NEADS, based out of Rome, NY, reports to the Continental U.S. NORAD 
Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, who in turn reports to NORAD 
headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   Reporting Structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector (From The National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004) 
According to the 9/11 Commission Report: During the late 1990s, threats of 
terrorits using aircraft as weapons were recognized, but training to counter this threat was 
not based on actual intelligence.  Further, the biggest threat NORAD perceived from 
these aircraft was their use in transporting weapons of mass destruction.  Ultimately, 
NORAD percived the dominiant threat to be from cruise missiles.   
Any order to shoot down a commercial airplane before the September 11, 2001, 
attacks would have to have come from the National Command Authority, a phrase used 
to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  Since officials had the impression that any threat 
or hijacked aricraft that would require intervention (in the form of shooting it down) 
would come from another country, they felt that sufficient time would be available to 
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identify the target and scramble interceptor aircraft.  Further, the threat of terrorists 
hijacking commercial airliners within the U.S.—and using them as guided missiles – was 
not recognized by NORAD before September 11, 2001 (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
On the morning of September 11, 2001, all four of the hijacked aircraft were 
flying in the NEADS sector, in Rome, New York.  NEADS is charged with safeguarding 
a half million square miles of North American airspace that stretches from the east coast 
to Tennessee through the Dakotas to the Canadian border, including Boston, New York, 
Washington D.C. and Chicago (Bronner, 2006).  That morning, NEADS could call upon 
two alert sites: Otis Air National Guard Base,  in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley 
Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, 2004).  Both Otis and Langley had one pair of ready fighter planes on 
alert.  Other facilities not on alert would be delayed in providing additional interceptor 
aircraft, as they would need time to arm fighters and organize crews (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  Figure 3 illustrates 
NORAD’s organizational structure during the attacks on September 11, 2001.     
 
Figure 3.   NORAD Organizational Structure 
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D. THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001   
1. FAA and the 9/11 Hijackings  
Under FAA regulations, all aircraft flying above 10,000 feet are required to emit a 
unique signal in order to distinguish the aircraft’s identity and determine its altitude.  The 
hijackers were able to “hide” their aircraft by disabling the transponders on three of the 
four aricraft they commandeered.  Without transponders, air traffic controllers can only 
track aircraft through their primary radar returns.  However, this process is much more 
difficult and does not reveal the aircraft’s identity and altitude.  Consequently, air traffic 
controllers seem to be so dependent on transponder signals that they usually do not 
display primary radar returns on their radar scopes  (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  However, after losing three of the four 
transponder signals, air traffic personnel changed the configuration settings on their radar 
scopes so that they could see the primary radar returns (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
Before 9/11, incidents of commerical aircraft deviating slightly off course, or 
occassions where an FAA controller lost radio contact with a pilot for a short period of 
time did occur.  Although it happened much less frequently, a controller could also lose a 
commercial airliner’s transponder signal.  However, the simultaneous loss of radio and 
transponder signals, which did happen during the hijackings, would be a rare and 
alarming occurance, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an 
airplane crash (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
According to procedure, the controller’s job in this instance would be to reach out to the 
aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other nearby planes in an attempt to 
reestablish communicatoins and set the aircraft back on course.  As these efforts could 
take five or more minutes, alarm bells would not start ringing until this protocol was 
attempted and failed (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
2004).  Once air traffic personnel had attempted to implement this operational procedure 
and were still unable to contact the aircraft, they knew something was gravely wrong.  
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2. FAA, Department of Defense (DoD), and White House Teleconferences 
After learning of the hijackings, personnel at FAA headquarters initiated 
teleconferences with various agencies at approximately 0920 Eastern Standard Time 
(EST).  According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the National Military Chain of 
Command (NMCC) officer, who participated in the call between the FAA and the DoD, 
said “the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it 
was of little value, and there were other important tasks” (National Commission of 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).  The 9/11 Commission Report 
further indicates that the teleconference did not play a role in coordinating a response to 
the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).    
At approximately 0930 EST, the FAA, DoD and the White House engaged in a 
teleconference.  However, since the teleconferences that occurred before 1000 EST did 
not include the correct officials from the FAA or the DoD, they were not successful in 
producing a meaningful, coordinated response to the hijackings by the military and the 
FAA (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
Senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in the video teleconference 
that was conducted from the White House by Richard Clark, special assistant to the 
President.  Although records indicate that this teleconference began at 0925 EST, the 
FAA did not join the discussion until 0940.  The 9/11 Commission Report did not 
determine who from DoD participated in this conference, but it does indicate that, in the 
first hour, no personnel involved in crisis management were present.  Also, the 9/11 
Commission Report states that, throughout the first hour of this teleconference, no 
information was conveyed to the NMCC.  A witness stated, “it was almost like there 
were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference 
orchestrated by the NMCC and then there was the White House video teleconference.  In 
my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision making” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).       
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E.  INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION  
On the morning of September 11, 2001, NORAD and the FAA had established 
protocols for dealing with the threat of a hijacked aircraft.  The 9/11 Commission Report 
states, “on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD 
required multiple levels of notification and aproval at the highest level of government” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004, p. 17).  
Established procedures required the pilot of the hijacked aircraft to inform the air traffic 
controllers of the hijacking via radio or by squaking 7500, which is the universal code 
that represents a hijacked aircraft.  Once controllers were notified they were to inform 
their supervisors, who would then relay the information up the chain of command to 
management at FAA headquarters.  When determination of a hijacking was confirmed, 
the information would then be reported to the director of the FAA Office of Civil 
Aviation Security.  Operating procedures then indicate that the Pentagon’s NMCC is to 
be notified and a military escort aircraft is to be be requested.  The military escort is to 
shadow the hijacked flight, to report anything unusual, and to aid in search and rescue in 
the event of an emergency.  Only then would the NMCC seek approval from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for military assistance.  Once approved, orders would then be 
transmitted through NORAD’s chain of command (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).   
The NMCC updated the FAA hijack coordinator who also assisted FAA centers in 
their coordination with the military.  FAA traffic control facilities, along with radars 
helped NORAD track the hijacked aircraft.  These protocols, though, did not plan for the 
possibility of an intercept.  The protocol assumed that figher escort would be discreet, 
vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft where it could 
monitor the aircraft’s flight path (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004).  As outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report, the protocols 
established for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking assumed that: the 
hijacked aircraft would be easily identifiable and would not attempt to dissapear, there 
would be time to address the problem through appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of 
command, and hijackings would take the traditional form, in that they would not be 
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suicide missions designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.  As concluded in 
the 9/11 commission report, these previously established protocols were unsuited for the 
events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001 (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).     
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. COLLABORATION AND KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION (CKI) 
PROGRAM 
In recent years, modern warfare trends have caused National Defense Policy to 
transition away from focusing on large-scale battles fought by independent platforms, to 
confronting unique scenarios requiring a rapid response by increasingly mobile, coalition 
forces.  Associated challenges in team decision making have emerged along with this 
policy shift, including distributed, joint command level, crisis-driven decision making.  
Success in this environment requires a renewed focus on understanding the human ability 
to perform complex and collaborative analysis and decision making under severe time 
pressure (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human 
Performance Division).  The mission of ONR is: “to foster, plan, facilitate and transition 
scientific research in recognition of its paramount importance to enable future naval 
power and the preservation of national security" (ONR, History & Mission of ONR).  
With the knowledge that accomplishing this mission means recognizing the evolving 
nature of modern warfare and policy, ONR organizes U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ 
science and technology programs, one of which is the CKI program. 
The objective of the CKI program is to better understand cognitive processes 
employed by team members when responding to one-of-a-kind complex, information-rich 
problems, and improve the effectiveness of team decision making to solve unique, time-
sensitive problems.  ONR’s interest in team collaboration research focuses on a cognitive 
perspective, aiming to develop cognitive science-based tools, models, and interfaces to 
provide common situational awareness to a diverse, distributed team collaborating to 
decide on a course of action (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department 
(Code 34), Human Performance Division).  Through the CKI program, ONR hopes to 
create new operator interfaces with supporting automated systems, allowing teams to 




warfighting effectiveness by refining its understanding of team knowledge sharing (ONR, 
Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance 
Division).  
B. COGNITION 
In general terms, cognition refers to the way individual minds, groups, and 
organizations of varying size develop concepts (Cognition, Merriam-Webster).  
Cognition includes the mental processes that humans engage in to gain knowledge, 
remember concepts, judge situations, and attempt to solve problems.  Higher level 
functions of the human brain fall under the concept of cognition.  These functions 
include, but are not limited to, spoken language, imagination, perception, and planning 
(Cognition, Wikipedia).  Perception, introspection, memory, imagination, conception, 
belief, emotions and reasoning are all examples of cognitive processes.  There are several 
levels of cognition which attempt to explain all of the different things humans can do 
with their minds, including metacognition, microcognition and macrocognition 
(Donaldson and Johnson, 2008).   
1. Metacognition 
Metacognition refers to the way humans think, process information and perform 
cognitive tasks.  Researchers initially began to study metacognition in teams in the early 
1990s.  The September 11, 2001 attacks inspired real-world studies of metacognition 
within groups and teams, focusing on human reaction and performance under stress 
(Donaldson and Johnson, 2008).  One important notion within metacognition is 
metamemory, the concept of how familiar humans are with what they remember.  In 
group situations, accurate memory performance is essential to team success (Salas and 
Fiore, 2004).  Two factors that contribute to group recognition and memory performance 
are consensus and correctness (Hinsz, 1990).  The consensus factor demonstrates the 
willingness of the team to choose a similar or alternative outcome.  The correctness factor 
demonstrates that collaborating groups are more likely to choose the correct alternative.  
Existing research on team problem solving is consistent with the idea of the correctness 
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factor, in that it shows that, when collaborating, groups are more likely to choose a 
correct response than they are to choose an incorrect response (Laughlin, 1980). 
2. Macrocognition and Microcognition 
Macrocognition refers to the way human cognition occurs in realistic decision-
making situations, and is defined as the internalized and externalized high-level mental 
processes employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, unique, 
collaborative problem solving situations.  Simply stated, macrocognition decribes the 
way cognition emerges in natural environments (Letsky et al., 2007).  Conceptually, 
macrocognition provides a framework for comprehending cognitive processes and their 
direct influence on task performance (Klein et al., 2000).  Letsky et al., (2007) define the 
term “high-level” as “the process of combining, visualizing, and aggregating information 
to resolve ambiguity in support of the discovery of new knowledge and relationships.”  
Internal processes are defined as high-level mental processes, occurring at either 
the team or individual level, which cannot be expressed through external means (Letsky 
et al., 2007).  These external means include: writing, speaking, and gestures.  Internal 
processes can only be evaluated by qualitative metrics, such as cognitive mapping or 
think out loud protocols or by using alternate quantitative metrics, such as pupil size 
(Letsky et al., 2007).  Externalized processes are defined as high-level mental processes, 
occurring at either the team or individual level, associated with actions that can be 
explicitly observed and measured in a consistent, reliable, repeatable manner (Letsky et 
al., 2007).  Teams in complex environments, collaborating to solve unique problems, 
employ these processes (Fiore, 2007).  Historically, cognitive psychologists have 
conducted contrived experiments, based on puzzle solving and controlled laboratory 
experiments.  These functions are referred to as microcognition, since they investigate the 
processes that are believed to be invariant and serve as the foundation of human 
cognition. 
3. Relevant Terms 
Throughout this document, terms will be used that hold specific meanings in the 
context of the study of cognition.  Here, we provide definitions for a number of these 
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terms, as they relate to team collaboration.  Consensus refers to an opinion or position 
reached by, and agreed upon by, the group as a whole (ONR, Science & Technology: 
Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).  Data refers to a raw 
fact or statement of event, independent of other entities (Bellinger, 2004).  Data may be 
usable, yet still has no significance in and of itself (Ackoff, 1989).  Decision refers to 
making a judgment on an issue that is being considered (ONR, Science & Technology: 
Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).  Decision Making is a 
form of problem solving in which an individual attempts to chose the best course of 
action from a given set of alternatives (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter 
Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). 
Distributed cognition is the cognitive work that is done, not in isolation inside an 
individual’s mind, but among teams, between individuals and artifacts, and over a period 
of time (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human 
Performance Division).  Information refers to data that are processed and deemed to be 
useful (Ackoff, 1989).  The term information implies the understanding of some sort of 
relationship, potentially cause and effect (Bellinger, 2004).  Knowledge refers to the 
deterministic application of data and information, such as memorization (Ackoff, 1989).  
Knowledge implies the recognition of a pattern that provides a high level of predictability 
about what will occur next (Bellinger, 2004).  Knowledge Building is a process, through 
which individuals increase not only their own understanding, but also the team’s 
collective understanding (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 
34), Human Performance Division).  Knowledge Interoperability refers to the exchange 
of relevant, actionable knowledge between team members (Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 
2005). 
Macrocognition in teams refers to the behavior that a team demonstrates when 
working together to solve a complex problem.  It consists of both verbal (team 
discussions and negotiations) and non-verbal (hand gestures, bodily cues, visual aids and 
text messages) actions, and is comprised of several macrocognitive processes (Warner & 
Letsky, 2005).  Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged 
in by individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product.  Team 
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collaboration refers to individuals collaborating to solve a problem or complete an 
intellectual task (Merriam-Webster, 2002).  Team problem solving refers to interactive 
decision-making between several team members with differing fields and levels of 
expertise, aimed at generating creative solutions to defined problems.  The outcome of 
team problem solving is a solution that could not be reached independently by the 
individual team members (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 
34), Human Performance Division). 
Understanding refers to an analytical, cognitive process that synthesizes current 
knowledge with new knowledge, thus supporting the transition from data to information, 
and the transition of information to knowledge (Bellinger, 2004). Understanding implies 
an appreciation of the reasons leading up to a certain event (Ackoff, 1989).  The 
difference between knowledge and understanding is that knowledge implies 
memorization, and understanding implies learning.  Humans with understanding are able 
to execute useful actions by building upon currently held information, knowledge and 
understanding itself.  Artificial intelligence (AI) systems possess understanding to the 
extent that a machine is programmed to be able to synthesize new knowledge from 
previously stored information and knowledge (Bellinger et al., 2004).  Wisdom refers to 
evaluated understanding.  It goes beyond understanding, itself, by giving humans an 
understanding about that which there has previously been no understanding.  It is a 
predictive process, which calls on all previous levels of perception.  Wisdom implies the 
ability to discern between right and wrong, good and bad, and is thus a uniquely human 
state, which cannot be achieved by a machine (Ackoff, 1989). 
4. Using Macrocognition to Understand Complex Cognition 
As previously noted, ONR perceives an increased need to understand how 
individuals and teams work together to plan, think, decide, solve problems, and take 
action as integrated units relying on interconnected and interdependent systems, as 
today’s military teams typically do (Fiore et al., in press).  ONR believes that cognition 
and collaboration in dynamic environments must be studied in great detail in order to be 
fully understood.  These studies have led to the development of theoretical models 
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capable of capturing complex collaborative processes (Fiore et al., in press).  The 
ultimate goal of these theoretical models is to exploit the understanding of human 
decision making in order to gain a military advantage over our adversaries.  
Macrocognition, as opposed to microcognition, describes cognition at a more 
complex level as a means of distinguishing differing levels of cognitive processes.  The 
concept of macrocognition was developed simultaneously in separate disciplines at the 
end of the 20th century.  Macrocognition was described in the cognitive sciences as 
cognitive processes occurring at levels greater than a single processing unit, such as 
communication and reasoning (Fiore et al., in press).  Cognitive engineers used the term 
to describe how cognition emerges when individuals and teams perform realistic tasks in 
natural environments, where complex cognitive processes are known to most often occur 
(Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995).  Psychologists and behavioral scientists have found great 
value in studying macrocognition in the context of team collaboration.  They have been 
and continue to be able to understand important aspects of human cognition and problem 
solving in collaborative settings (Warner et al., 2005). 
C. DATA, INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION (DIK-T) 
Simply stated, the DIK-T process is the combining of data and information to 
create actionable knowledge that did not explicitly exist before the collaboration, which 
can be considered synonymous with the term knowledge building (Sharma, 2008).  This 
process involves more than just those three components, however.  Ackoff, a systems 
theorist and professor of organizational change, classifies the content of the human mind 
into five categories: Data, Information, Knowledge, Understanding and Wisdom 
(Bellinger et al., 2004).  He holds that the first four categories deal only with the past, 
with what is already known, and that wisdom is the only category that deals with the 
future.  Wisdom is evaluated understanding, and incorporates vision and design (Sharma, 
2008).  Wisdom, however, is not easily reached.  Humans must move their minds in order 
through the first four categories to be able to create the future, as opposed to merely 
grasping the events of the present (Ackoff, 1989).  
 27
1. Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) Hierarchy 
Ackoff was not the first, and not the last for that matter, to mention the DIKW 
hierarchy.  The hierarchy is mentioned as early as 1982 in the information science 
domain, when Cleveland pointed to the origin of the hierarchy (Sharma, 2008).  
Surprisingly, the hierarchy’s first mention is neither in the knowledge management nor 
information science field, but in early 20th century poetry (Cleveland, 1982).  
Cleveland names T.S. Eliot as the first to mention the hierarchy in his 1934 poem, "The 
Rock" (Eliot, 1934):  
Where is the Life we have lost in living? 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? 
To this day, researchers struggle to answer those questions.  With Eliot’s 
hierarchy as a starting point, Ackoff’s version points out that information ages most 
quickly, followed closely by knowledge and that understanding only appears to be 
permanent.  Wisdom, however, is truly permanent (Ackoff, 1989), and is most quickly 
achieved in teams.  Conceptions of data, information and knowledge have evolved since 
Eliot wrote his poem in 1934.  However, he was able to point out some very real 
relationships that continue to influence the way researchers approach the study of 
cognition (Hey, 2004). 
2. Knowledge Transfer in Teams 
Modern research on team collaboration aims to uncover truths about cognition by 
harnessing the power of collaboration in teams.  A team is a group of several 
interdependent people who cooperate dynamically and flexibly to achieve a common goal 
(Salas et al., 1992).  Teams can also be considered interdependent collections of 
individuals who share a common goal of achieving specific outcomes for themselves and 
their organization (Sundstrom et al., 1990).  Military and government decision making 
teams are characterized by diverse knowledge, distinct roles, rotating members, and a 
hierarchical command structure (Letsky et al., 2007).  They work in an environment 
distinguished by ambiguous situations with little margin for error (Letsky et al., 2007).  
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Further, military teams have short developmental stages and are comprised of 
heterogeneous team members.  This combination serves to intensify the problems that 
arise during team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007). 
ONR’s focus is to develop ways to expedite military teams’ progression to the top 
of the DIK-T hierarchy.  Military commands are geographically dispersed and support 
locations across the globe, causing most decision making teams to act as ad hoc virtual 
organizations (Socias, 2008).  These hybrid organizations involve many team members at 
several locations with little time to collaborate to make an informed decision, such as the 
NORAD/FAA team analyzed in this thesis.  During its progression through this 
hierarchy, a military decision making team will encounter many obstacles such as 
uncertain circumstances, rapidly unfolding events, and hostility (Elliot et al., 2001). 
Decision makers must be able to work through these obstacles.  Problem solving must be 
geared toward identifying and disregarding inaccurate and unnecessary information in 
order to act on necessary information in a timely manner (Elliot et al., 2001).  Executing 
a rehearsed strategy is challenging enough.  Attempting to execute the plan as situations 
and mental models change, on the other hand, is even more difficult.  It requires constant 
re-evaluation and adjustment of the plan in order for each team member to maintain an 
accurate awareness of the situation.   
D. DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
Decision making in groups of several members or organizations presents the 
unique challenge of arriving at a decision based upon the input of multiple individuals 
(Lahti, 1996).  There are various styles that describe the processes groups use to decide 
upon the best course of action.  This section mentions several of these models, relevant to 
team collaboration.  In order to compare and contrast each decision making model, we 
will refer to the notion of interests, which are formed by an individual's organizational 
task, career and personal life.  In any group decision making situation, the different 
participating individuals, and organizations, often have differing interests which they 
wish to pursue (Morgan, 1996). 
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1. The Rational Model 
The rational model, also referred to as the classical model, focuses on the manner 
in which decisions ought to be made, and is the baseline against which other models are 
compared (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989).  It focuses on objectives, alternatives, consequences 
and optimality.  This model assumes that the decision maker, which can be an individual 
or team, is made aware of all of the available information required to make a decision.  
The decision maker then considers all possible alternatives with objectives in mind, and 
selects the best possible decision. The rational model presumes that the decision maker is 
completely rational and searches for a decision using a planned, orderly, and consistent 
process.  This process must proceed, in order, through the following steps: problem 
identification, development of criteria against which all potential solutions can be 
evaluated, identification of alternative courses of action, evaluation of these alternatives, 
selection and implementation of the best alternative (Lahti, 1996). 
2. The Administrative Model 
The administrative model, also referred to as the behavioral model, focuses on the 
manner in which decisions are actually made, in situations where the decision makers do 
not possess all of the information needed to make a decision.  Similar to the rational 
model, the decision making proceeds sequentially and the alternatives are examined one 
at a time.  However, in this model, the first satisfactory alternative that is found is chosen.  
Decision makers’ individual experience, or lack thereof, and capabilities, along with 
limitations on information processing and resources, act as constraints to the decision 
making process (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008).  Thus, the decision maker seeks to 
simplify the problem.  Within the simplified model that the decision maker has created, 
this model assumes the decision maker identifies and examines a limited assortment of 
highly visible, previously tested, easily accessed alternatives.  The decision maker then 
selects one of the alternatives which they deem satisfactory to the extent that it meets the 
minimum criteria for a desired solution (Lahti, 1996). 
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3. The Implicit Favorite Model 
The implicit favorite model focuses on describing the manner in which decisions 
are actually made, as well.  In this model, decision making is essentially a process of 
substantiating a choice or decision that the decision maker has already made in an 
intuitive and unscientific manner.  In this model, the decision maker seeks to simplify the 
decision making process, a recurring theme among these models, by identifying an 
"implicit favorite".  The decision maker does so before the alternatives are evaluated, 
often subconsciously, rendering themselves neither rational nor unbiased (Donaldson & 
Johnson, 2008).  After choosing a favorite solution, the decision maker will attempt to 
appear rational and unbiased by developing decision criteria and by identifying and 
evaluating various alternatives in a subjective fashion, in order to ensure that the favorite 
solution emerges superior.  Thus, it can justifiably be selected as the best solution (Lahti, 
1996). 
4. The Political Model 
The political model focuses on describing another manner through which 
decisions are actually made.  The political model considers the preconceived notions that 
decision-makers bring to the table in the decision-making process, such as the interests 
that motivate them.  Since the group members have different agendas, they need to 
negotiate with each other.  As in the implicit favorite model, the decision maker is 
irrational and biased (Lahti, 1996).  The process involves bargaining among the decision 
makers, through which each individual or entity attempts to influence the team, as a 
whole, to agree with their chosen solution (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989).  Once the more 
powerful decision makers have been persuaded to support a particular alternative, the less 
powerful members of the decision making team typically consent.  This model is based 
on personal influence and negotiation, and often involves withholding information in 
order to better relate a given perspective, but the associated bargaining and social 




by personal agendas, which may prevent the selection of the best solution.  Only by 
acknowledging the human propensity to push these personal agendas, can potential 
problems and conflicts be foreseen and minimized (Lahti, 1996).  
5. The Emotional Model 
The emotional model, suggests that human emotions are essential to rational 
decision making.  Since emotions are generally regarded as irrational occurrences, and 
are thought to cloud judgment, this model has often been ignored by researchers.  Recent 
research suggests that emotions act as indicators in our memory, which allow humans to 
associate them, positively or negatively, with a prospective decision (Thagard & Barnes, 
1996).  Unlike the rational and political models, the emotional model is most applicable 
when teams are faced with high technical uncertainty and forced to make decisions in 
rapidly changing environments.  In this context of an assortment of possibly occurring 
outcomes, the value of rational analysis is reduced (Courtney, 2001).  The benefit of this 
process is that it allows groups to draw upon their collective psychological assets to make 
decisions based on more than just the facts.  However, the danger in this process is 
groupthink, which is characterized by team members making a decision together that they 
would not make individually, based purely on emotion (Thagard & Barnes, 1996).  
Interestingly enough, these dangers are best mitigated by exercising greater emotional 
aptitude (Goleman, 1995). 
6. The Anarchy Model 
The anarchy model, also referred to as the garbage can model, addresses the 
situation in which a group faces not only external uncertainty, but also internal conflict.  
Under these circumstances, the decision making process becomes anarchy, which does 
not follow a linear progression.  This model describes the manner in which organizations 
are often combining “garbage cans” of randomly assorted problems and alternatives 
(Beach, 1997).  These situations are rare and truly ambiguous (Courtney, 2001).  This 
model does not adequately address the entire decision making process, but does illustrate 
that order can come out of chaos (Beach, 1997). 
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7. Reflection on Decision-Making Models 
 The study of group decision making is both a science and an art form.  The 
rational and political models are easily applied to most planned decision-making 
situations.  Conversely, the emotional and anarchy models are best suited to confronting 
unplanned decision-making situations.  However, researchers have yet to reach a 
consensus on decision-making (Beach, 1997).   Reflecting on currently used decision-
making processes is a good start, but the understanding of team collaboration can only 
reach the next level by encouraging mutual trust, common vision and motivation 
(Courtney, 2001).  
E. THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR) MODEL OF TEAM 
COLLABORATION 
Team collaboration is becoming increasingly dynamic, especially in a military 
context, allowing communication flow to follow virtually any path.  Cognitive processes 
within each stage of collaboration are represented at two levels: metacognitive, guiding 
the overall problem solving process, and macrocognitive, supporting team member 
activities within the respective collaboration stage.  Additionally, there are verbal and 
non-verbal communication mechanisms, used to develop the metacognitive and 
macrocognitive processes (Warner et al., 2005).  
The ONR model of team collaboration focuses on macrocognitive processes.  
Microcognitive processes are not emphasized, since there are limited metrics for 
measuring microcognitive team processes, such as information and neural-cognitive 
processing.  However, measuring verbal protocols and team communications allow for 
the empirical assessment of macrocognitive level activities, such as knowledge building, 
knowledge interoperability, shared team understanding, and team negotiation to reach 
team consensus (Warner et al., 2005). 
Over the years, there have been several incarnations of the model.  However, the 
model evaluated in this thesis consists of five phases: Individual Knowledge Building, 
Team Knowledge Building, Internalized Team Knowledge, Externalized Team 
Knowledge, and Team Problem Solving Outcomes; each with several associated 
 33
collaborative macrocognitive processes.  The model focuses on the manner in which 
teams build new knowledge within a problem solving context, at the individual and team 
levels, as they move through these phases.  New knowledge is viewed as the product of 
the team’s collaboration, positioned within a particular problem solving situation.  
Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged in by 
individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product (SUMMIT, 2008).  
The processes begin with input, which is the initial information that a team receives, 
informing them of the task at hand and its desired outcome.  Contributing factors include: 
time constraints, changing information, technology, team configurations and the tasks 
involved. 
There is an additional sixth phase, or macrocognitive process category, which is 
essential for describing team collaboration during real-world events.  This additional 
macrocognitive process emerged during previous research when other task domains were 
analyzed (Hutchins et al., 2008).  These other problem-solving situations were MIO, air 
warfare and firefighting scenarios.  This phase addresses team members’ critical need to 
tell another team member to take a specific course of action (Hutchins et al., 2008).  
Decision to Take Action (DTA) is the additional macrocognitive process, which consists 
of a team member issuing an order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to 
Take Action (RTA).  Understanding the difference between the two requires an 
understanding of the severity of the action to be taken, as well as the relationship between 
the team member issuing the order and the team member receiving the order (Donaldson 
& Johnson, 2008).  RTAs occur between two team members of similar rank or status, and 
the outcome of the action is typically not critical to the scenario outcome.  The outcome 
of most COAs is, however, critical to the scenario outcome.  Consequently, a COA order 
is typically given by a superior team member to a junior team member (Hutchins et al., 
2008). 
The six phases of the model seem chronological in nature, and in many cases they 
are.  However, especially during an extended scenario, it is possible for a team or 
individual to move from an early phase to a later phase and vice versa.  In these cases, it 
is also possible for teams to skip phases, entirely.  Since team thought processes and 
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collaborative efforts are both parallel and continuous, the model and the cognitive 
processes will likely continue to evolve as researchers continue to study the cognitive 
processes involved in team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007).  Additionally, several of 
the macrocognitive processes used in this thesis were modified by: altering, excluding 
and adding several macrocognitive process definitions.  Justification for these 
modifications can be found in the Chapter IV of this thesis.  Explanations and examples 
of each macrocognitive process can be found, in their original verbiage, under the 
applicable cognitive phase below (SUMMIT, 2008).  
1. Individual Knowledge Building Processes 
The first phase of team collaboration involves Individual Knowledge Building 
Processes, which begin with an initial input of data or information and focuses on team 
members acting individually to use that input to build their own task knowledge.  The 
metacognitive processes occurring during this phase are highlighted by each team 
member becoming aware that, in order to solve the collaborative problem, knowledge 
needs to be developed from data and information.  Actions that team members engage in 
during this stage include, but are not limited to, reading, beginning to form mental 
models and accessing electronic displays (SUMMIT, 2008).  All of the macrocognitive 
processes in the Individual Knowledge Building phase focus on supporting the 
development of individual and team knowledge, which will be put to use in future phases 
of team collaboration to develop solution alternatives (Bellinger, 2004).  Below are the 
applicable macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008). 
a. Individual Information Gathering  
Individual information gathering involves actions individuals engage in to 
add to their existing knowledge such as reading, asking questions, accessing displays, etc.  
Measurement methods include eye-tracking, communication audio, computer-generated 
messages and searches, asking behavior logged by experimenter on collaboration logger.  
Possible indices include the ‘depth and breadth’ of information seeking behaviors (e.g., 
searching for an appropriate vehicle for a given objective or searching for the location of 
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a needed personnel resource); dwell times in ‘areas of interest’.  For example, team 
member studies the personal as well as collaborative maps which display the waypoints 
where resources may be held. 
b. Individual Information Synthesis  
Individual information synthesis involves comparing relationships among 
information, context, and artifacts to develop actionable knowledge.  Measurement 
methods include information relationship density, nodal linkages, concept maps, 
similarity among knowledge objects; post-performance debrief/questionnaire, written or 
verbal probes during scenario.  Possible indices include nature of connectedness between 
concepts, quantity of connections between concepts.  For example, the Humanitarian 
Personnel Specialist synthesizes information about the different personnel he is in charge 
of and about the objective of the first operation into a set of criteria of what resources he 
should send to which grid. 
c. Knowledge Object Development 
Knowledge object development involves creation of cognitive artifacts 
that represent actionable knowledge for the task.  Measurement methods include analysis 
of created notes, diagrams, tables, sketches.  Possible indices include quantity of 
diagrams/tables, structure of diagrams/tables, number of pushpins created, and relation 
between pushpins.  For example, the Air Vehicle Specialist creates a table on a document 
outlining the three most appropriate means for moving parcels to zone 3A and provides it 
to the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist so that they may refer to it when planning how 
to get parcels to pickup zones. 
2. Team Knowledge Building Processes 
The majority of collaboration occurs during the next phase, Team Knowledge 
Building, where team members begin to collectively construct team knowledge 
(Bellinger, 2004).  The Team Knowledge Building phase includes actions taken by 
teammates to communicate data, information and knowledge with the intent of 
transforming that information into actionable knowledge (SUMMIT, 2008).  The 
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metacognitive processes occurring during this phase involve team members sharing and 
integrating knowledge, so that the team can come up with a common representation of 
the problem (Bellinger, 2004).  Changes in the collective mental representation of the 
problem can begin to occur as the team gains more complete understanding of the 
problem’s elements, goals and overlooked information (McComb, 2005).  The 
macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on supporting the development of team 
situational awareness.  Although the focus is different, many of the macrocognitive 
processes occurring in this stage are similar to those occurring in the Individual 
Knowledge Building phase.  Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive 
processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008). 
a. Team Information Exchange 
Team information exchange involves passing relevant information to the 
appropriate teammates at the appropriate times.  Possible indices include quality, amount, 
flow/sequencing, and timing of information exchanged; anticipation ratio (i.e., the ratio 
of passing to asking behavior) collected from the collaboration logger.  For example, 
during the discussion of where to establish the land base, the Military Personnel 
Specialist points out that the land base location suggested by other team members is 
extremely far from any military personnel, which may be critical to completing mission. 
b. Team Knowledge Sharing 
Team knowledge sharing involves explanations and interpretations shared 
between team members or with the team as a whole. These explanations may be 
augmented by graphic visualizations on shared workspaces.  Possible indices include 
quality, amount, flow/sequencing, and timing of knowledge exchanged, percentage of 
teammates sharing knowledge.  For example, the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist posts 
pushpins (i.e., information memos) on the shared map that highlight for all team members 
where resources such as pallets and humanitarian workers are located. 
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c. Team Solution Option Generation 
Team solution option generation describes offering potential solutions to a 
problem.  Possible indices include the number of potential options offered, the percentage 
of teammates offering options, the timing of option generation, and solutions generated in 
proportion to total communications.  For example, the team develops specific options 
regarding the transportation of supplies from the base to a grid where it is needed. 
d. Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 
Team evaluation and negotiation of alternatives describes clarifying and 
discussing the pros and cons of potential solution options. This could include clarifying 
pieces of information, verbally simulating the ripple effects of offered alternatives, or 
attempting to persuade other teammates regarding the relative efficacy of alternatives.  
Possible indices include the number of clarifications requested and provided, the number 
of supporting information points and/or conflicting information points offered per 
solution ultimately chosen; percentage of teammates who participated in the evaluation of 
alternatives; flow pattern of communication among members regarding evaluation of 
alternatives; and degree of following behavior within a team communication.  For 
example, after the transportation specialist suggests that even though the helicopter at the 
base is more expensive to operate it can still deliver the supplies faster than the helicopter 
on the carrier, the team discusses the pros and cons of either option, such as what the 
impact of each option is on the refugees. 
e. Team Process and Plan Regulation 
Team process and plan regulation involves discussing or critiquing the 
team’s knowledge building process or plan following feedback on its effectiveness.  
Possible indices include the number of times a critique is offered, the percentage of 
teammates contributing to the critique or re-evaluation of the team’s plan, and the timing 
of regulation or replanning efforts.  For example, after completing one operation, the 




vehicle specialist adamantly states that the cost of the airplane far exceeds what they 
would spend on higher reliability weather reports. Team members unanimously agree to 
purchase the highest reliability information possible in all subsequent planning. 
3. Internalized Team Knowledge 
The Internalized Team Knowledge phase deals with the collective knowledge 
held in the individual minds of team members (SUMMIT, 2008).  The metacognitive 
process occurring during this stage is highlighted by the team’s awareness of obvious 
knowledge overlap.  The macrocognitive processes in this stage focus on supporting the 
team in fostering a common understanding and common goals (Bellinger, 2004).  Below 
are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage 
(SUMMIT, 2008). 
a. Team Knowledge Similarity 
Team Knowledge Similarity can involve the degree to which differing 
roles understand one another (e.g., how well a land/sea vehicle specialist understands a 
humanitarian specialist), or how well the team members understand the critical goals and 
locations of important resources (shared situation awareness).  Team Knowledge 
Similarity is indexed as an average distance score, a correlation, or percentage of 
agreement.  Specific Forms include: (1) Task mental model similarity: The degree to 
which teammates’ mental models of relatively stable task characteristics (e.g., equipment, 
procedures) converge (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993); (2) Team interaction 
knowledge similarity: The degree to which teammates’ knowledge of their relatively 
stable positional roles, interdependencies and interaction patterns converge. This is 
referred to in the shared mental model literature as team interaction mental models 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993); (3) Teammate knowledge similarity: The degree to which 
teammates’ mental models of one another’s relatively stable levels of skill, knowledge, 
experience, dispositions and/or habits converge. This dimension is referred to in the 
shared mental model literature as shared mental models of teammates (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993) and in the transactive memory literature as teammate knowledge consensus 
(Austin, 2003); (4) Shared situation awareness: The degree to which teammates’ 
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awareness and interpretation of moment-to-moment changes in their collective situation 
converge. This can also be evaluated by determining critical landmarks or by inserting 
perturbations and then observing team member interaction in response to this.  This 
construct has been defined previously by Cooke et al. (2001), Endsley (1995), and Stout 
et al. (1994). 
b. Team Knowledge Resources 
Team members’ collective understanding of resources/responsibilities 
associated with the task. This could be examined through a performance assessment 
survey given to all members of the team at the end of each operation. Each individual 
team member would respond as to the relevant knowledge they have via paper and pencil 
method. Then, the whole team would be asked what relevant knowledge the team as a 
whole knew. This could also be examined through visual analysis of the eye tracking 
videos in conjunction with an assessment of the plan. If a team ember did not see a 
critical and relevant piece of information, then that could lead them to make a plan that 
was not optimal and would then lead the team to receive a lower score on their plan. 
Team Knowledge Resources can be indexed as a sum or average of all 
team members’ knowledge, or as a percentage of the relevant knowledge (defined a priori 
as the criterion space) that is held by at least one team member.  Specific forms include: 
(1) Task knowledge stock: Accurate task-relevant knowledge held by team members. 
This would include knowledge about task strategy and equipment. This dimension is 
included within the components of transactive memory (Austin, 2003) and is referred to 
as task mental model accuracy within the shared mental model literature (Cooke et al., 
2001; Rouse et al., 1992); (2) Interpositional knowledge: Accurate knowledge regarding 
position-specific roles, goals, responsibilities, access to information, constraints, and 
interdependencies with other team positions. This dimension is referred to as team 
interaction mental model accuracy within the mental model literature and as 
interpositional knowledge within the general team literature (Volpe et al., 1996); (3) 
Recognition of teammate expertise: Total amount of accurate knowledge regarding 
teammates’ expertise and behavioral habits. This dimension is referred to in the literature 
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on transactive memory as teammate knowledge accuracy (Austin, 2003), in the literature 
on shared mental models as teammate mental model accuracy (Mathieu et al., 2005; 
Rouse et al., 1992), and in the schema literature as teammate schema accuracy (Rentsch, 
1993); (4) Individual situation awareness: Accurate awareness of moment to moment 
changes in the team’s environment. The construct has been defined previously by 
Endsley (1995). 
4. Externalized Team Knowledge 
During the Externalized Team Knowledge phase, all information has been 
analyzed, in some form or another, by team members, and they concentrate on refining 
the accuracy and completeness of their collective knowledge.  During this phase, after all 
individual knowledge has been openly shared, the team’s representation of the problem 
ceases to evolve.  All components of the shared knowledge not agreed upon have been 
disregarded, leaving a more accurate and only relevant view of the problem at hand.  It is 
interesting to note the degree to which a team’s problem representation has matured 
through the problem solving process up to this point.  The metacognitive process 
occurring during this phase is highlighted by the team’s awareness that the final solution 
option must meet the problem solving goals.  The macrocognitive processes in this phase 
focus on aiding the entire team in choosing the optimal solution option in the context of 
achieving the ultimate goal (Bellinger, 2004).  Below are the applicable collaborative 
macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008). 
a. Externalized Cue-strategy Associations 
Externalized cue-strategy associations describe the team’s collective 
agreement as to their task strategies and the situational cues that modify those strategies 
(and how).  Possible indices include the percent or number of cues explicitly planned for 
and the quality of those cue-strategy associations.  For example, linkages between 
weather data and resources appropriate for use in certain weather conditions. 
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b. Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis 
Pattern recognition and trend analysis is the accuracy of the patterns or 
trends explicitly noted by members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged 
by other team members.  Possible indices include the number or percent of trends and 
task related patterns collectively agreed upon that are correct or incorrect, or the amount 
of time needed to correctly agree upon those patterns or trends.  For example, there is an 
optimal plan that can be determined based on cost and resources moved. If the air 
specialist creates a route for an aircraft to leave a carrier, go over to a site to pick up 
personnel, and then drop them off in another location, it could be considered a pattern, 
especially if it is not challenged by the other members of the team. 
c. Uncertainty Resolution 
Uncertainty resolution is the degree to which a team has collectively 
agreed upon the status of problem variables (e.g., hostile/friendly).  Possible indices 
include the number or percentage of problem variables in which a team-level assessment 
has been agreed upon and that assessment is correct or incorrect, the amount of time 
needed to correctly agree upon those assessments; or the nature of “consensus” events 
logged by experimenter.  For example, the resolution of the plan, and the individual 
components of the plan, would be an example of uncertainty resolution. Each team 
member is responsible for his or her resources, but also for communicating with 
teammates to move those resources to their respective locations. At first, there is a certain 
degree of uncertainty about the best method to move those resources, and it is the job of 
the team members to resolve that and come to a consensus with their plan they submit. 
5. Team Problem Solving Outcomes 
During the Team Problem Solving Outcomes phase, the team compares the 
solution option they selected with the problem solving goal.  The team is then able to 
refine the chosen solution option to fully meet the goal (Bellinger, 2004).  This phase 
serves to ensure that the team’s solution effectively, expeditiously and efficiently meets 
the criteria for problem resolution.  The final output simply marks the accomplishment of 
the assigned task.  The model of team collaboration was designed to study how a team 
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functioned through all of the collaboration stages, not to appraise the output of the 
collaboration process in any way.  The metacognitive process occurring during this stage 
is highlighted by the team’s assessment of the quality of their solution or plan (SUMMIT, 
2008).  The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on aiding the entire team in 
evaluating their chosen solution option in the context of achieving the ultimate goal 
(Bellinger, 2004).  Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in 
their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008). 
a. Quality of Plan (Problem Solving Solution) 
Quality of plan (problem solving solution) involves the degree to which 
the solution adopted by a problem solving team achieves a resolution to the problem 
(e.g., limit fatalities, limit destruction).  Measurement methods include the output from 
function hooks in the program that shows number of objectives achieved (e.g., 67 
refugees out of 100 rescued) at end of operation.  Possible indices include the number of 
objectives completed, quality of the resolution to a problem.  For example, each operation 
has an objective to complete, for example, rescuing a certain number of refugees from a 
particular zone.  The percentage of refugees actually extracted from this zone would 
show the quality of a plan in regards to its problem solving solution.  If one team rescues 
all 100 refugees and another only 80, then the first team has a higher quality plan in terms 
of solving the problem.  However, efficiency remains a factor (see below). 
b. Efficiency of Planning Process 
Efficiency of planning process describes the amount of time it takes a 
problem solving team to arrive at a successful resolution to a problem.  Measurement 
methods include the operation time provided by the master control panel; anticipation 
ratios, number of interactions.  Possible indices include the length of the problem solving 
process.  For example, a team that requires 32 minutes for planning vs. a team that 
quickly plans and inputs in 17 minutes showcases a strong difference in planning 
efficiency, assuming their output remains high quality. 
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c. Efficiency of Plan Execution 
Efficiency of plan execution describes the quality of the plan (e.g., number 
of lives saved) divided by the amount of resources used to accomplish this and the 
amount of time the plan takes to unfold.  Measurement methods include functions in the 
simulation that provide data on number of resources spent per planning phase and the 
impact on civilian population.  Possible indices include all financial costs associated with 
the plan including labor (that is, time a plan becomes executed until the accomplishment 
of plan objectives multiplied by resources—man hours, gas, etc.).  For example, the 
quality of a plan utilizing a high amount of unnecessary air travel to consolidate 
humanitarian aid parcels will likely be much lower than one that uses efficient ground 
travel to consolidate parcels to a single pick-up point for the expensive air vehicle. The 
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IV. METHOD 
A. CODING PROCESS 
This thesis empirically evaluates the model of team collaboration developed by 
the ONR sponsored CKI Program, using the real-world team collaboration domain of the 
September 11, 2001, NEADS / FAA MCC Operations channel 3 transcript.  For this 
research, we applied the macrocognitive process definitions to the team communications 
in the transcript, to determine whether these definitions accurately represent how teams 
collaborate to make real-world decisions, or if the model is more suitable for analyzing 
controlled, laboratory situations.  Additionally, this chapter provides suggestions for 
enhancements and additions to the existing list of macrocognitive process definitions. 
Using definitions included in the model of team collaboration, each coder 
independently coded 2,278 utterances from 1,710 speech turns, contained in the 
transcript.  Once the individual coding was complete, the coders met in the presence of 
the thesis advisor to compare and discuss each other’s classification of every speech turn.  
In cases where the coders agreed on an appropriate code to be applied to a speech turn, no 
discussion was necessary.  When the coders disagreed, each coder would then supply the 
reason behind their coding decision.  Then, the coders would either agree on a final code 
for that speech turn, marking that code in the “FINAL” category of the transcript table, 
located in Appendix A of this thesis.  Codes that are bolded in any of the columns of the 
table indicate that one coder was persuaded by the other to change his assessment of a 
given speech turn. 
1. Unnecessary Separation 
During the coding process, the coders used two very different approaches to 
analyze each speech turn.  Coder one was inclined to break down each speech turn into 
separate utterances, each having its own code.  Coder two had a different approach, 
which was equally thorough.  However, coder two often felt that that separating each 
speech turn into several utterances was unnecessary.  In the example below, coder one 
separated the Miscellaneous (MISC) utterance and coded the subsequent utterance as 
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Team Information Exchange (TIE).  Coder two felt that it was unnecessary to break out 
the MISC utterance, as it had no bearing on the overall intent of the speaker, and coded 
the entire speech turn as TIE.  In each case, both coders categorized the intent of the 
speech turn with an identical code.  In cases where one coder separated a speech turn into 
two utterances and the other coder did not, the code Unnecessary Separation (US) was 
placed in that coder’s column in the table.  For those utterances, the coder who had not 
assigned a code tended to agree with the coder who had.  In every case, both coders 
eventually reached agreement on the final code for the speech turn, as a whole. 
Table 1.   Example of Unnecessary Separation Coding 








Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo, 
Foxtrot.  9900, copy.  MISC US MISC 
     One is going to Bangor - Correct.  Gold 99.  TIE TIE TIE 
 
B. MODIFYING COGNITIVE PROCESS CODES AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Additions to the Model 
The model and its macrocognitive processes have been revised by the CKI 
program (Letsky et al., 2007).  In view of that fact, several codes were added for this 
analysis.  As mentioned in Chapter III, we have added the Decision to Take Action 
(DTA) macrocognitive process coding category, consisting of team members issuing an 
order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to Take Action (RTA), based 
on research conducted by Hutchins & Kendall (2008, in press).  Since we are analyzing 
communications from a military organization where issuing and implementing orders is a 
critical element of task completion, the addition of these codes is both appropriate and 
necessary (Hutchins et al., 2008).   
2. Modifications to the Model 
Several of the codes used in this thesis were modified by altering their definitions.  
Several of the definitions did not indicate how or when the macrocognitive process 
 47
should be used as a code to categorize speech turns.  Instead, the majority of those 
definitions called for a calculation that would need to have been taken at prescribed 
intervals during the course of the recorded event.  While these calculations are valuable 
to understanding team performance, they are not valuable as codes intended to categorize 
individual transactions.   
Under the Team Knowledge Building phase of the model, we shortened the 
definition of Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis (PRTA) to read: “patterns 
communicated among team members,” as opposed to reading: “number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and accuracy of 
the patterns.”  The definition was shortened, because we used the code to identify single 
instances of pattern recognition or trend analysis.  Identifying the number of patterns and 
the time taken to detect those patterns, as well as the accuracy of the patterns as a metric, 
adds value to cognitive research, but it must be done separately from the coding process.   
3. Omissions from the Model 
Several definitions were clearly designed for use in controlled, laboratory 
experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, real-world scenario. 
This is the case because during an actual event, it is impossible to administer a pre-and-
post-event questionnaire. Some of the cognitive processes that appeared more relevant to 
laboratory settings, on the other hand, could be tailored to real-world scenarios.  
Principally, the definitions of those codes requiring a calculation were modified, and 
those that were completely dependent on calculations were eliminated.  However, this is 
not evidence that these definitions should be excluded from the model, but simply that 
they were not applicable for the type of data produced by this real-world event. 
Under the Individual Knowledge Building Processes phase, Knowledge Object 
Development was not applicable because we relied on the transcribed communications, 
alone, as our basis for analysis.  We simply had no way of knowing if any team member 
created cognitive artifacts that represented actionable knowledge for the task (i.e. there 
was no indication of this process occurring in the transcript).  Under the Team Knowledge 
Building Processes phase, Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives did not 
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apply, because no team member verbally simulated the ripple effects of offered 
alternatives.  Our goal was to simply identify, not calculate, the number of clarifications 
requested and provided; number of supporting information points and/or conflicting 
information points offered per solution ultimately chosen; or the percentage of teammates 
who participated in the evaluation of alternatives.  Team Process and Plan Regulation 
(TPPR), also under the Team Knowledge Building Processes phase, was not applicable to 
this scenario either.  During the time period covered by the transcript, the NEADS / FAA 
team were not given any feedback on the effectiveness of any of their plans. 
Under the Internalized Team Knowledge phase, Team Knowledge Similarity and 
its four subcomponents were excluded from our analysis, due to the fact that they all 
require a measure of degree to which differing roles understand one another, and that was 
not possible to asses from the transcript.  Two subcomponents of Team Knowledge 
Resources, also under the Internalized Team Knowledge phase, were not applicable. The 
first, Task Knowledge Stock was excluded from our analysis, because we had no way of 
measuring transactive memory.  The second, Recognition of Teammate Expertise was 
excluded, again because we were unable to measure the total amount of accurate 
knowledge regarding teammates’ expertise and behavioral habits.  
All three of the macrocognitive processes in the Team Problem Solving Outcomes 
phase were excluded, for a number of reasons.  Primarily, the team did not reach that 
cognitive stage during the portion of the transcript that was analyzed. Had the team 
reached that stage, it is still beyond the purpose of this thesis to assess the degree to 
which the team’s solution effectively met the criteria for problem resolution, the 
efficiency with which the plan did so, and the speed with which the team generated their 
plan. For many real-world tasks, such as NORAD collaborating with the FAA, 
performance assessment metrics are not available and their development is outside the 
scope of this research. 
 49
C. MEASURING INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 
1. Inter-rater Reliability 
Inter-rater reliability, the degree of agreement between raters, is used to refine 
tools given to human evaluators by determining if a particular system is appropriate for 
measuring a particular variable (Brennan, 1981).  For instance, inter-rater reliability is 
used, in this case, to determine if the level of subjectivity occurring between raters is too 
high, indicating a change is needed. Changes could include refinement of the definitions 
or better training of coders. It provides a score of the degree of concurrence between the 
ratings given by raters, who in this thesis are referred to as Coder 1 and Coder 2.  If raters 
have a high rate of disagreement, then either they require more training on the scale being 
used, or the scale is defective.  Inter-rater reliability can be determined by a number of 
statistics, typically a version of measuring kappa.  Kappa refers to a chance-adjusted 
measure of agreement (Brennan, 1981).  It is considered a more robust measure than 
simply calculating inter-rater agreement percentage, because kappa accounts for the 
agreement occurring by chance.  
2. Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient 
For this analysis, we elected to use Cohen's kappa coefficient, which is the 
appropriate method for measuring categorical inter-rater reliability between two raters 
(Cohen, 1960).  Fleiss’ kappa provides a similar measure of agreement, which would 
have been appropriate if more than two raters existed (Fleiss, 1981).  Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient accounts for the hypothetical probability of chance agreement, using the 
observed data to calculate the likelihood of each observer arbitrarily deciding on each 
available category.  A potentially advantageous criticism of Cohen’s kappa coefficient is 
that it has a tendency to take the frequencies of the observed categories for granted.  
Cohen’s kappa coefficient is considered an overly conservative measure of agreement, 
because it often underestimates the inter-rater agreement over commonly used categories 
(Cohen, 1960).  Additionally, the number of categories affects the magnitude of the value.  
For instance, the fewer the categories, the higher the Cohen’s kappa coefficient will be 
(Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient, Wikipdeia). 
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Cohen's kappa coefficient measures the agreement between two raters, each of 
whom classifies N items—in this case, speech turns from the 9/11 transcript—
into C mutually exclusive categories—in this case, the macrocognitive process categories 
included in the model.  If the two raters are in complete agreement, kappa is equal to 1.  
If the two raters are in complete disagreement, other than what would be anticipated by 
chance, then kappa is equal to 0 (Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient, Wikipedia).  Landis and 
Koch presented the following table for interpreting kappa values, supplying only their 
professional opinions as supporting evidence.  Thus, this table is not universally 
accepted.  However, it is a helpful guideline for interpreting the degree of inter-rater 
agreement indicated by a kappa value arrived at by two given evaluators (Landis & Koch, 
1977).  
Table 2.   Cohen’s Kappa Interpretation (From Landis & Koch, 1977) 
Kappa Interpretation 
<0 No Agreement 
0.0 – 0.20 Slight Agreement 
0.21–0.40 Fair Agreement 
0.41–0.60 Moderate Agreement 
0.61–0.80 Substantial Agreement 




A. CODING RESULTS 
Of the 1,710 speech turns, each of the 2,278 utterances warranted an individual 
code.  Each individual utterance in a speech turn conveyed a specific message and was 
coded as such.  Accordingly, part of a speech turn may have been a miscellaneous 
statement which was not a crucial component of the mission.  However, another utterance 
in the speech turn conveyed a very important message.  Thus, it was important to separate 
each utterance.  In order to properly analyze the cognitive process used by the NEADS 
team members, each coder entered a code for each utterance into a spreadsheet.  The 
coders were then able to compare the given code to each other, thereby determining the 
level of inter-rater reliability and the final code for each utterance for analytical purposes.  
The number of final codes use was 2,278 which included 707 Miscellaneous (MISC) and 
73 utterances that were determined to be Not Codeable (NC).  In the data analysis, the 
MISC and NC codes were used only to determine the frequency of each code used.  
1. Percentage of Code Use 
During analysis of the recorded transcript of channel three on September 11, 
2001, it was discovered that 12 of the 22 (54.5%) macrocognitive process codes were 
used.  Included in the codes used were: Course of Action (COA) and Request to Take 
Action (RTA) under the Decision to Take Action category, but not the MISC or NC 
codes.  As previously stated there were 10 codes not utilized for the analysis of the 
transcript.  However, this is not to say they are not valuable or useful codes, but that they 
simply did not apply to this specific real-world, unplanned event.  
2. Coding Trends 
Team Information Exchange (TIE) was the code most used as it was applied to 
792 of 1498 utterances (52.87%).  This figure is significant because it conveys how much 
information was being shared between team members, often without it being requested.  
While other times, team members needed to be asked for information as demonstrated 
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from the second most used code, Individual Information Gathering (IIG) with 463 out of 
the 1498 utterances (30.91%).  These two codes will often relate to each other in the form 
of a question asked and then answered.  The morning of September 11, 2001, was a very 
chaotic and confusing time.  There were a lot of questions being asked by team members 
to enhance their mental model of the situation.  However, the level of expertise of each 
team member assisted in their ability to disseminate pertinent information to other team 
members.  In other words, their past experience helped them to understand and 
acknowledge which information being passed was crucial to the events that were 
occurring and, therefore, needed to be shared with all involved.  Table 3 shows the 
macrocognitive process codes and their respective percentages, excluding the codes 
MISC, US, and NC. 
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Table 3.   Frequency and Percentage of Macrocognitive Processes Used by NORAD 
and FAA1 
Code Cognitive Process Number Percentage 
  Individual Knowledge Building Process     
IIG Individual Information Gathering 463 30.91 
IIS Individual Information Synthesis 26 1.74 
KOG Knowledge Object Development 0 0 
  Team Knowledge Building     
TIE Team Information Exchange 792 52.87 
TKS Team Knowledge Sharing 56 3.74 
TSOG Team Solution Option Generation 46 3.07 
ENA Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 0 0 
PPR Team Process and Plan Regulation 0 0 
  Internalized Team Knowledge     
TKSim Team Knowledge Similarity 0 0 
TKR Team Knowledge Resources 0 0 
TkKS Task Knowledge Stock 0 0 
IPK Interpositional Knowledge 3 0.2 
RTE Recognition of Teammate Expertise 0 0 
ISA Individual Situation Awareness 25 1.67 
  Externalized Team Knowledge     
ECA Externalized Cue-strategy Associations 1 0.07 
PRTA Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis 1 0.07 
UR Uncertainty Resolution 2 0.13 
  Problem Solving Outcomes     
QoP Quality of Plan 0 0 
EPP Efficiency of Planning Process 0 0 
EPE Efficiency of Planning Execution 0 0 
  Decision to Take Action     
RTA Request to Take Action 64 4.27 
COA Course of Action 19 1.27 
TOTAL   1498 100.01 
1 Excludes the Miscellaneous, Unnecessary Separation, and Not Codeable Codes 
B. DEFINITION INTERPRETATIONS 
During the coding process, we often discussed the interpretation of definitions for 
several macrocognitive processes.  The outcomes of these discussions helped determine 
situations where certain codes were appropriate.  The nature of the problem was such that 
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the team was flooded with continuous information.  New information required the 
decision makers to ask multiple questions, in order to clarify new information and update 
their mental model of the situation.  Under the Individual Knowledge Building phase, we 
used the code Individual Information Gathering (IIG) to classify speech turns in which a 
team member initially asks for or accesses information.  When a team member asked for 
or provided clarification on previously collected information, we classified that speech 
turn as Individual Information Synthesis (IIS).  IIS was also used to classify utterances 
where the speaker was making inferences about information.  In both cases, the code used 
for the response to the question was not the same as the code used for the question.  The 
response was typically coded Team Information Exchange (TIE) or Team Knowledge 
Sharing (TKS), since all team members monitoring channel 3 had access to the answer or 
explanation. 
On a similar note, many definitions require “all team members” to discuss a piece 
of data, information or knowledge.  Since all we had to rely on was an audio transcript, it 
was impossible to know if “all team members” were included in a particular discussion.  
We found that most of the macrocognitive process definitions were neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive.  More specifically, a given utterance could potentially meet the requirements 
to be classified as more than one code.  We determined that there was often a great deal 
of overlap between definitions.  For instance, TIE can be used as a “catch-all” code, since 
generally every utterance contains relevant information being passed between team 
members 
C. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Two coders analyzed the transcript, in order to test the relative subjectivity of the 
coders’ understanding and application of the macrocognitive process definitions included 
in the model.  This inter-rater reliability test, measuring the degree of agreement between 
the two coders, can be used to refine the model’s cognitive process definitions so that any 
coders, trained in applying the model, could reach an adequate level of agreement when 
evaluating a given transcript.  A low score could indicate that the model definitions need 
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to be refined or that the coders need additional training in applying the model.  The test 
further determines that the model is appropriate for evaluating a real-world team 
collaboration scenario, such as the one observed in this thesis.   
Inter-rater reliability was determined by Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, which 
provided a score referring to the concurrence in the ratings given by the two coders.  
Analysis of the initial independent coding by each coder yielded a Cohen’s Kappa 
Coefficient of 0.77.  As previously mentioned, fewer categories imply a higher Cohen’s 
Kappa Coefficient.  In this case, excluding MISC, NC, US, DTA (COA) and DTA(RTA), 
we categorized the speech turns in the transcript into only 10 of the model’s 22 
macrocognitive process codes.  Since less than 50 percent of the model’s macrocognitive 
process codes were employed, we contend that our analysis consisted of a relatively low 
number of categories.  This assertion contributes to our relatively high Cohen’s Kappa 
Coefficient.   
According to Landis and Koch (1977), the coefficient achieved by the two coders 
can be interpreted to mean that the two coder’s agreement is substantial.  Along with the 
high inter-rater reliability kappa score, this indicates that the macrocognitive process 
definitions used by the coders are both objective and applicable to real-world decision-
making domains.  However, those definitions that the coders agreed to disregard, because 
they did not apply when analyzing team communications from a real-world event, should 
potentially be clarified for future applications.  Coder 1 and coder 2 engaged in numerous 
discussions in order to come to an agreement as to how the individual codes should be 
used.  It was observed that as the coding process progressed, the coders became more 
familiar with each other’s interpretation and application of the macrocognitive process 
definitions.  Thus, the frequency of disagreements, which was initially higher, decreased 
as the coders continued to apply the model to the transcript.  Ultimately, by either initial 
agreement or through the use of debate, coder 1 and coder 2 were in 100% agreement as 
to which final code was to be used for each speech turn.   
During comparison discussions, it became apparent to each coder that he had 
occasionally made a mistake when assigning an incorrect macrocognitive process code to 
a certain speech turn.  In these cases, the mistaken coder agreed with the other coder’s 
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categorization of that speech turn and changed his code accordingly.  Those 44 instances, 
which account for less than 2% of the analysis, are marked in bold in the appropriate 
Coder category on the transcript in Appendix A.  Additionally, Table 4 below illustrates 
the total instances in which the two coders agreed on each macrocognitive process code. 


























































TIE  685 0 6 0 0 1 3 5 7 2 61 0 0 0 0 770 
IIS  12 13 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 31 
MISC  27 0 582 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 97 0 0 0 0 712 
DTA(RTA)  4 0 3 40 13 0 7 1 2 0 10 0 0 0 0 80 
DTA(COA)  0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 14 
NC  2 0 1 0 0 67 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 74 
IIG  1 0 12 0 0 1 413 1 2 0 33 0 0 0 0 463 
TKS  19 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 61 
TSOG  9 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 26 0 2 0 0 0 0 39 
ISA  9 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 11 3 0 0 0 0 26 
US  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
IPK  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
UR  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
PRTA  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ECA  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 
Coder 1 773 13 604 41 24 70 429 50 39 13 221 1 0 0 0 2278
 
D. INSIGHTS INTO THE COGNITIVE PROCESS 
1. Dynamic Decision Making 
On September 11, 2001, the FAA/ NEADS team responded to several instances of 
plane hijackings, occurring over a period of time. As a result, they were forced to make a 
series of dynamic decisions.  The term dynamic decision making refers to a situation in 
which the decision maker cannot reach the goal by means of a single decision (Brehmer, 
1992).  In this form of problem solving, a team seeks a viable course of action (Hutchins 
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& Kendall, 2009).  Because current decisions are constrained by earlier decisions, and 
eventually constrain later decisions, each decision is dependent on another.  Additionally, 
the problem evolves, in real time, on its own and as a result of the decision-maker’s 
actions (Brehmer, 1992).  Table 5 displays an example of how information is shared in 
pieces, leading decision-makers to decide on a major course of action, without solving 
the overall problem.  Specifically, Team Information Exchange leads to Team Knowledge 
Sharing, which leads to Decision to Take Action (Course of Action), and then the problem 
continues. 
Table 5.   Example of Dynamic Decision-Making Process 
 
2. The Iterative Nature of Cognitive Processes 
Although the model seems to imply that the cognitive phases occur sequentially, 
the transcript illustrates the iterative nature of the knowledge building between 
individuals and across teams (Fiore et al., 2008).  In light of these observations, and by 
analyzing the transcript, we infer that the decision-making process is cyclical, involving 
constant reassessment of facts and judgments.  While it is necessary for the team to 
consider how the current decision will solve the immediate problem, it is even more 
LINE SPEAKER MESSAGE 
CODER 
1 CODER 2 FINAL 
702 
Male 
Speaker: Sergeant Demage?   MISC US MISC 
    We are working a tanker.   TIE TIE TIE 
703 
Sergeant 
McCain: There is a bomb on board Boston - TKS TIE TIE 
704 
Male 
Speaker: *Explative* MISC MISC MISC 
705 
Male 
Speaker: On board what?  Boston 93?   IIG IIG IIG 
706 Huntress: United. TIE TIE TIE 
707 
Male 
Speaker: United? IIG IIG IIG 
708 
Sergeant 
McCain: Bomb on board United 93. TKS TIE TIE 
709 Huntress: 
Intercept.  Intercept.  We want the aircraft 








important to consider how it will impact future decisions and accomplish the overall task 
(Brehmer, 1992).  Stress is inherent in dynamic decision making, as is also apparent in 
the FAA/NEADS transcripts, because the decision maker cannot control when critical 
decisions have to be made (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009; Hutchins & Kendall, in press).   
Deciding on a course of action affects the problem as well as the cognitive 
process involved in making that decision.  By implementing a decided course of action, 
and observing its results, the decision maker actually changes the problem, itself 
(Hutchins & Kendall, 2009).  For example, any action taken against a hijacked aircraft to 
determine the hijackers’ intent will cause a response.  That response, or lack thereof, will 
alter the team’s mental model of that task (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009).  Individuals 
initially react to injected data or information by making minor decisions.  The outcomes 
of these decisions change the nature of the problem, for better or for worse.  Execution of 
these minor courses of action leads to the creation of new information and knowledge, 
which forces the team to decide on more important courses of action, and this process 
repeats. 
3. Uncertainty Reduction and Intuition 
Throughout the team communications, we notice a continual growth in team 
understanding of the problem, as well as a continually increasing level of interpretation.  
A team finds the majority of its strength in its ability to coordinate, to maintain team 
situational awareness, to reduce uncertainty and to resolve ambiguity.  Teams resolve 
ambiguity in data by restructuring it into more meaningful information.  Restructuring 
serves to establish easily recognizable patterns, since detection of the abnormal requires 
recognition of the normal.  Thus, when an anomaly occurs it is recognized as such (Fiore 
et al., in development).  By combining, sorting and filtering information, a mental model 






real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations (Johnson-Laird, 1999), from which a person 
assumes they can explain and even predict a particular state of the world (Fiore et al., 
2008). 
From a person’s mental model stems intuition, which serves to expedite the 
individual decision-making process.  Little effort is used to reach intuitive decisions, 
which are typically made subconsciously (Hogarth, 2001).  In situations involving 
significant uncertainty, such as the situation faced by the FAA/NEADS team, previous 
experience plays a large role.  In this case, a solid mental model allowed the team to 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the team at NEADS was faced with a 
one-of-a-kind catastrophe of amazing proportions, and was forced to collaborate under 
extremely difficult circumstances.  Their mental ability was pushed to the limit, as they 
were required to adapt and update their preexisting mental models, which were geared 
toward less intense hijacking situations.  The communications between NEADS and the 
FAA during the crisis provided an excellent example of team collaboration, against 
which to apply and assess the model of team collaboration.  Despite the fact that several 
macrocognitive process codes were not applicable to this analysis, that does not indicate 
however that those codes are irrelevant to the model. It was simply impossible to 
determine, by analyzing the transcript alone, if the cognitive processes defined by those 
codes were actually occurring.  
Based on our research, we can say with certainty that the model is applicable to 
the NEADS and FAA communications transcript.  The results confirm that the team 
moved between the various cognitive phases outlined by the model, as the tragedy 
developed.  Even though the model does not state that a team will progress sequentially 
from the beginning macrocognitive phases to the later macrocognitive phases, our 
research indicates that the NEADS team did, in fact, make such a progression during the 
observed time period.  The results of the Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient analysis demonstrate 
that two individuals can use the model to evaluate the same data and reach a substantial 
rate of agreement.  This attests to the fact that the model is undistorted by emotion or 
personal bias.  It is an objective tool that is able to be interpreted and applied by 
researchers of differing backgrounds. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Including the Donaldson & Johnson thesis (2008) and Socias thesis (2008), three 
of the four audio channels have been transcribed and coded with definitions from the 
model (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008; Socias, 2008).  Since each channel represents a 
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portion of the entire NEADS/FAA team effort, it would be useful to transcribe and code 
the remaining channel.  Then, further analysis could be conducted to mathematically 
determine the length of time it took the team to progress through the stages of the model, 
reach a shared mental understanding of the problem and ultimately agree on a solution.  
The efficiency and accuracy of shared information could also be evaluated.  The author 
of a future thesis could also incorporate calculations called for by several of the codes. 
Definitions of laboratory cognitive processes, requiring calculations or surveys, 
such as Knowledge Object Development, Team Evaluation and Negotiation of 
Alternatives, Team Process and Plan Negotiations, Team Knowledge Similarity, Task 
Knowledge Stock, Recognition of Team Expertise, Quality of Plan, Efficiency of 
Planning Process, and Efficiency of Plan Execution could be revised to make them more 
applicable to real-world scenarios.  Limiting these cognitive processes to definitions 
intended for laboratory settings impairs the ability to accurately utilize them in the 
evaluation of team communications from real-world scenarios. Future researchers may 
also wish to assess actual outcomes of the team collaborative process.  The quality of the 
team’s final plan could be evaluated, along with the amount of available resources.  
Decisions made during the Outcome Appraisal stage of the model could be evaluated to 
see if they actually resolve the problem the team faced. 
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APPENDIX A.  NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION CHANNEL 3 TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 1231 
THROUGH 1556 (GMT) 
 
1 TIME SPEAKER MESSAGE CODER 1 CODER 2 FINAL 
2 [00:00]  Computer Voice: 
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 25 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 30 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 35 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 40 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 45 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 50 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 55 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 0 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 5 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 15 seconds.  
Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 20 seconds. MISC MISC MISC 
3   Sergeant Rayorta: Yes, ma’am.  This is Sergeant Rayorta. MISC MISC MISC 
4   Huntress: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
5   Sergeant Rayorta:
I’m just letting you know for information, 
we’re having an exercise - SF exercise - 
We’re having a come out. MISC MISC MISC 
6   Huntress: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
7   Sergeant Rayorta: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
8   Huntress: Copy, thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
9   Sergeant Rayorta: All right.  Thank you.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
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10   MCC: This is your MCC.  MISC MISC MISC 
      
All flight personnel report to Op’s, all 
flight personnel report to Op’s. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
11   Male Speaker: - Didn’t come up in primary radar. TIE  TIE TIE 
12   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  So you have a general location as 
to where he is? IIG IIG IIG 
13   Male Speaker: We’re still tracking him right now. TIE TIE TIE 
14   Female Speaker: You’re tracking him?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Can you - Can you give lat and long 
where you think he is just for our SA? IIG IIG IIG 
15   Male Speaker: Yeah, hold on a second. MISC MISC MISC 
16   Female Speaker: 
And where are they going now, do you 
know? IIG IIG IIG 
17   Male Speaker: No idea.  He’s heading towards Kennedy - TIE TIE TIE 
18   Female Speaker: Hey, _______?   NC NC NC 
      We’re looking for assets.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 ____ give me a lat and long because 
__________ primary only.   IIG IIG IIG 
      
FAA is tracking it.  They ________ 
because they’re the only ones seeing it. TIE TIE TIE 
19   Female Speaker: 
And is there any military assistance 
requested? IIG IIG IIG 
20   Male Speaker: Yes, ___________ - TIE TIE TIE 
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21   Female Speaker: Yes, that’s correct. TIE TIE TIE 
22   Male Speaker: F-16s __________. TIE TIE TIE 
23   Female Speaker: Yes, you do want F-16’s out? IIG IIG IIG 
24   Male Speaker: Yes, F16’s out of Otis. TIE TIE TIE 
25   Female Speaker: 
But you don’t have - You don’t have any 
modes or codes on him? IIG IIG IIG 
26   Male Speaker: Not right now.  Right now it’s just - TIE TIE TIE 
27   Female Speaker: Is he inbound to JFK? IIG IIG IIG 
28   Male Speaker: We have 41,15 north - TIE TIE TIE 
29   Female Speaker: You don’t know where he is at all? IIG IIG IIG 
30   Female Speaker: 41,15 north - TIE TIE TIE 
31   Male Speaker: 07,346 west - TIE TIE TIE 
32   Female Speaker: 07,346 west - TIE TIE TIE 
33   Male Speaker: - and the approximate heading is 190 - TIE TIE TIE 
34   Female Speaker: 190 - TIE TIE TIE 
35   Male Speaker: -3879 TIE TIE TIE 
36   Female Speaker: -3879 TIE TIE TIE 
37   Male Speaker: 
Last known altitude is flight level is 290 
but we - TIE TIE TIE 
38   Female Speaker: Please give me a call and let us know - IIG IIG IIG 
39   Female Speaker: 
Can you give me any other information on 
it? IIG IIG IIG 
40   Male Speaker: You want the type and stuff?   IIG IIG IIG 
      What do you need?  What do you want? IIG IIG IIG 
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41   Female Speaker: 
Yeah, like passengers on board, where it 
came from - IIG IIG IIG 
42   Male Speaker: 
We’ll call you right back as soon we know 
more info. MISC MISC MISC 
43   Female Speaker: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
44   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
45   Male Speaker: 
767, ___________.  No idea how many 
people on board right now.  They came 
from Boston.  They’re supposed to be 
going to L.A. and they’re headed south.  
They’re going the wrong way, obviously.  
It’s just - TKS TKS TKS 
46   Female Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
47   Male Speaker: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
48   Female Speaker: All right.  Thank you very much. MISC MISC MISC 
49   Male Speaker: 
And so where are they - who are you 
gonna send?  Do you know anything? IIG IIG IIG 
50   Female Speaker: That determination hasn’t been made yet.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
Let me - if you could hold on just a 
moment, I’m gonna get - We have some 
coordination going on right now.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I think that they said they’re gonna put 
Otis on battle stations.  That’s who I 
would anticipate the aircraft to be based 
on them going to JFK.  That would be our 
closest backup. IIS TIE IIS 
51   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  Let me give you my commercial 
number in case we get disconnected here. MISC MISC MISC 
52   Female Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
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53   Male Speaker: 603 - TIE TIE TIE 
54   Female Speaker: 603 - TIE TIE TIE 
55   Male Speaker: 879 - TIE TIE TIE 
56   Female Speaker: 879 - TIE TIE TIE 
57   Male Speaker: 6666 TIE TIE TIE 
58   Female Speaker: 666 - Oh, That’s a scary number.  6666.   MISC MISC MISC 
      And your number again, Sir?  Joe? IIG IIG IIG 
59   Male Speaker: 
Joe Cooper.  You can talk to anyone here.  
Everybody knows what’s going on. TKS TKS TKS 
60   Female Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
61   Male Speaker: 
All right.  So yeah.  So I’ll stay - I’ll stay 
on hold and you can give me call so we 
can get this going. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
62   Female Speaker: Okay.  Stand-by. MISC MISC MISC 
63   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  Can you please call - I got miss 
assigned data up here.  Write it all down.  
I got to get off the - MISC MISC MISC 
64   Male Speaker: Boston Center? MISC MISC MISC 
65   Huntress: Huntress calling you back real quick.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
Did you guys have a Mode 2 at all on 
American 11? IIG IIG IIG 
66   Male Speaker: 
Last altitude we saw it was descending 
_____ 290. TIE TIE TIE 
67   Huntress: 
I’m sorry.  Prior Mode 2 for American 
11? IIG IIG IIG 
68   Female Speaker: - Mode 3 - IIG IIG IIG 
69   Huntress: 
Did you file anything - any information 
for Mode 3  IIG IIG IIG 
 68
      
because we can locate them on the scope 
if so? TSOG TSOG TSOG 
70   Male Speaker: Well - MISC MISC MISC 
71   Female Speaker: Boston to Los Angeles.  That was - TIE TIE TIE 
72   Male Speaker: 
Last known altitude for Flight 11 was 290.  
Before that, he was requesting - Hold on.  
Looks like he was requesting flight level 
350. TKS TKS TKS 
73 [00:05]  Huntress: Okay.  All we’re asking is your Mode 3.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Your Mode 3?  Did you assign any Mode 
3 to that aircraft? IIG IIG IIG 
74   Male Speaker: The reason - The reason was - MISC MISC MISC 
75   Male Speaker: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
76   Female Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
77   Male Speaker: MCC - MISC MISC MISC 
78   Male Speaker: Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
79   Male Speaker: 
I just called it totally, utterly impossible to 
recall 53. TIE TIE TIE 
80   Male Speaker: 3064 TIE TIE TIE 
81   Female Speaker: 
We still should be able to get it without 
53. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
82   Male Speaker: 52 is working. TIE TIE TIE 
83   Male Speaker: We don’t have any Mode 3s.  No. TIE TIE TIE 
84   Huntress: Nothing you guys - TIE TIE TIE 
85   Male Speaker: 
Primary target only.  I don’t even know 
what it - I can try and find his original 
mode 3. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
86   Huntress: Yeah, that’s all we need. TIE TIE TIE 
87   Male Speaker: Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
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88   Male Speaker: What does 56 look like? IIG IIG IIG 
89   Huntress: 
We don’t know yet.  They don’t have a 
mode 3. TKS TKS TKS 
90   Male Speaker: 
- mashed in so much real world stuff 
happened during an exercise.   MISC MISC MISC 
91   Female Speaker: ________ American 11.   NC NC NC 
92   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  Did you get the battle stations, 
________? IIG IIG IIG 
93   Female Speaker: 
Yeah, he’s having a tough time talking 
because they are making threats and they 
have to - TKS TKS TKS 
94   Male Speaker: Otis 1241 - Real world - TIE TIE TIE 
95   Male Speaker: 
For what?  _______?  You’re gonna call 
them?   IIG US IIG 
      They’re not gonna help you out. TIE TIE TIE 
96   Male Speaker: You want to read that out?   IIG IIG IIG 
97   Female Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
98   Male Speaker: 
It’s a - It’s a commercial number.  508 - 
508-487-4069 or 4616. TIE TIE TIE 
99   Female Speaker: Anybody 290 _______. NC NC NC 
100   Male Speaker: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
101   Huntress: Yes, go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
102   Male Speaker: The original code was 1443. TIE TIE TIE 
103   Huntress: 
1443.  Copy that.  Thank you, Sir.  And 
one more question. MISC MISC MISC 
104   Male Speaker: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
105   Huntress: Any aircraft close by him that - a mode 3? IIG IIG IIG 
106     About the time that - NC NC NC 
107     Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
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108   Male Speaker: I think we’re working on that.   ISA US ISA 
      
I don’t have anybody next to him right 
now but - His speed is slowing down now.  
He’s turning southwest bound.   TIE TIE TIE 
      So we don’t have anybody close to him. ISA ISA ISA 
109   Huntress: Okay.  Thank you, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
110   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
111   Huntress: We will eventually find - NC NC NC 
112   Male Speaker: 1443 TIE TIE TIE 
113   Male Speaker: 
Well - Well, we’ll look and sit down - I’ll 
sit one of these guys down and we’ll - 
have to go on a little bit of hold here, 
that’s all.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I mean, we don’t have a crew in yet.  I 
mean - ISA US ISA 
114   Huntress: 
Yeah.  He said nobody in that - nobody in 
that - NC NC NC 
115   Male Speaker: Z point. TIE TIE TIE 
116   Huntress: SDMC, scramble - Is the data - is that - NC NC NC 
117   Male Speaker: Copy.  Same mission. MISC TIE TIE 
118   Male Speaker: 
Who’s talking in New York giving them a 
heads up?  Anybody called New York? IIG IIG IIG 
119   Male Speaker: 
The FCC.  I don’t know what_______ on 
of these guys, too.  TIE TIE TIE 
       I need a direction, destination - IIG IIG IIG 
120   Female Speaker: Is there a reference point? IIG IIG IIG 
121   Male Speaker: It’s around there, Steve. TIE TIE TIE 
122   Male Speaker: Can we give you the Z point? TSOG TSOG TSOG 
123   Female Speaker: ________ is Huntress ID. TIE TIE TIE 
124   Male Speaker: It’s north of New York City. TIE TIE TIE 
 71
125   Huntress: I got this lat, long 41, 15 coming 436. TIE TIE TIE 
126   Male Speaker: 
Yes, Ma’am.  Are you aware of the 
possible hijacking of American 11?   IIG IIG IIG 
127   Male Speaker: That’s gonna be 346? TIE TIE TIE 
128   Huntress: 
Destination as a real world hijack 
American 11.  He is headed 40 miles 
north of JFK headed towards JFK.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’re trying to find out any information 
that we possibly can.   ISA TIE ISA 
      
Apparently, the pilot was having a rough 
time because there have been threats in 
the cockpit. It started out of Boston for 
Los Angeles, now heading - TKS TKS TKS 
      
I wanted to give you a heads up to let you 
know that American 11.  We’re trying to 
locate any information as far as the 
location.   ISA ISA ISA 
      He is currently a Mode 3.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Do you have any information whatsoever? IIG IIG IIG 
129   Male Speaker: I do not.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Hold on one second. MISC MISC MISC 
130   Huntress: It’s KKKK - TIE TIE TIE 
131   Female Speaker: I can’t locate that Mode 3. TIE IIG IIG 
132   Male Speaker: 
MCC - Have you guys gotten any 
information on this yet? IIG IIG IIG 
133   Female Speaker: Is that KKKK, is that his position? IIG IIG IIG 
134   Male Speaker: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
135   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  We’re working on a 25 mile box 
around that and getting everything up. ISA ISA ISA 
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136   Huntress: 
HRD Foster Conar.  How are you doing 
this morning? MISC MISC MISC 
137   Male Speaker: Fine. MISC MISC MISC 
138   Male Speaker: 
Hey, any word on - we got word that there 
was a real world hijack going on? IIG IIG IIG 
139   Sergeant McCain: That’s right. TIE TIE TIE 
140   Male Speaker: Anything on that at all?   IIG IIG IIG 
141   Sergeant McCain:
We’re getting fighters airborne now.  
They’re going to be under FAA control 
and we have not found the aircraft 
________.   TIE TIE TIE 
      He’s not squawking. TIE TIE TIE 
142   Male Speaker: Oh, he’s not squawking? IIG IIG IIG 
143   Sergeant McCain: ___________ through the FAA. NC NC NC 
144   Male Speaker: Are the fighters airborne already? IIG IIG IIG 
145   Sergeant McCain: Not yet. TIE TIE TIE 
146   Male Speaker: Not yet? IIG IIG IIG 
147   Sergeant McCain: I’ll let you know when they get airborne. TIE TIE TIE 
148   Male Speaker: Okay.  Thanks _____. MISC MISC MISC 
149   Sergeant McCain:
Yep.  Northeast Air Defense Sector, 
Sergeant McCain, can I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
150   Male Speaker: 
Yes, Collin Scoggins, Boston Center.  
How are you doing?. MISC MISC MISC 
151   Sergeant McCain: Yes, Sir, just fine. MISC MISC MISC 
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152   Collin Scoggins: 
Are you all working on trying to get 
someone up to - IIG IIG IIG 
153   Sergeant McCain: Yes.  Yes, we are. TIE TIE TIE 
154   Collin Scoggins: 
Can you, by any chance, can you give me 
an altitude on him?  Do you have an 
altitude - IIG IIG IIG 
155   Sergeant McCain: Last one was 29,000. TIE TIE TIE 
156   Collin Scoggins: 
Okay.  I didn’t know if your radar could 
actually pick up a correct altitude just so 
we can kind of nail it down maybe. IIS IIG IIS 
157   Sergeant McCain: We haven’t even found the track yet. TIE TIE TIE 
158   Collin Scoggins: You haven’t found the track yet? IIG IIG IIG 
159   Sergeant McCain: Can you tell us where he’s at?  He- IIG IIG IIG 
160   Collin Scoggins: 
Hold on one second.  Did you arrange 
__________ off from the nearest navi?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
It’s primary only but I’ll get you a track 
and you’ll be able to find them. TIE TIE TIE 
161   Sergeant McCain: Is there anyway that you can - NC NC NC 
162   Collin Scoggins: 15 miles east of Kennedy. TIE TIE TIE 
163 [00:10]  Sergeant McCain: 15 miles east of Kennedy. TIE TIE TIE 
164   Collin Scoggins: East of JFK traveling southwest bound.  TIE TIE TIE 
       It’s only going about 300 knots. TIE TIE TIE 
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165   Sergeant McCain: 15 miles east of Kennedy doing 300 knots. TIE TIE TIE 
      
Is there anyway - are we in contact with 
pilot?  Are you guys in contact with the 
pilot? IIG IIG IIG 
166   Collin Scoggins: No contact with the pilot whatsoever. TIE TIE TIE 
167   Sergeant McCain:
No chance in maybe getting some 
________? IIG IIG IIG 
168   Collin Scoggins: We can’t, nope.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
The only thing that I understand that we 
got here was that someone heard in the 
background someone entering the cockpit.  
That’s it.   IIS IIS IIS 
      
We have not had any contact with the 
pilot at all. TIE TIE TIE 
169   Sergeant McCain: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
170   Collin Scoggins: Do you have visual on him yet? IIG IIG IIG 
171   Sergeant McCain: We’re picking up a search track roughly -  TIE TIE TIE 
      
Let me give you a better range here.  I got 
it 8 miles east northeast of Kennedy on 
search only.   TIE TIE TIE 
172   Collin Scoggins: 
8 miles east northeast of Kennedy?  8 
miles northeast east we have a visual, is 
that about right?   IIG IIG IIG 
      That’s about right.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Do you have an altitude on that? IIG IIG IIG 
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173   Sergeant McCain: No, I don’t. TIE TIE TIE 
174   Collin Scoggins: 
You don’t?  When you get an altitude, can 
you call us here at the center? IIG IIG IIG 
175   Sergeant McCain: I will do my best. TIE TIE TIE 
176   Collin Scoggins: And we can pass that on to New York.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Our DSN here is 881-1635. TIE TIE TIE 
177   Sergeant McCain:
We’re losing - We’re losing primary on 
them now. TIE TIE TIE 
178   Collin Scoggins: 
You’re losing primary on them now?  Do 
you have another sight or - IIG IIG IIG 
179   Sergeant McCain:
No.  HR2 was the only site.  We’re got 
satellite ________ right now.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Give me your phone number? IIG IIG IIG 
180   Collin Scoggins: Okay.  881- TIE TIE TIE 
181   Sergeant McCain: - 881 - TIE TIE TIE 
182   Collin Scoggins: 1635 TIE TIE TIE 
183   Sergeant McCain: 1635 TIE TIE TIE 
      And your name again?   IIG IIG IIG 
184   Collin Scoggins: My name is Collin - TIE TIE TIE 
185   Sergeant McCain: Collin. TIE TIE TIE 
186   Collin Scoggins: Scoggins.  S-C-O-G-G-I-N-S. TIE TIE TIE 
187   Sergeant McCain:
Scoggins.  Okay.  That’s all we’re seeing 
right now. TIE TIE TIE 
188   Colin Scoggins: Okay.  No altitude pick up? IIG IIG IIG 
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189   Sergeant McCain: No. TIE TIE TIE 
190   Collin Scoggins: 
Okay.  Let me know if there’s _________ 
New York and they have no clue what to 
move around them.  So - DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
191   Sergeant McCain: I roger that. MISC MISC MISC 
192   Collin Scoggins: 
Yep.  Thank you very much.  
___________________ let us know 
________? NC NC NC 
193   Sergeant McCain: Sure will. MISC MISC MISC 
194   Collin Scoggins: Thank you.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
195   Sergeant McCain:
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain.  May I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
196   Collin Scoggins: 
Yes, southeast -First Air Force Public 
Affairs, Sergeant Timmons. TIE TIE TIE 
197   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
198   
Sergeant 
Timmons: 
I was just talking with ID and we had a 
phone call that came down to us saying 
that they had a possible hijack out of 
Boston. TIE TIE TIE 
199   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
200   
Sergeant 
Timmons: 
And I just flipped around and we were just 
- we always watch the news and a 737 hit 
the World Trade Center and I was just 
curious at the same time if that was the 
aircraft?  IIG IIG IIG 
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 Last I knew they had a primary on him 
and the track was not squawking 7500 but 
it was - IIS TIE TIE 
201   Sergeant McCain: Send them to New York City.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      Still continue go.  Okay.  Okay.   MISC US MISC 
      Who’s plugged in up there?   IIG US IIG 
      Plug in.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      I’m gonna have to have you hold.   TIE US TIE 
      This is what I’ve got so far. TIE TIE TIE 
202   
Sergeant 
Timmons: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
203   Sergeant McCain: We’re working to confirm that. TIE TIE TIE 
204   
Sergeant 
Timmons: 
Okay.  That’s fine.  I understand you guys 
are pretty busy - MISC MISC MISC 
205   Sergeant McCain: We’re jumping through hoops right now. MISC MISC MISC 
206   
Sergeant 
Timmons: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
207   Sergeant McCain: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
208   
Sergeant 
Timmons: 
All right, I tell you what.  I’ll give you 
guys a call back.  I know you’re pretty 
busy up there. MISC MISC MISC 
209   Sergeant McCain: Yep.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
210   
Sergeant 
Timmons: All right.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
211   Sergeant McCain:
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain.  May I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
212   
Sergeant 
Timmons: 
Sergeant Kelly from Otis.  Flew panthers 
off at 1252 Zulu.   TIE TIE TIE 
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213   Sergeant McCain: Roger that, thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
214   Sergeant Kelly: - peculiar - NC NC NC 
215   Sergeant McCain:
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain.  Can I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
216   Sergeant Kelly: 
Yeah, how are you doing?  Lieuenant 
Tracy at Otis.  How’s it going? MISC MISC MISC 
217   Sergeant McCain: We’re kind of busy.  How you doing? MISC MISC MISC 
218   Lieuenant Tracy: I know.  I’m busy here, too.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We’ve got the -- I just want to let you 
know that there’s a Maine 85 in the 
airspace - TIE TIE TIE 
219   Sergeant McCain: What airspace? IIG IIG IIG 
220   Lieutenant Tracy: Pardon? MISC MISC MISC 
221   Sergeant McCain: What airspace? IIG IIG IIG 
222   Lieutenant Tracy: In Whisky 105.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
It may be useable for the missions that our 
panthers just took off on. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
223   Sergeant McCain: 
Okay.  Stand by.  Let me run this up the 
channel.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We’re gonna pass that up and if we need 
them then we’ll get back to you.   TIE TIE TIE 
      How’s that? IIG US IIG 
224   Lieutenant Tracy: That’s great.   TIE TIE TIE 
225   Sergeant McCain: That’s the best we can do right now. ISA TIE ISA 
226   Lieutenant Tracy: 
Yeah, you can - you can probably get 
them through Giant Killer if they’re in the 
area.   TSOG TIE TSOG 
      
They’re out of Bangor and confirm that 
the location was 40, 40 north, west 74 IIG IIG IIG 
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please? 
227   Sergeant McCain: I’m sorry?  Say that again. MISC MISC MISC 
228   Lieutenant Tracy: 40, 40 north, west 74. TIE TIE TIE 
229   Sergeant McCain: 74 west.   TIE TIE TIE 
      And that is the location of the Maine 85? IIG IIG IIG 
230   Lieutenant Tracy: 
No, that was the location that you guys 
gave me of the - of the 767. TIE TIE TIE 
231   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  I - NC NC NC 
232   Lieutenant Tracy: I wanted to double check the 74 west.   TIE TIE TIE 
233   Sergeant McCain:
We’re hearing - we’re hearing reports 
right now that the civilian aircraft crashed 
in to the World Trade Center.  Okay? TIE TIE TIE 
234 [00:15]  Lieutenant Tracy: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
235   
                        
Sergeant McCain:
It’s not confirmed at this point.  We’re 
trying to confirm that.  It’s all over the 
news and the whole nine yards.  -  TIE TIE TIE 
      Just confirmed it?  Boston Center? IIG IIG IIG 
236   
                        
Lieutenant Tracy: Holy shit.   MISC MISC MISC 
      There it is. TIE TIE TIE 
237   Sergeant McCain:
All right?  So we don’t know what’s 
going on.   ISA TIE ISA 
238   Lieutenant Tracy: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
239   Sergeant McCain: All right? MISC MISC MISC 
240   Lieutenant Tracy: Well, I’ll get off the phone. MISC MISC MISC 
241   Sergeant McCain: I’ll try to keep you informed. MISC MISC MISC 
242   Lieutenant Tracy: Okay, thanks.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
243   Sergeant McCain: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
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244   Lieutenant Tracy: 
This is Sergeant Akin calling from 
International Guard Operation Center at 
Andrews.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I can probably pretty much assume that 
ya’ll are being a little bit busy up there 
now. IIS US IIS 
245   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
246   Sergeant Akin: 
But I have a question.  Can you confirm if 
Otis was scrambled on to those aircraft 
that are out there toward - IIG IIG IIG 
247   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
248   Sergeant Akin: That was agreed? IIG IIG IIG 
249   Sergeant Bianchi: Yes, definitely. TIE TIE TIE 
250   Sergeant Akin: Thank you very much. MISC MISC MISC 
251   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
252   Sergeant Akin: Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
253   Sergeant Bianchi: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
254   Sergeant Akin: Yes, this is Sergeant Akin calling again.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I just need to get your name and I spoke 
with you earlier about the 102nd 
scramble. IIG IIG IIG 
255   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
256   Sergeant Akin: Can I get your name again? IIG IIG IIG 
257   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Sergeant Bianchi.  Bravo, India, 
November - Alpha, November, Charlie, 
Hotel, India. TIE TIE TIE 
258   Sergeant Akin: Okay.  Your rank again? IIG IIG IIG 
259   Sergeant Bianchi: Senior Analyst. TIE TIE TIE 
260   Sergeant Akin: Senior Analyst?  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
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261   Sergeant Bianchi: Second aircraft? IIG IIG IIG 
262   Sergeant Akin: Yeah, yeah. NC NC NC 
263   Huntress: That one looks like it’s - NC NC NC 
264   Male Speaker: United? IIG IIG IIG 
265   Huntress: We’re calling it a jet. TIE TIE TIE 
266   Male Speaker: The first one - NC NC NC 
267   Huntress: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain.  May I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
268   Female Speaker: Hey, it’s Ken Borchen down at Langley. TIE TIE TIE 
269   Sergeant McCain: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
270   Ken Borchen: 
Do you guys have a few available to let us 
know what’s going on right now? IIG IIG IIG 
271   Sergeant McCain: I’m sorry? MISC MISC MISC 
272   Ken Borchen: Do you guys have a few available or - IIG IIG IIG 
273   Sergeant McCain: Yeah, hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
274   Ken Borchen: Any word on what’s going on? IIG IIG IIG 
275   Sergeant McCain:
None of this is really classified that we 
know of.  It’s all over the news if you’ve 
seen the news. TKS TKS TKS 
276   Ken Borchen: 
Yeah.  Is that why we’re getting the battle 
stations? IIG IIG IIG 
277   Sergeant McCain: Yes, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
278   Ken Borchen: Okay.  I’ll call you back then. MISC MISC MISC 
279   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
280   Ken Borchen: Giant Killer call. NC NC NC 
281   Sergeant McCain: We’re actually - NC NC NC 
282   Huntress: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain. MISC MISC MISC 
283   Male Speaker: Yes, this is _____ Kelly from Langley. MISC MISC MISC 
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284   Sergeant McCain Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
285   Lt. Kelly: Hold for MCC Major Evans. MISC MISC MISC 
286   Sergeant McCain: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
287   Lt. Kelly: Go ahead.  Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
288   Male Speaker: 
We are looking for words on - for the 
battle stations. IIG IIG IIG 
289   Sergeant McCain:
It’s Langley Command Post.  They want 
words on why they’re on battle stations. TKS TKS TKS 
        Major Evans: We’re looking for words. TIE TIE TIE 
291   Sergeant McCain: Have you been watching the news? IIG IIG IIG 
292   Major Evans: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
293   Sergeant McCain: That’s why. TIE TIE TIE 
294   Major Evans: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
295   Sergeant McCain: - Langley Command Post. TIE TIE TIE 
296   Major Evans: Okay.  That’s the reason - TIE TIE TIE 
297   Sergeant McCain:
You can pass it to the __________ as 
well. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
298   Major Evans: 
We were looking for the words because 
we understand we need to get words. IIG IIG IIG 
299   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Air sovereignty national - TIE TIE TIE 
300   Major Evans: Go. MISC MISC MISC 
301   Sergeant McCain: Hey, this is Major McCarthy.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Who am I speaking to? IIG IIG IIG 
302   Major Nasypany: This is Major Nasypany.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
303   Major McCarthy: 
Hey, Nasypany.  Are you guys watching 
CNN? IIG IIG IIG 
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304   Major Nasypany: 
Yep.  We are in a situation right now.  I’m 
kind of busy so - MISC MISC MISC 
305   Major McCarthy: Okay.  I just wanted to - NC NC NC 
306   Major Nasypany: Yeah.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
307   Major McCarthy: 
Attention in the Ops room.  All personnel 
who are not actively involved right now, 
would they please leave the Ops room?  
I’ll say again: All personnel that are not 
actively involved please leave the Ops 
room. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
308   Major Nasypany: Yes, I do. NC NC NC 
309   Male Speaker: 
Do you have contact with that aircraft 
airborne? IIG IIG IIG 
310   Male Speaker: 
No.  United 175 is the second aircraft that 
crashed in to the Trade Center. TIE TIE TIE 
311   Huntress: 
Okay.  That’s what I needed, Sir, is 
confirmation.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Only one other question:  The 
__________ on board were either 
___________? NC NC NC 
312   Male Speaker: You’d have to get Boston Center on that.   TSOG US TSOG 
      
They were both out of Boston going to 
Los Angeles. TIE TIE TIE 
313   Huntress: ____________. NC NC NC 
314   Male Speaker: 
Boston Center would have that 
information.  TIE TIE TIE 
      We don’t have that information yet. TIE TIE TIE 
315   Huntress: Thank you, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
316   Male Speaker: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
317   Huntress: Sorry. MISC MISC MISC 
318   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
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319   Huntress: Yes.  No, we’re here.   MISC MISC MISC 
320   Male Speaker: November, 612, Uniform, Alpha. TIE TIE TIE 
321   Huntress: November, 612, Uniform, Alpha. TIE TIE TIE 
322   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, we shut all the traffic off at Boston 
Center.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Nobody is departing.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’re routing all incoming arrivals New 
York Metro Airport.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I have a question for you in case we have 
any more aircraft that start deviating.  We 
need to - NC NC NC 
323   Huntress: I don’t even have one. TIE TIE TIE 
324   Male Speaker: 
I’m not gonna send that because I don’t 
know what the hell to put on it.   TIE TIE TIE 
325   Male Speaker: 
American Airlines is still airborne, still 
hijacked. TIE TIE TIE 
326   Male Speaker: Oh, God.  They better call the President.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
327   Female Speaker: Believe me, we know. TIE TIE TIE 
328 [00:20]  Female Speaker: American 11. TIE TIE TIE 
329   Male Speaker: 
New York, Huntress ID reference 
American Airlines 11.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 I’m calling American right now - New 
York.   TIE TIE TIE 
330   Male Speaker: This is New York.  Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
331   Huntress: 
Yes, Sir.  We just had information that 
American Airlines 11 is still airborne 
heading towards Washington.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Did you get that information? IIG IIG IIG 
332   Male Speaker: Stand by.   MISC MISC MISC 
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333   Huntress: 
Sir, I’m on with New York.  I’m on with 
New York, hold on.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 Tail number is right here.  November, 
334, Alpha, Alpha. TIE TIE TIE 
334   Male Speaker: - Alpha, Alpha - American - NC NC NC 
335   Huntress: Air Defense? MISC MISC MISC 
336   Female Speaker: Yes, go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
337   Male Speaker: What beacon code are you looking at? IIG IIG IIG 
338   Huntress: 
Sir, we don’t have a beacon code.  We 
only have a tail number.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Last known beacon code was 1443 - TIE TIE TIE 
339   Male Speaker: 
I’m gonna give you a phone number and 
you need to call them because - DTA(RTA) TIE DTA(RTA) 
340   Huntress: Is it 631-468-,  TIE TIE TIE 
      Sir, 5959? IIG IIG IIG 
341   Male Speaker: It’s 631-468-5959.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
That’s the Watts desk and they’ll have any 
information you may need on this flight. TSOG US TSOG 
342   Huntress: 
Okay.  If you can do me a favor and have 
them call us.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      We cannot call out for some reason. TIE TIE TIE 
343   Male Speaker: All right.  Let me have your number. IIG IIG IIG 
344   Huntress: It’s - Do you have DSN or no? IIG IIG IIG 
345   Male Speaker: I’m sorry? MISC MISC MISC 
346   Huntress: 315 - TIE TIE TIE 
347   Male Speaker: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
348   Huntress: - 334 - TIE TIE TIE 
349   Male Speaker: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
350   Huntress: -6344 TIE TIE TIE 
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351   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
352   Huntress: Thank you, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
353   Male Speaker: All right.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
354   Huntress: Oh, shoot.  6348, 6344.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Who needs what?  Major Anderson?  
Major Anderson, what did you need?  
American Airlines 11?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
 New York is gonna call me back right 
now with the information that they have.   TIE TIE TIE 
      I’m just waiting.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
That’s the first one we had that we 
thought went into the World Trade Center.  
767 type aircraft.  We got his tail number 
and everything.   TKS US TKS 
355   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
356   Huntress: 
How you doing?  This is Kelly.  Can I 
post? IIG IIG IIG 
357   Sergeant Perry: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
358   Lt. Kelly: Langley. NC NC NC 
359   Sergeant Perry: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
360   Lt. Kelly: We need the heading again.  The altitude - IIG IIG IIG 
361   Sergeant Perry: 
The altitude?  Stand by.  Langley needs an 
altitude. IIG IIG IIG 
362   Lt. Kelly: 
Okay.  010299.  Let me give you another 
heading.  We don’t have a - TIE TIE TIE 
363   Sergeant Perry: 
We have tankers - We have additional 
tankers on the wire.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Call sign?  I’m not sure on the numbers. TIE TIE TIE 
364   Male Speaker: I’m aware of it, yes.  Thank you, Sir.   US TIE TIE 
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365   Male Speaker: 
We got the tail number, November, 334, 
Alpha, Alpha.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
________ when they hit________ still 
airborne, still hijacked. TIE TIE TIE 
366   Male Speaker: Open line.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
367   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  This is Langley again.  What’s the 
primary?  Is it 234? IIG IIG IIG 
368   Sergeant Perry: Standby. MISC MISC MISC 
369   Male Speaker: Copy. MISC MISC MISC 
370   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Perry.   MISC MISC MISC 
371   Male Speaker: I need a - NC NC NC 
372   Sergeant Perry: Hello?   MISC MISC MISC 
373   Male Speaker: I don’t know exactly where - TIE TIE TIE 
374   Sergeant Perry: All right.  Nothing heard. TIE TIE TIE 
375   Male Speaker: Ten miles. TIE TIE TIE 
376   Sergeant Perry: Oh, yeah.   MISC MISC MISC 
377   Male Speaker: Hello?  What? I just got here. MISC MISC MISC 
378 [00:25]  Male Speaker: 
- World Trade Center.  That’s the second 
aircraft that hit. TKS TKS TKS 
379   Male Speaker: 
Northeast, Sergeant Perry.  Nothing heard.  
We’re trying to get a hold of them.  We’re 
trying to make sure - TIE TIE TIE 
380   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
381   Sergeant Perry: ___________ from CONAR.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
Hey, real quick can you guys throw in the 
chat with squawks for the Otis birds, 
please? DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
382   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  We’ll send it on to the chat. TIE TIE TIE 
383   Male Speaker: Thank you.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
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384   Sergeant Bianchi: You’re welcome.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
385   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
386   Sergeant Bianchi: Hi, Sergeant Lucas calling from Lotus.   MISC MISC MISC 
387   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
388   Sergeant Lucas: 
We’re in the CONAR chat here and see I 
that CONAR - the region commander has 
directed all sectors -  TIE TIE TIE 
      Are we increasing THREATCOM? IIG IIG IIG 
389   Sergeant Bianchi: 
I know we are for New York.  That’s all I 
know. TIE TIE TIE 
390   Sergeant Lucas: Okay.  So we are not at this time? IIG IIG IIG 
391   Sergeant Bianchi: 
I don’t believe you are.  I haven’t read the 
chat.  I haven’t got the chat in front of me 
so I couldn’t tell you. TIE TIE TIE 
392   Sergeant Lucas: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
393   Sergeant Bianchi: All right? MISC MISC MISC 
394   Sergeant Lucas: Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
395   Sergeant Bianchi: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
396   Sergeant Lucas: 
This is Air Force _______, Sergeant 
Michael speaking. MISC MISC MISC 
397   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah, Sergeant McCain.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
The force protection plan and the force 
protection mission Bravo, was that just for 
NEADS or us or - IIG IIG IIG 
398   
Sergeant 
Michael: It’s everybody in New York State. TIE TIE TIE 
399   Sergeant McCain: That’s all of New York? IIG IIG IIG 
400   
Sergeant 
Michael: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
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401   Sergeant McCain:
What about for CONAR?  Have you heard 
anything? IIG IIG IIG 
402   
Sergeant 
Michael: 
No, I haven’t heard anything about that.  
All I heard about was all national guard 
units inside of New York State - General 
Barbarren put them in to Bravo. TKS TIE TKS 
403   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  In New York.  All right.  Thank 
you. MISC MISC MISC 
404   
Sergeant 
Michael: All right? MISC MISC MISC 
405   Sergeant McCain: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
406   
Sergeant 
Michael: 
Indianapolis was the last one to work with 
it.   TIE TIE TIE 
407   Sergeant McCain: - earlier from Boston? IIG IIG IIG 
408   Male Speaker: Yeah, Boston to L.A. TIE TIE TIE 
409   Male Speaker: Boston to L.A. TIE TIE TIE 
410   Male Speaker: 
We don’t know what the hell it’s for.  All 
we can do is say we - I don’t know - TIE TIE TIE 
411   Huntress: Go ahead.  Hold on - MISC MISC MISC 
412   Male Speaker: 
It’s over Long Island.  __________ over 
Long Island and _____. TIE TIE TIE 
413   Sergeant McCain: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
414   Male Speaker: 
It’s ________ here from CONAR.  We 
need a phone number for the air team. IIG IIG IIG 
415   Sergeant Bianchi: Air team? IIG IIG IIG 
416   Male Speaker: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
417   Sergeant Bianchi: Hold on a second.  Oh, hold on a second. MISC MISC MISC 
418   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
419   Sergeant Bianchi: Yep.  Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
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420   Male Speaker: 
- 010 - Did you catch that in - 6 miles east 
of the White House.   TIE TIE TIE 
421   Sergeant Bianchi: 
304 extension will get you right to a 
commander. TIE TIE TIE 
422   Male Speaker: Say again now?  I couldn’t hear that. IIG IIG IIG 
423   Sergeant Bianchi: 587-6304. TIE TIE TIE 
424   Male Speaker: 6304.  Thanks very much. TIE TIE TIE 
425   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Right here, Sir.  Here’s your target.  Bravo 
032.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
426   Male Speaker: 
Hey, it’s Sergeant Benowski at the 
________ post at Langley.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Did you do a ________ for our guys? IIG IIG IIG 
427 [00:30]  Sergeant Bianchi: I’m sorry, ma’am.  1335? IIG IIG IIG 
428   
Sergeant 
Benowski: Yes, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
429   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  That’s what I need. TIE TIE TIE 
430   
Sergeant 
Benowski: Okay.  Thanks.  Bye-bye. MISC MISC MISC 
431   Sergeant Bianchi: Steve, prosecute Bravo 032. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
432   
Sergeant 
Benowski: Radar only.  Bravo 326? IIG IIG IIG 
433   Male Speaker: 32 TIE TIE TIE 
434   Male Speaker: Bravo 032. TIE TIE TIE 
435   Sergeant Bianchi: Don’t have an altitude? IIG IIG IIG 
436   Male Speaker: Don’t have an altitude.  290 knots. TIE TIE TIE 
437   Male Speaker: ______________? NC NC NC 
438   Sergeant Bianchi: We don’t have an altitude.   TIE TIE TIE 
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439   Male Speaker: 
_______ is at 80 now.  Bravo 032, that’s 
the aircraft.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Get his Z point.  Thank you. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
440   Sergeant Bianchi: Where are the fighters? IIG IIG IIG 
441   Male Speaker: 
2T25.  Quit 25 right down there.  
________on bad data now.  Zero velocity.  
032 back on the Z point. TIE TIE TIE 
442   Male Speaker: I got it. MISC MISC MISC 
443   Male Speaker: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
444   Male Speaker: Okay.  From York, he was 080 to 01 - TIE TIE TIE 
445   Male Speaker: Where is York? IIG IIG IIG 
446   Huntress: Indianapolis. TIE TIE TIE 
447   Sergeant McCain: Oh, okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
448   Huntress: 80,010 TIE TIE TIE 
449   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  So 841 - NC NC NC 
450   Huntress: 38, 41 north. 082, 52 west. TIE TIE TIE 
451   Male Speaker: How long ago? IIG IIG IIG 
452   Huntress: When was that last __________, Sir? IIG IIG IIG 
453   Sergeant McCain: Right before we saw him - TIE TIE TIE 
454   Huntress: That was his last - TIE TIE TIE 
455   Male Speaker: They’re doing that now. TIE TIE TIE 
456   Huntress: Heading westbound 270. TIE TIE TIE 
457   Male Speaker: Heading west 270. TIE TIE TIE 
458   Male Speaker: 
I don’t know his speed at this point.  WE 
got that information off of the - . TIE TIE TIE 
459   Huntress: Bravo 112.  That point you gave me, Mo. TIE TIE TIE 
460   Male Speaker: Lat and long - 270. TIE TIE TIE 
461   Sergeant McCain: The point out is Bravo 112. TIE TIE TIE 
462   Huntress: Bravo 112, Bravo 112. TIE TIE TIE 
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463   Sergeant McCain:
Bravo - American 77 last known position 
is Bravo 112.  That hit point right there. TIE TIE TIE 
464   Huntress: Right here? IIG IIG IIG 
465   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
466   Male Speaker: Oh, my God.   MISC MISC MISC 
467   Sergeant McCain: What is it? IIG IIG IIG 
468   Female Speaker: Delta what? IIG IIG IIG 
469   Male Speaker: 89 TIE TIE TIE 
470   Male Speaker: 89.  Boeing 757. TIE TIE TIE 
471   Male Speaker: Las Vegas?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
 I don’t even know how the - I need a 
code. IIG IIG IIG 
472   Female Speaker: 089 is the Delta 89. TIE TIE TIE 
473   Sergeant McCain: Bravo 089?  Bravo 089.  Area 1. TIE TIE TIE 
474   Female Speaker: 
Yeah, that’s another hijack. Delta is 
_______ Bravo 089 has been trapped. TKS TIE TKS 
475   Sergeant McCain:
Do me a favor?  Make sure that gets a 
special 15 just for everybody’s 
information. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
476   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  I’m not sure where all the tankers 
are right now.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I got another hijack.  Another hijack.  It’s 
a Delta - Delta 89. TIE TIE TIE 
477   Sergeant McCain: It’s right there. TIE TIE TIE 
478   Male Speaker: Boston to Vegas.  I know it’s _______. TIE TIE TIE 
479   Sergeant McCain: It’s right there.  Approximately 75 miles.   TIE TIE TIE 
480   Male Speaker: Bravo 089. TIE TIE TIE 
481   Male Speaker: Delta 89.   TIE TIE TIE 
482   Sergeant McCain: Take a deep breath.   MISC MISC MISC 
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483 [00:35]  Male Speaker: 
Oh, yeah.  They’ve been airborne for quite 
a while.  Sorry. TIE TIE TIE 
484   Male Speaker: Come here.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
485   Sergeant McCain: Go to be. NC NC NC 
486   Huntress: 
Delta 89.  Out of Boston heading to 
________ 1304. TIE TIE TIE 
487   Male Speaker: 
I got additional fighters coming out of - 
Got more aircraft coming out from 
Langley.  First Fighter Wing. TIE TIE TIE 
488   Huntress: __________south of Cleveland. TIE TIE TIE 
489   Male Speaker: ALS, right? IIG IIG IIG 
490   Male Speaker: 
Aircraft __________, right near the 
_________.  Okay.  Steve, you’ve got an 
aircraft spotted right near the Pentagon. TIE TIE TIE 
491   Male Speaker: Mode 3 - IIG IIG IIG 
492   Sergeant McCain: 1304 TIE TIE TIE 
493   Huntress: 
Okay, guys.  Another aircraft spotted near 
the Pentagon.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Also, did you get the word that Delta 89 
south of Toledo - Yeah, the track is Bravo 
089.   IIG IIG IIG 
494   Male Speaker: 
Reclassified as specials, Laia.  Somebody 
made a ___________.  It’s going back to 
special.  I’m gonna forward tell it.   TIE TIE TIE 
      If CONAR calls, its - NC NC NC 
495   Male Speaker: Bravo 089? IIG IIG IIG 
496   Sergeant McCain:
Bravo 089.  That’s the special.  That’s the 
Delta 89, 767, originally Boston to Las 
Vegas from what I understand. TKS TIE TKS 
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497   Male Speaker: 
And I’m trying to contact ___________ 
for another possible hijack. TIE TIE TIE 
498   Sergeant McCain:
You might want to - you might want to 
talk to Duluth, too.   TSOG DTA(RTA) TSOG 
      That’s the keyboard.  We’ve been so busy.  MISC US MISC 
499   Male Speaker: Talking about - NC NC NC 
500   Sergeant McCain:
Yeah, they’ve got guards posted all over - 
They ought to have some freaking 
__________.  Just grass, Mo.   TIE TIE TIE 
501   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, _______ sky actually.  
_______________. NC NC NC 
502   Sergeant McCain: No. MISC MISC MISC 
503   Male Speaker: It just shows that the - I don’t know.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
They ain’t gonna do much at the White 
House. TIE TIE TIE 
504   Sergeant McCain: We’re talking to - NC NC NC 
505   Male Speaker: Sergeant Perry?   IIG US IIG 
      Is this his wife?   MISC MISC MISC 
      We’re really busy.  Okay?  Like - MISC MISC MISC  
506   Male Speaker: Right there.   TIE US TIE 
      Both of them. TIE TIE TIE 
507   Sergeant McCain: What about Duluth?   IIG US IIG 
      Did you think about them?   IIG US IIG 
      What about Duluth?  Did you - IIG IIG IIG 
508   Male Speaker: - Fighters. TIE TIE TIE 
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509   Sergeant McCain: All right.  Just throwing out possibilities.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Force protection condition?   IIG US IIG 
      We’re at Bravo.  Real world. TIE TIE TIE 
510   Male Speaker: Real world? IIG IIG IIG 
511   Sergeant McCain: Call your wife when you get a chance.  MISC MISC MISC 
      Who’s this? MISC MISC MISC 
512   Male Speaker: _______ near Lake Eerie. TIE TIE TIE 
513   Sergeant McCain: This is Sergeant McCain.   MISC US MISC 
      That is a Delta flight, 89. TIE TIE TIE 
514   Male Speaker: They say it possibly may not be a hijack.   TIE US TIE 
      He - They did get in touch with him.  TIE US TIE 
      
 They confirmed that they are 
___________. TIE TIE TIE 
515   Sergeant McCain:
So it’s just a possible - Right now it’s just 
a possible hijack, okay?  TIE US TIE 
      
They’ve started to learn towards it’s not.  
______________.  Okay?  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 They are in contact with the FAA.  They 
are in contact with that aircraft. TIE TIE TIE 
      It’s a Delta 89 757 ______________.   TIE TIE TIE 
516   Huntress: 
Keep them at high priority though, 
because they’re not sure about that.   DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
517   Sergeant McCain: Hey, ________.  How are you doing? MISC MISC MISC 
518   Huntress: Not well. MISC MISC MISC 
519   Male Speaker: Do you need help on anything? IIG IIG IIG 
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520   Male Speaker: 
Nope.  We got things as well handled as 
we can. TIE TIE TIE 
521   Male Speaker: Okay.  I’m in Rome, TIE US TIE 
      
so if you need anything I can come right 
in. TIE TIE TIE 
522   Male Speaker: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
523   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
524   Male Speaker: Okay.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
525   Male Speaker: - Possible. NC NC NC 
526   Male Speaker: High priority - NC NC NC 
527   Male Speaker: Who was that? IIG IIG IIG 
528   Female Speaker: 
One of the guys in ________ wanting to 
know if we needed any help. TIE TIE TIE 
529   Sergeant McCain: If anything, we need more trackers. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
530   Male Speaker: Yep. TIE TIE TIE 
531 [00:40]  Sergeant McCain: Say that again, please. MISC MISC MISC 
532   Male Speaker: Who’s that? IIG IIG IIG 
533   Male Speaker: 
The search track is heading toward New 
York.  That’s all I know.   TIE US TIE 
      
He’s got a tracker sitting here doing just 
New York and he’s telling us the tracks.  
That’s all. TIE TIE TIE 
534   Male Speaker: Sergeant McCain. TIE TIE TIE 
535   Sergeant McCain: Yes, this is __________. NC NC NC 
536   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
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537   Male Speaker: DMNA just called. TIE TIE TIE 
538   Sergeant McCain: Who? IIG IIG IIG 
539   Male Speaker: DMNA. TIE TIE TIE 
540   Sergeant McCain: Who are they? IIG IIG IIG 
541   Male Speaker: Division Military and Naval Affairs. TIE TIE TIE 
542   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
543   Male Speaker: 
We’ve been directed to force protection 
condition Charlie. TIE TIE TIE 
544   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  That’s real world? IIG IIG IIG 
545   Male Speaker: Yep. I’m here. MISC MISC MISC 
546   Sergeant McCain: Hello?  Can you hear me? MISC MISC MISC 
547   Male Speaker: Yeah, I can now.   MISC US MISC 
      Did you hear me? MISC MISC MISC 
548   Sergeant McCain: Yes, I heard you.   TIE US TIE 
      
Force conduct - Force condition Charlie 
for New York State; is that correct? IIG IIG IIG 
549   Male Speaker: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
550   Sergeant McCain: Just New York State? IIG IIG IIG 
551   Male Speaker: Yep. TIE TIE TIE 
552   Sergeant McCain: Roger that. MISC MISC MISC 
553   Male Speaker: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
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554   Sergeant McCain: Thanks.   MISC MISC MISC 
555   Male Speaker: MCC - MCC - MISC MISC MISC 
556   Sergeant McCain:
Go ahead. Did you get word that the 
Pentagon has now been hit?  IIG IIG IIG 
      We’re at condition Charlie. TIE TIE TIE 
557   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
558   Sergeant McCain:
Charlie.  Yep. We’re at Charlie.  No.  
Okay. TIE TIE TIE 
559   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  We need to be more selective on 
what we drop.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      
We have Boston - No, we have New York 
City and Washington back here.  TIE US TIE 
      
We’re watching New York and 
Washington.   TIE US TIE 
      
Up there, they have Boston - the hijack 
headed west and the _______. TIE TIE TIE 
560   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  There’s one hijacker now? IIG IIG IIG 
561   Male Speaker: Right now they - NC NC NC 
562   Sergeant McCain:
 - Shelly, those are out of Langley.  
Shelly, those are the Langley - TIE TIE TIE 
563   Male Speaker: Show that one Z point you just put in.    DTA(COA) US DTA(COA) 
      Go. DTA(COA) US DTA(COA) 
      I see that guy going north.   IIS US IIS 
      Let him run north.  DTA(COA) US DTA(COA) 
      I don’t want anything headed east.  DTA(COA) US DTA(COA) 
      
You tell me if you see anything heading 
towards New York City, okay? DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
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564   Male Speaker: ____________. NC NC NC 
565   Sergeant McCain:  Huh?  MISC US MISC 
      
That’s not him.  That’s your search target 
right now.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
We have fighters on cap over New York 
City.  We have fighters right now headed 
for Washington to go on cap to be in 
position.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
They’re trying to find someone to get on 
our western guy.  They’re having 
problems - TIE TIE TIE 
566   Male Speaker: ______________? NC NC NC 
567   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, they’re having a problem.  That 
might be.  He might be headed towards 
the Sears Tower.  I don’t know.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
They are trying to get on that guy 
someone - west.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 We don’t know if they’re trying to get 
someone from Selfridge.  - has no aircraft. TIE TIE TIE 
568   Male Speaker: 
Steve, Steve.  They’re trying to get Toledo 
airborne.   TIE TIE TIE 
569   Male Speaker: Toledo? IIG IIG IIG 
570   Male Speaker: 
They’re trying to get Toledo up.  We are 
trying to get a hold of Toledo.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Trying to get them airborne to get that 
other guy. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
571   Sergeant McCain: There’s four now reported.   TIE US TIE 
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      They’re not where they’re supposed to be. TIE TIE TIE 
572   Male Speaker: Steve, do you have enough trackers?   IIG IIG IIG 
573   Sergeant McCain: Do we need anybody - IIG IIG IIG 
574   Male Speaker: 
Do we need to recall anybody for 
tracking? IIG IIG IIG 
575   Sergeant McCain: We have everybody in. TIE US TIE 
      
I can get another crew in here pretty damn 
quick. TSOG TIE TIE 
576   Male Speaker: No, we’re okay right now.   TIE TIE TIE 
577   Sergeant McCain:
If I have to I’ll call every son of a bitch I 
can. TIE TIE TIE 
578   Male Speaker: We’re okay right now. TIE TIE TIE 
579   Male Speaker: All right.   MISC US MISC 
      Let me know. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
580   Male Speaker: Hello?  MISC US MISC 
      Did you catch that?   IIG US IIG 
      089, hard right-hand turn at level 27,000. TIE TIE TIE 
581   Male Speaker: They got a computer - NC NC NC 
582   Male Speaker: What do you need utility for, Sir?   IIG US IIG 
      You need TT?   IIG US IIG 
      Okay.  Long arm is down?   IIG IIG IIG 
      I need TT out here. TIE TIE TIE 
583   Sergeant McCain: 
Nobody at Duluth.  They don’t have any 
aircraft.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Try to get Toledo up.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
584   Male Speaker: I need GTE out here immediately.   TIE TIE TIE 
585   Male Speaker: Jeff, long arm radios are down.   TIE TIE TIE 
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586   Sergeant McCain: I got four so far.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
They reported American Airlines 11, 
American Airlines - TIE TIE TIE 
587 [00:45]  Male Speaker: They’re still airborne? IIG IIG IIG 
588   Male Speaker: 
No.  This is from the beginning of this 
whole shebang.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Keep an eye on it.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      Where’s he at?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Weapons has the listings in their checklist. 
In the checklist they have a whole ITA 
listing.  I don’t know what they’re - 
Boston and New York.   TIE TIE TIE 
589   Sergeant McCain: Surveillance, Sergeant Richmond.  Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
590   Male Speaker: Hello, this is Sergeant Barns at the 103rd. MISC MISC MISC 
591   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
592   
Sergeant 
Richmond: 
I got a call earlier saying you guys might 
need a _____? TIE TIE TIE 
593   Sergeant Barns: Let me - Let me give you to my MCC - MISC MISC MISC 
594   
Sergeant 
Richmond: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
595   Sergeant Barns: Who is this?  The 103rd? IIG IIG IIG 
596   
Sergeant 
Richmond: 103rd. TIE TIE TIE 
597   Sergeant Barns: I’m sending you to 6311. TIE TIE TIE 
598   
Sergeant 
Richmond: Yeah, I did.   NC NC NC 
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      Northeast? NC NC NC 
599   Sergeant Barns: 
Hello, sir.  This is Sergeant Demage at the 
103rd ACS.   MISC TIE TIE 
      
I got a call from you guys earlier saying 
you might need a sub.  Do you need us? IIG IIG IIG 
600   
Sergeant 
Richmond: Let me find out for you.  Hold on. TIE TIE TIE 
601   Sergeant McCain: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
602   
Sergeant 
Demage: Do you need the 103rd out of Connecticut? IIG IIG IIG 
603   Sergeant McCain: Not yet. TIE TIE TIE 
604   
Sergeant 
Demage: Not yet, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
605   Sergeant McCain:
Do you want us to - to get our radar up or 
- IIG IIG IIG 
606   Male Speaker: Stand by and crank it a turn, he says. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
607   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  We have people in route to turn it 
on right now. TIE TIE TIE 
608   
Sergeant 
Demage: Okay.  We’ll be ready.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Thanks. Gotcha. MISC US MISC 
609   Sergeant McCain: MCC? MISC MISC MISC 
610   
Sergeant 
Demage: What? MISC MISC MISC 
611   Sergeant McCain: Charlie crew swing surveillance? IIG IIG IIG 
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612   Male Speaker: You need them? IIG IIG IIG 
613   Sergeant McCain: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
614   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
615   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  Long arm radios, computer up 
front is locked up. TIE TIE TIE 
616   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
617   Sergeant McCain: Looks like the Pentagon got hit. TIE TIE TIE 
618   Male Speaker: Pentagon did get hit.   TKS TIE TIE 
      
We need to make a command decision.  
________ saying he needs some more 
surveillance people. TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’re recommending Charlie crew swing 
to come in here. TIE TIE TSOG 
619   Sergeant McCain:
He needed __________ and it wasn’t 
working. TIE TIE TIE 
620   Male Speaker: Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      We’re all here.  Northeast. TIE TIE TIE 
621   Sergeant McCain: Yeah, I’m looking for a Major Deskins.  TIE US TIE 
      
This is Major Mormon from Springfield 
National Guard Base. TIE TIE TIE 
622   Huntress: 
Stand by.  Stand by.  I’ll get you Major 
Deskins - DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
623   Sergeant McCain:
Who am I talking to right now?  What 
office? IIG IIG IIG 
624   Major Mormon: This is the Ops floor, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
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625   Sergeant McCain: Of where? IIG IIG IIG 
626   Major Mormon: Of Northeast Air Defense Sector. TIE TIE TIE 
627   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
628   Major Mormon: 
Huntress.  I just motioned. She’s up and 
behind some glass here.   TIE TIE TIE 
629   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  I don’t need to talk to her.   TIE US TIE 
      
What we're trying to do is she just called 
here and said we need airplanes in the air.  TIE US TIE 
      
I don’t know why she called Springfield 
National Guard Base. TIE TIE TIE 
630   Major Mormon: 
We’ve got a problem out there.  That’s 
why she called. TIE TIE TIE 
631   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  You know where our airplanes are, 
correct? IIG IIG IIG 
632   Major Mormon: 
Sir, I really - I haven’t been working that 
part of our - TIE TIE TIE 
633   Sergeant McCain: I understand.  I understand.  I - MISC MISC MISC 
634   Major Mormon: I’m not familiar - NC NC NC 
635   Sergeant McCain:
I understand.  All I’m doing is following 
up on a phone call and make sure it wasn’t 
somebody - TIE TIE TIE 
636   Major Mormon: 
I’ve got her coming down here right now 
and she’ll be here in just a minute. TIE TIE TIE 
637   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
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638   Major Mormon: 
6311.  The Ohio National Guard.  You 
called them.  You called them. TIE TIE TIE 
639   Sergeant McCain: Major Deskins. MISC MISC MISC 
640   Major Mormon: 
Major Deskins?  This is Major Tom 
Mormon from - TIE TIE TIE 
641   Sergeant McCain:
Oh, by the way.  68 IC 3, 68 IC 3, be 
advised we are at 4th option Bravo.  Force 
protection Bravo.  Real world. TIE TIE TIE 
642   Major Deskins: Copy. MISC MISC MISC 
643   Major Mormon: Copy.   MISC MISC MISC 
644   Male Speaker: 
I hate to bother you with this, okay, but 
Steve says he needs more people. I 
suggest we call - TIE TIE TIE 
645   Male Speaker: Force protection - TIE TIE TIE 
646   Male Speaker: We call Charlie Crew Swings.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I want all the surveillance people in here 
pronto. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
647   Sergeant McCain: - the other one now. NC NC NC 
648   Male Speaker: No problem.  MISC US MISC 
      
Kevin?  Make sure that this is a no 
bullshit recall.  I want them in here as fast 
as possible. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
      Quit 301.  Try it.   NC NC NC 
649   Sergeant McCain: I don’t know.  Do you need more people? IIG IIG IIG 
650   Huntress: - for 89? IIG IIG IIG 
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651   Sergeant McCain: - I don’t know who they’re - NC NC NC 
652   Sergeant McCain: Stand by.  I may need you as a runner.   DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
      Do you need more people?  IIG IIG IIG 
       I’m gonna get you two.  TIE US TIE 
      
Go find Kevin Foster and tell him I need 
two ID techs from Charlie ASAP. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
653   Huntress: 
From what I understand, this guy out west 
is orbiting?  TIE TIE TIE 
      Is that what I heard? IIG IIG IIG 
654   Male Speaker: 
I got a recall Charlie flight surveillance, 
and I recalled two ID techs over here so 
that these guys can get a break.   TIE US TIE 
      
These guys have been sitting here and 
messing with this stuff.   TIE US TIE 
      You need some kind of food.  TIE MISC MISC 
      
Sir, I recalled all of Charlie Crew 
surveillance and two ID techs. TIE US TIE 
      
We recalled Charlie crew surveillance 
from swing and two ID techs from Charlie 
flight.   TIE TIE TIE 
655 [00:50]  Sergeant McCain:
We called Charlie crew surveillance.  We 
already did it.  We already did.  It’s 
already been done.  They’ve been 
recalled. TIE TIE TIE 
656   Male Speaker: 
MCC,  __________ 257 has gone to 
1,200.  ____________ target - TIE TIE TIE 
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657   Sergeant McCain: Hey, Steve.  How you doing?   MISC US MISC 
      Hey, we’re not doing so good right now.  MISC US MISC 
      I need you guys to make sure that - MISC MISC MISC 
658   Male Speaker: 
Attention in the area, attention in the area.  
Check noise level in the Ops room, please.  MISC MISC IIG 
      
Noise level in the Ops room. Did anyone 
hear it?   IIG US IIG 
      
Can you please - Chuck, Bravo 089.  
That’s the track number.  Okay.   TIE US TIE 
      
Tell them we’re still gonna keep it at 15 
until we confirm that he’s on the ground.  
All right?   DTA(RTA) TIE TIE 
      Northeast, Sergeant McCain. MISC US MISC 
659   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, this is Sergeant Centra- at 
Southeast.  MISC US MISC 
      
Could you confirm that B089 is where it’s 
supposed to be ________? IIG IIG IIG 
660   Male Speaker: Can I confirm what? IIG IIG IIG 
661   Sergeant McCain: That the track of special in your area - IIG IIG IIG 
662   Sergeant Centra Bravo 089?   IIG US IIG 
      
Okay.  Last - These are the last words, 
okay?   TIE US TIE 
      
They got in touch with the pilot.  He is 
evidently not declaring a hijack and is 
landing at Cleveland for precautionary 
measures only.  But - TIE TIE TIE 
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663   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
664   Sergeant Centra: 
- But we are going to keep him a special 
15 until we confirm him down on the 
ground and safe. TIE TIE TIE 
665   Sergeant McCain: I understand. MISC MISC MISC 
666   Sergeant Centra: Understand?  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
667   Sergeant McCain: You to 6854. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
668   Sergeant Centra: 
At this point, I ain’t doing shit.  I’m just 
passing on information.   MISC MISC MISC 
669   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
670   Male Speaker: 
6854, I got the 103rd coming to you - I’m 
talking to my operator.   TIE US TIE 
      
I got the 103rd coming your way.  I’m 
sending you to 6854.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
MCC?  The 103rd __________ working a 
link. TIE TIE TIE 
671   Sergeant McCain: You the man. MISC MISC MISC 
672   Male Speaker: 
Connecticut I want to say or Rhode Island.  
Connecticut. TIE TIE TIE 
673   Male Speaker: 
Connecticut.  It’s Connecticut.  The 103rd 
is up in birds TIE TIE TIE 
674   Sergeant McCain:
I don’t know.  I know they were looking 
for _______ number.  I don’t know what’s 
going on with that.   TIE TIE TIE 
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      MCC, _____? NC NC NC 
675   Male Speaker: I don’t know.  Let me check.   MISC MISC MISC 
676   Sergeant McCain: I need to know.  All the targets - IIG IIG IIG 
677   Male Speaker: Do we have any available?   IIG IIG IIG 
678   Sergeant McCain: That’s what I’m asking. TIE TIE TIE 
679   Male Speaker: Okay.  That’s what you’re asking? IIG IIG IIG 
680   Sergeant McCain: Yes.   MISC MISC MISC 
681   Male Speaker: Steve?  Steve? MISC MISC MISC 
682   Sergeant McCain: Yes? MISC MISC MISC 
683   Male Speaker: 
A request just went in for an E3 over 
Chicago. TIE TIE TIE 
684 [00:55]  Sergeant McCain: Got it. TIE TIE TIE 
685   Male Speaker: Yeah, he was making a turn down - TIE TIE TIE 
686   Sergeant McCain: I got the recall in. TIE TIE TIE 
687   Male Speaker: ________ calling from __________.   MISC US MISC 
      I’d like to do 3 or 4 line checks. TIE TIE TIE 
688   Female Speaker: Not a good time.  Not a good time at all.   TIE US TIE 
      
We’ve got all kinds of shit hitting the fan 
down here.  Okay? TIE TIE TIE 
689   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Forget it. MISC MISC MISC 
690   Male Speaker: Yeah, do it later. MISC MISC MISC 
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691   Sergeant Bianchi: Washington - NC NC NC 
692   Male Speaker: How long?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
We have to get a hold of Booster.  Major 
Booster.   TIE US TIE 
      Can we call him?  Did you try to call him?  IIG US IIG 
      Try Major Booster and try Captain Ruby.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      
Where’s the recall book?  The recall 
roster?   IIG US IIG 
      Get a hold of Booster.  DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      
If you can’t get a hold of him then get a 
hold of Humberg.  Humberg’s at home 
asleep.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
      
It’s all there.  All your recall officers are 
there.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Northeast? Okay.  Major Cheney, how are 
you doing?  Are you having any problems 
out there?   MISC IIG IIG 
      Okay.  You got two going up to Fargo -  TIE US TIE 
      
This is Sergeant McCain.  How are you 
doing, Major Cheney?  We’re kind of 
busy here.  MISC US MISC 
      
Two at Fargo and two city.  I’ll pass that 
on.  TIE US TIE 
      Under FAA control right now? IIG IIG IIG 
693   Sergeant Bianchi: ________ airline. NC NC NC 
694   Male Speaker: Right.  Got it.  That’s fine.  MISC US MISC 
      I’ll let them know.   MISC US MISC 
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      You bet.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
695   Sergeant McCain: No, we don’t know where he is.   TIE TIE TIE 
696   Huntress: ________ just called.   TIE US TIE 
      
You got two coming up on status with 
Fargo and two more in two cities. TIE TIE TIE 
697   Sergeant McCain: Why aren’t we calling the other crew? IIG IIG IIG 
698   Huntress: 
That’s from the lodge.  That came from 
the lodge.   TIE US TIE 
      They’re bringing them on status.   TIE US TIE 
      
Yes, it will be about half an hour before 
they get there.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Sergeant McCain.  Sergeant McCain, 
Northeast.. MISC US MISC 
699   Sergeant McCain: Yes, this is ________.  MISC US MISC 
       Is the exercise knocked off?   IIG IIG IIG 
700   Male Speaker: The exercise was cancelled.   TIE US TIE 
      We’re all out of parts here. TIE TIE TIE 
701   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  I’ll call the battle gap cab.  Thanks. TIE TIE TIE 
702   Male Speaker: Sergeant Demage?   MISC US MISC 
      We are working a tanker.   TIE TIE TIE 
703   Sergeant McCain: There is a bomb on board Boston - TKS TIE TIE 
704   Male Speaker: Fuck. MISC MISC MISC 
705   Male Speaker: On board what?  Boston 93?   IIG IIG IIG 
706   Huntress: United. TIE TIE TIE 
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707   Male Speaker: United? IIG IIG IIG 
708   Sergeant McCain: Bomb on board United 93. TKS TIE TIE 
709   Huntress: 
Intercept.  Intercept.  We want the aircraft 
away from there. DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
710   Sergeant McCain:
United 93, bomb on board.  They are 
recently over Pittsburg. TKS TIE TIE 
711 [01:00]  Huntress: You have a mode 3 code? IIG IIG IIG 
712   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
713   Huntress: 
Yeah, Lieutenant calling from down 
Southeast. MISC MISC MISC 
714   Sergeant McCain: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
715   Sergeant Perry: 
Hey, just wanted to confirm that that guy 
that you’re telling us, Bravo 089 is Delta 
89? IIG IIG IIG 
716   Male Speaker: That’s correct. TIE TIE TIE 
717   Sergeant Perry: 
Oh, okay.  I’m seeing the stuff in the chat 
here, too.  IIG US IIG 
      Can you lat tel that to us? IIG IIG IIG 
718   Male Speaker: Can we lat tel what? IIG IIG IIG 
719   Sergeant Perry: 
I got another thing here from 14:07 from 
NEADS MCC. TIE TIE TIE 
720   Male Speaker: What do you need? IIG IIG IIG 
721   Sergeant Perry: 
About the aircraft from Canada?  We’d 
like to get a position on that. IIG IIG IIG 
722   Male Speaker: We don’t have a position on it.   TIE TIE TIE 
723   Sergeant Perry: 
Okay.  Good deal.  Hey, what’s going on 
with Delta 89?  Is he landing or - IIG IIG IIG 
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724   Male Speaker: 
He’s landing - Last we heard he’s 
supposed to be landing at Cleveland. TKS TIE TIE 
725   Sergeant Perry: Okay.  Good deal.   MISC MISC MISC 
726   Male Speaker: Got to go. MISC MISC MISC 
727   Sergeant Perry: Wait - MISC MISC MISC 
728   Male Speaker: Any squawks?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
If this is the next guy’s input then this is a 
good one. NC NC NC 
729   Sergeant Perry: 
You couldn’t orchestrate this kind of 
bullshit. MISC MISC MISC 
730   Female Speaker: Into Cleveland.  Okay. TIE TIE TIE 
731   Sergeant McCain: 1527 - TIE TIE TIE 
732   Male Speaker: 1527?  Can we locate that, please?   IIG US IIG 
      1527, right? IIG IIG IIG 
733   Sergeant McCain: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
734   Female Speaker: 1527, mode 3, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
735   Sergeant McCain: 35911.  35911.  078, 46 west. TIE TIE TIE 
736   Male Speaker: 7846.  Going in for a Z point. TIE TIE TIE 
737   Male Speaker: 
Thank you, Sir.  This is the plane with the 
bomb on board.   TKS TIE TIE 
738   Female Speaker: 351 north 078, 46.   TIE TIE TIE 
739   Sergeant McCain: Airborne in 20 minutes. TIE TIE TIE 
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740   Female Speaker: 
All I got is a Z point - I got a Z point but 
to tell you the truth, I don’t know what the 
track number is.  I can’t find it but it’s in 
there.  TIE US TIE 
      
If you look right on that __________ you 
gave me.  3978 - TIE TIE TIE 
741   Sergeant McCain: Coming up on 3280 - TIE TIE TIE 
742   Male Speaker: Bravo 424, what’s the Z point on that?   IIG IIG IIG 
743   Sergeant McCain: Why are they calling Charlie Crew in? IIG IIG IIG 
744   Male Speaker: Huh? IIG IIG IIG 
745   Sergeant McCain: Why are they calling Charlie Crew in? IIG IIG IIG 
746   Male Speaker: Open line.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
747   Male Speaker: 
Colonel Lott from the 174th is the SD 
available? MISC MISC MISC 
748   Male Speaker: Yes, Sir.  Stand by.   MISC US MISC 
      
Colonel Lott from 174th wants to talk to 
you, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
749   Sergeant Perry: ____________________. NC NC NC 
750   Colonel Lott: 
I’m doing, well, as good as can be 
expected.   TIE US TIE 
      
I got guys that will be launching in about 
15 minutes. TIE TIE TIE 
751   Sergeant Perry: I appreciate it.   MISC US MISC 
      Are they loaded? IIG IIG IIG 
752   Male Speaker: We’ve got hot guns.  That’s all I - TIE TIE TIE 
753   Colonel Lott: Hot guns?  IIG US IIG 
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Well, that’s good enough for me for the 
time being.  Only words I got are - I got 
another possible aircraft with a bomb on 
board.  It’s in Pennsylvania, York, 
approximate area. TIE TIE TIE 
754   Male Speaker: Yeah, that’s south. TIE TIE TIE 
755   Colonel Lott: 
Yeah, south of us.  There’s also the 
possibility of - Where is that guy?  
Where’s the other guy?  The special?  He 
turned back over the lake?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
No, the other lake.  Lake Eerie.  Right 
there.   TIE US TIE 
      
Okay, another one that’s possibly at 
Cleveland area. TIE TIE TIE 
756 [01:05]   Male Speaker: Okay.  Do you want sectors on those? IIG IIG IIG 
757   Colonel Lott: 
Not yet.  It looks like one, the one over 
Cleveland,  turned around.   IIS US IIS 
      
It looks like he’s heading back to the east.  
The guy down at York, Pennsylvania - IIS TIE TIE 
758   Male Speaker: 
I’m gonna try to voice that hard copy 
___________ at CONAR - TIE TIE TIE 
759   Colonel Lott: 
Can I have a phone number for you?  
6850?   IIG US IIG 
      
What’s your name again?  What’s your 
name again?  Thank you. IIG IIG IIG 
760   Male Speaker: 410 - MISC TIE TIE 
761   Colonel Lott: 1527 on the mode 3? IIG IIG IIG 
762   Male Speaker: Yeah, we’re not finding them.  Open line. TIE TIE TIE 
763   Female Speaker: This is Sergeant Richmond.   MISC MISC MISC 
764   Male Speaker: What happened? IIG IIG IIG 
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765   Male Speaker: We’re finding out.  We’re finding out.   TIE TIE TIE 
766   
Sergeant 
Richmond: - Northeast of Camp David. TIE TIE TIE 
767   Male Speaker: No, I don’t.   TIE US TIE 
      Can you get a Z point for me?  DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
       Give me the lat and long.  Open line. DTA(RTA) IIG IIG 
768   Male Speaker: Open line.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry.   MISC MISC MISC 
769   Female Speaker: ___________ from CONAR.   MISC US MISC 
      
We understand a plane coming out of 
Canada - We need clarification on if that 
plane is going to DC or state - Washington 
State. IIG IIG IIG 
770   Male Speaker: DC. TIE TIE TIE 
771   Sergeant Perry: It’s going towards DC? IIG IIG IIG 
772   Male Speaker: We believe so. TIE TIE TIE 
773   Sergeant Perry: : NC NC NC 
774   Male Speaker: Stand by.  All right.  Hold on.   DTA(RTA) MISC MISC 
775   Sergeant Perry: Major Nasypany on line.  Go. MISC MISC MISC 
776   Male Speaker ___________ from CONAR, Sir.  MISC US MISC 
      
 I just - I had a request to find out if we 
have any fighters near the aircraft going 
towards DC that’s coming out of Canada? IIG IIG IIG 
777   Sergeant Perry: Yeah. MISC TIE TIE 
778   Major Nasypany: We do?  What do we have out there? IIG IIG IIG 
779   Male Speaker: Wait a minute.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      
Are you requesting that we have Quit 25, 
26 in the MCA area?  Quebec, India, 
Uniform, Tango? IIG IIG IIG 
780   Major Nasypany: 25 and 26?  Where are they out of? IIG IIG IIG 
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781   Male Speaker: 
4 quit, 4 quit, 25 and 26.  We’re falling 
behind in the __________ stuff.   TIE TIE TIE 
782   Major Nasypany: Quit? IIG IIG IIG 
783   Male Speaker: Quit.  TIE US TIE 
       It’s over the NCA area.  TIE US TIE 
       Quit 25, 26.   TIE TIE TIE 
      QT? IIG IIG IIG 
784   Major Nasypany: QT, yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
785   Male Speaker: What base are the fighters out of? IIG IIG IIG 
786   Major Nasypany: They’re over Cleveland.   TIE US TIE 
      
I’ve got 3 over there.  I got 25, 26 and 27.  
I got 3 birds there. TIE TIE TIE 
787   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  I’m trying to see if that’s the same 
- airline right now? IIG TIE IIG 
788   Male Speaker: 
No, they’re with the NCA.  I got them 
flying over the NCA.  They’re doing the 
best they can.   TIE TIE TIE 
789 [01:10]   Major Nasypany: 
4342.  They want somebody to handle 
them.   TIE TIE TIE 
      What aircraft is this?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
It keeps saying unknown, unidentified.  
Okay. IIG IIG IIG 
790   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
791   Major Nasypany: Hi, this is Mr. Arnold at Niagara Falls.   MISC US MISC 
      How are you? MISC MISC MISC 
792   Female Speaker: Good. MISC MISC MISC 
793   Sergeant Perry: Hey, I need to talk to somebody -  IIG IIG IIG 
      They called about our availability.  TIE US TIE 
       They said to ask for the MCC. TIE TIE TIE 
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794   Mr. Arnold: Yes, Sir.  Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      I got MCC from Niagara Falls on the line.  TIE TIE TIE 
795   Sergeant Perry: Yes, hi.  Who is this?   IIG US IIG 
      This is the MCC.   TIE US TIE 
      Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
796   Mr. Arnold: Hi, it’s Mr. Arnold from Niagara Falls. MISC MISC MISC 
797   Sergeant Perry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
798   Male Speaker: 
We can have one chopper ready - We can 
have it airborne in 2 hours pumped up 
with some extra offload capability and 
we’re in the process of pumping another 
two up right now after that. TKS TIE TKS 
799   Mr. Arnold: Okay.  One and two hours?   IIG US IIG 
      How long for the second two? IIG IIG IIG 
800   Male Speaker: 
I would give it about an hour and a half to 
two hours for the other two.  I - TIE TIE TIE 
801   Mr. Arnold: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
802   Male Speaker: North of Camp David. TIE TIE TIE 
803   Mr. Arnold: Hello?  Who’s this? MISC MISC MISC 
804   Male Speaker: 
It’s Niagara Falls calling to see if you 
need __________ Cleveland right behind 
us.   TIE TIE TIE 
805   Male Speaker: Okay.  Was he on hold? IIG MISC IIG 
806   Male Speaker: No, no. TIE TIE TIE 
807   Male Speaker: 
Have we called the Southeast and see if 
they have any fighters out of Charleston? IIG IIG IIG 
808   Sergeant McCain: No, not yet.   TIE TIE TIE 
809   Male Speaker: You got an idea? IIG IIG IIG 
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810   Sergeant McCain: That one is from New York. TIE TIE TIE 
811   Male Speaker: Northeast. MISC MISC MISC 
812   Sergeant McCain: Yeah, this is _________. MISC NC NC 
      Is there any _________? IIG NC NC 
813   Female Speaker: Hold on a minute, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
814   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
815   Male Speaker: Do you know who it is? IIG MISC MISC 
816   Sergeant McCain: I have no idea who - NC MISC MISC 
817   Male Speaker: 
Is there any way we can _______ noise 
level?  IIG IIG IIG 
      I’m sorry, Sir. MISC US MISC 
818   Sergeant McCain: Stand by.  Stand by.   MISC US MISC 
      We’re real busy here. TIE MISC MISC 
819   Female Speaker: I understand, Sir.   MISC MISC MISC 
820   Male Speaker: 
Get a hold of ________ turn around and 
go ________.  DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
       Not you but that was an idea.  TIE US TIE 
       Sir, are you there? IIG US IIG 
       Call back.  DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
       I think line 2 is clear. TIE US TIE 
821   Sergeant McCain: Line two?  Anybody on line two?  IIG IIG IIG 
       Okay.  Yes, Sir. MISC US MISC 
822   Male Speaker: That is a coast guard.   TIE TIE TIE 
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Turn him around and have him go look.  
Northeast is - DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
823   Sergeant McCain: Northeast, Sergeant Perry.   MISC MISC MISC 
824   Male Speaker: Hey, Mike.  This is Sergeant Tillhouse. MISC MISC MISC 
825   Sergeant McCain: Yeah, hi. MISC MISC MISC 
826   Sergeant Perry: 
Hey, just to let you know I’m on the 
freeway heading home.  I’m in Syracuse.  
If they’re doing any recall people I’m on 
my way home. TIE TIE TIE 
827   
Sergeant 
Tillhouse: Miles, Miles.  Standby.  Miles? MISC MISC MISC 
828   Sergeant Perry: Yes? MISC MISC MISC 
829   
Sergeant 
Tillhouse: This is Sergeant McCain.   MISC US MISC 
      We could use you.   TIE TIE TIE 
830 [01:15]  Sergeant McCain: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
831   
Sergeant 
Tillhouse: We could use you bad. ISA TIE ISA 
832   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  I’ll try and get in there as soon as I 
can. TIE TIE TIE 
833   
Sergeant 
Tillhouse: Thanks, bud.   MISC US MISC 
      What’s that? IIG IIG IIG 
834   Sergeant McCain: The President is airborne. TIE TIE TIE 
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835   
Sergeant 
Tillhouse: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
836   Sergeant McCain: Got it. MISC MISC MISC 
837   Male Speaker: 
Can you help some of these people at 
tracking this bird?   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
838   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  We’re recalling a bunch of people.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Hey, this is Sergeant McCain, Northeast.   MISC US MISC 
      
Can you get Air Force One airborne and 
get a good position on them and a good 
check on them?   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      
Can you make sure you call us as soon as 
possible - DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
839   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  We’re doing it now because he’s 
on his way. TIE TIE TIE 
840   Male Speaker: 
I don’t care how far south he is we just 
want to know where he’s at. TIE TIE TIE 
841   Sergeant McCain: We’re doing it now. TIE TIE TIE 
842   Male Speaker: Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
843   Sergeant McCain: We got 475.  We got the particulars, yeah.  TIE TIE TIE 
844   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
845   Sergeant McCain:
He needs to anchor in the next three 
hours. TIE TIE TIE 
846   Male Speaker: 
Well, where’s he going?  Where’s he 
heading? IIG IIG IIG 
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847   Sergeant McCain: Oh, God.  Okay.  ____ for ID. NC NC NC 
848   Male Speaker: No, it’s leaving Florida. TIE TIE TIE 
849   Sergeant McCain: Leaving Florida? IIG IIG IIG 
850   Male Speaker: 
Yeah.  More fighters are going out.  Guns 
are on them.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Two of them when they get there are 
going to - Washington DC - All right?   TKS TIE TKS 
      We’ll have two fighters. TIE TIE TIE 
851   Sergeant McCain: Where’s force - where’s he going - IIG IIG IIG 
852   Male Speaker: 
I was told he was going to _______.  
That’s what I was told.   TIE TIE TIE 
      777? IIG IIG IIG 
853   Sergeant McCain: Yep, four sevens.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Can you make any sense out of - Okay.   IIG US IIG 
      
He’s gonna be in the Chicago area.  
_______ 50,000 tons will give them.  
Most of it. TIE TIE TIE 
854   Male Speaker: Quiet down a little bit.  Use the intercom.  DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
855   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, it’s going to Washington.  All right.  
_____ 19th - TIE TIE TIE 
856   Sergeant McCain: There’s more than one aircraft.   TIE TIE TIE 
857   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
858 [01:20]  Male Speaker: Yeah, this is Sergeant Centron.  MISC MISC MISC 
       ___________, please? NC US NC 
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859   Male Speaker: 
Line 1 is secure so you’ll be secure on line 
1. TIE TIE TIE 
860   Sergeant Perry: Okay.  Can I - NC NC NC 
861   Sergeant Centron: Stand by.  Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
862   Sergeant Perry: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
863   Male Speaker: You can pick up.   MISC MISC MISC 
      You got it, Sir?  MISC MISC MISC 
       Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
864   Sergeant Perry: It’s Colonel Creski with 1st Fighter Wing. MISC TIE TIE 
865   Male Speaker: Yes, Sir? IIG MISC MISC 
866   Sergeant Perry: 
Hey, do you have a Senior Control or the 
Senior Duty Officer or somebody around? IIG IIG IIG 
867   Colonel Creski: 
Okay.  We got out MCC here.  He’s on a 
line.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’ve got our Senior Director?  I can 
send you to him? IIG IIG IIG 
868   Sergeant Perry: 
Okay.  Whoever - Basically whoever is in 
charge. TIE TIE TIE 
869   Colonel Creski: Cleveland, can I help you? MISC IIG IIG 
870   Sergeant Perry: Who’s this?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
This is Colonel Creski with the 1st Fighter 
Wing. TIE TIE TIE 
871   Colonel Creski: It’s Lt. Colonel Cleveland. TIE TIE TIE 
872   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
Hey.  We got a call from NORAD 
basically saying get four jets airborne with 
a hot gun as soon as you can? TIE TIE TIE 
873   Colonel Creski: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
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874   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
We got word from ACC basically telling 
us to standby because technically we work 
for the ACC type of thing and let’s make 
sure we get our story straight kind of stuff. IIS TIE TIE 
875   Colonel Creski: 
We’re looking to get a four ship with a 
gun or whatever you got available to get 
up to finish escorting Air Force One back 
in to the Washington area. TSOG TIE TSOG 
876   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
Okay.  Somebody needs to get a hold of 
ACC and tell them about this. DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
877   Colonel Creski: Okay.  I’ll talk to my commander. TIE TIE TIE 
878   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
I tried to get a hold of NORAD - the 
number that, you know?   TIE US TIE 
      Their lines are all busy. TIE TIE TIE 
879   Colonel Creski: Yeah, I can believe it. MISC TIE MISC 
880   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: I thought maybe you might have it. IIG IIG IIG 
881   Colonel Creski: 
No, I don’t have the number right now.  
The circuits are so busy we can even get 
DSN access. TIE TIE TIE 
882   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: Great. MISC MISC MISC 
883   Colonel Creski: Hold on a second.  Give me your number. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
884   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
Okay.  The number here is - 5411 is 
command post.   TIE TIE TIE 
885   Colonel Creski: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
886   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 574 is ________. NC TIE TIE 
887   Colonel Creski: Got it.  Okay.   MISC US MISC 
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We got to shut down line so that we can 
use it.  ISA DTA(COA) ISA 
      
I’ll go talk to my commander and then I’ll 
be right back with you. TIE TIE TIE 
888   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
Okay.  You understand the issue is that 
we’re being ________ by NORAD and 
ACC and saying that we don’t work for 
NORAD yet.  They’re not being dicks 
about it.  They just want to make sure that 
we don’t - IIS TIE IIS 
889   Colonel Creski: 
Well, if you can get them hot cocked and 
ready to go, we’d appreciate it.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
890   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: Okay.  We’re heading that direction. TIE TIE TIE 
891   Colonel Creski: All right.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
892   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
893   Colonel Creski: Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
894   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: 
Let’s have the four ships recently take off 
or that’s taking off - or gonna take off out 
of Langley? NC NC NC 
895   Colonel Creski: How recently? IIG IIG IIG 
896   
Lt. Col. 
Cleveland: Half a quit.  There’s another flight - TIE TIE TIE 
897   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
898   Male Speaker: 
Hey, this is Colonel Brooks at the Air 
National Guard Cat. MISC MISC MISC 
899   Male Speaker: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
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900   Sergeant Perry: 
I guess they’re getting ready to launch two 
of our Air National Guard F-16’s out of 
the 113’s.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
These guys don’t have a clue who they’re 
talking to and who’s their commanding 
control. I’m assuming it will be you.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I need a radio frequency for them to make 
contact as soon as they get handed off by 
ATC. TIE TIE TIE 
901   Colonel Brooks: Standby, Sir.   MISC US MISC 
      I’ll hand you off to our Senior Director. TIE TIE TIE 
902   Sergeant Perry: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
903   Colonel Brooks: its 6313 if you get disconnected.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
904   Sergeant Perry: 9900__________. NC NC NC 
905   Colonel Brooks: 
There are five aircraft in our sights.  10, 
Charlie, 104, Alpha, 10 - TIE TIE TIE 
906   Sergeant Perry: 
Yes, 1, Kilo, Charlie, 104 Alpha is all he 
said.  I don’t know if that means anything. IIS TIE TIE 
907   Female Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
908   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, Bob Davie, Washington Flight 
Control.   MISC US MISC 
      
I was told to give you a call about 
possibly fueling any area? TIE IIG IIG 
909   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  Please, hold.  Let me put you on 
with somebody that can help you. MISC MISC MISC 
910   Sergeant Perry: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
911   Bob Davie: 6313 if you get disconnected.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Hold on and I’ll patch you up to him. MISC US MISC 
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912   Sergeant Perry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
913   Bob Davie: Call 9900.   TIE TIE TIE 
914   Sergeant Perry: 
Yes, 4, Alpha, 10 going to Kilo, Charlie, 
Echo, Foxtrot.  Copy TIE TIE TIE 
915   Bob Davie: 
Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo, 
Foxtrot.  9900, copy.  MISC US MISC 
      
 One is going to Bangor - Correct.  Gold 
99.   TIE TIE TIE 
916   Female Speaker: Thank you, what was it? IIG IIG IIG 
917   Male Speaker: Come up on 28216. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
918 [01:25] Female Speaker: I wonder if he said - I got weapons - IIG MISC MISC 
919   Female Speaker: Is there somebody monitoring the guard? IIG IIG IIG 
920   Female Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
921   Female Speaker: Hi, this is Captain Sortil from ________. MISC MISC MISC 
922   Female Speaker: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
923   Sergeant Perry: I need to talk to your SD. MISC MISC MISC 
924   Captain Sortil: 
I’ll take you up to him.  If you get 
disconnected it’s 6313. TIE TIE TIE 
      Standby.  6313. MISC US MISC 
925   Sergeant Perry: Slow it down.   MISC US MISC 
      
Hey listen, we’re getting all kinds of 
planes out of the sky and you folks are 
having them launched and we don’t know 
anything about it.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
We need you to have somebody call over 
here and give us some codes when it - DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
926   Captain Sortil: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
927   Sergeant Perry: 
___________ here at Andrew’s Command 
Post.  MISC US MISC 
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      Who am I speaking with? IIG MISC MISC 
928   Male Speaker: Standby a second. MISC MISC MISC 
929   Sergeant Perry: Okay.  Still there? MISC MISC MISC 
930   Male Speaker: Yeah, standby.   MISC MISC MISC 
      I got another call.  MISC MISC MISC 
      Just give me a second. MISC MISC MISC 
931   Sergeant Perry: No problem.  No problem. MISC MISC MISC 
932   Male Speaker: Go ahead.   MISC MISC MISC 
933   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant McCain. MISC MISC MISC 
934   Male Speaker: 
Hey it’s Sergeant Parker from Atlantic 
City. MISC MISC MISC 
935   Sergeant Perry: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
936   Sergeant McCain:
The authenticators that were faxed over?  
The Alpha, Bravo?   IIG US IIG 
      The side was cut off. TIE TIE TIE 
937   Sergeant Parker: 
You need us to refax the authenticators to 
Atlantic City? IIG IIG IIG 
938   Sergeant McCain: Right.  Alpha, Bravo - MISC TIE TIE 
939   Sergeant Parker: 
Okay.  Do you have a name on the fax of 
who sent it to you so I could contact 
them? IIG IIG IIG 
940   Sergeant McCain: It’s Sergeant Perkins or Chief Overman. TIE TIE TIE 
941   Sergeant Parker: Sergeant Perkins or who? IIG IIG IIG 
942   Sergeant McCain: Chief Overman. TIE TIE TIE 
943   Sergeant Parker: 
I don’t know either of those people.  All 
right.  I’ll work on it.   TIE TIE TIE 
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944   Sergeant McCain:
Oh, I’m sorry.  I thought you said who do 
you make it attention to.  I don’t know 
who we spoke to there as far as getting 
this stuff faxed. TIE TIE TIE 
945   Sergeant Parker: I’ll get it to you as soon as I can. MISC TIE MISC 
946   Sergeant McCain: This is the MCC talking.   MISC US MISC 
      May I have your attention, please?   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      Everybody _ slide one.  Slide one - DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
947   Sergeant Parker: Utilities, Tom Berry. MISC MISC MISC 
948   Sergeant McCain:
Hey, this is Sergeant McCain up in the 
Ops room.  MISC US MISC 
      
I need you guys to send a runner up here, 
pronto. DTA(RTA) MISC DTA(RTA) 
949   Male Speaker: What do you need? IIG IIG IIG 
950   Tom Berry: 
I need you to send a runner up here 
pronto.  __________ or somebody. DTA(RTA) MISC DTA(RTA) 
951   Sergeant McCain:
Well, _______ is out of the building right 
now. TIE TIE TIE 
952   Tom Berry: 
Is there anyone else in the military or air 
techs down there? IIG IIG IIG 
953   Sergeant McCain:
Ray’s around here somewhere.  I might 
have to page him. TIE TIE TIE 
954   Tom Berry: 
I need him to come to the Ops room, 
pronto.  Have him see Sergeant McCain.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
955   Sergeant McCain: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
956   Tom Berry: Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
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957   Sergeant McCain:
__________ Weapons on an unsecure 
line.  How may I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
958   Tom Berry: Yeah, hi.  Did you ________ 351? NC IIG IIG 
959   Sergeant McCain:
Everybody has been told.  I will check 
with each one of the control teams. TIE TIE TIE 
960   Male Speaker: I appreciate it.  Thanks.   MISC US MISC 
      
Yes, Ma’am.  He’s checking with 
everybody right now.  He’ll be back with 
me shortly.   TIE TIE TIE 
961   Male Speaker: I need more coffee.  Oh, yeah.  It’s potent.  MISC MISC MISC 
962   Male Speaker: -107 NC NC NC 
963   Male Speaker: 
We need to get some Medivac airplanes 
up in the air.   ISA ISA ISA 
      
Would that be a problem with your guys if 
we got them - IIG IIG IIG 
964   Male Speaker: From where, Sir? IIG IIG IIG 
965 [1:30]    Female Speaker: 
You said the national - Washington DC, 
Baltimore area. TIE TIE TIE 
966   Male Speaker: 
Yeah.  Standby.  Sir, if you standby I will 
check with the MCC.  Standby.   MISC TIE MISC 
      
Can we get Medivac aircraft airborne and 
give them a code? IIG IIG IIG 
967   Female Speaker: Absolutely.   TIE TIE TIE 
968   Male Speaker: And get all mode 3.  IIG IIG IIG 
      
 Sir, can you call across the hotline to 
Huntress control? DTA(RTA) IIG DTA(RTA) 
969   Female Speaker: 
What’s the - Do you got their number or 
can you transfer me? IIG IIG IIG 
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970   Male Speaker: 
I believe it’s the same - Standby.  Let me 
see if they can pick up.  Standby.   TIE TIE TIE 
      You are Washington Center? IIG IIG IIG 
971   Female Speaker: That is correct. TIE TIE TIE 
972   Male Speaker: I’ll have them call you, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
973   Female Speaker: Thank you.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
974   Male Speaker: 
Hey, Jeremy?  Have them call 
Washington Center for that.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      He left. Washington Center.   TIE US TIE 
      Oh, I love you.   MISC US MISC 
975   Female Speaker: 482, west, over. TIE NC TIE 
976   Male Speaker: 
I know what’s going on.  Yeah, we just 
had - NC TIE NC 
977   Female Speaker: 
We need somebody that has knowledge of 
what the hell is going on - ISA TIE ISA 
978   Male Speaker: Miller is here, Dana is here.   TIE TIE TIE 
      November, 4? IIG IIG IIG 
979   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  So far all the aircraft that we’ve 
been looking at as possible hijacks are 
either crashed or down.   TIE TIE TIE 
980   Female Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
981   Female Speaker: 
We’re not sure if there’s any more aircraft 
right now.  What we’re gonna work right 
is ________ ship because every center is 
closing down as you can see.   TIE TIE TIE 
      If they don’t see them, call right away.   DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
      
If you see it and they haven’t hit it up, call 
that center.  DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
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We don’t have Boston to work with now, 
we don’t have Cleveland now. TIE TIE TIE 
982   Female Speaker: They’re closing down every center. TIE TIE TIE 
983   Female Speaker: 
Open line.  Huntress ID how may I help 
you? MISC MISC MISC 
984   Female Speaker: 
This is Washington Center.  We’ve got a 
target we need to find out about.  He is - TIE TIE TIE 
985   Female Speaker: Okay.  Okay.  Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      He’s got another target. TIE TIE TIE 
       BFR? IIG IIG IIG 
986   Huntress: BFR. TIE TIE TIE 
987   
Washington 
Center: BFR.   TIE TIE TIE 
988   Huntress: 3,100 feet. TIE TIE TIE 
989   
Washington 
Center: 3,100 feet. TIE TIE TIE 
990   Huntress: 
He is 25 miles northeast of Dulles Airport 
on a southwest heading. TIE TIE TIE 
991 [01:35]  
Washington 
Center: 
Southwest heading.  Okay.  Do they have 
any other mode 3’s or anything like that?   IIG IIG IIG 
      Find that out. DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) IIG 
992   Huntress: 
It looks like you might have a fighter 
aircraft in the immediate vicinity at 8,000 
feet and descending so you might be 
taking a look at that guy already. IIS TIE IIS 
993   
Washington 
Center: 1200 BFR. TIE TIE TIE 
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994   Huntress: 
The mode 3 on your military looks like 
4512.  He is directly overhead now of the 
target. TIE TIE TIE 
995   
Washington 
Center: Okay.  We’ll pass the information. MISC TIE MISC 
996   Huntress: All right.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
997   
Washington 
Center: 
Did you get all of it because I got 
unplugged?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Twenty five miles northeast of Dulles on a 
southwest heading, 1200 BFR.  Dulles 
International toward Chicago.   TIE TIE TIE 
      I’m sorry about that. MISC US MISC 
998   Male Speaker: I don’t - NC NC NC 
999   
Washington 
Center: 
It’s right here.  Okay.  The latest one - I 
need all you guys - MISC TIE TIE 
1000   Huntress: 
Open line.  Northeast, this is Sergeant 
Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1001   Male Speaker: Hey, this is Major Rodriguez.  TIE US TIE 
       I need to talk to your SD.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Can you hear me? MISC US MISC 
1002   Huntress: 
Yeah.  6313.  I’ll patch you right up to 
him. MISC TIE TIE 
1003   Sergeant Perry: - Secure voice? IIG IIG IIG 
1004   Major Rodriguez: Negative. TIE TIE TIE 
1005   Sergeant Perry: I need a secure voice phone with the SD. TIE TIE TIE 
1006   Major Rodriguez: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1007   Sergeant Perry: You have reached an unsecure line.  MISC MISC MISC 
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      How may I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1008   Major Rodriguez: 
Sergeant, this is Tom Clinko with 
Cleveland Center. MISC TIE TIE 
1009   Sergeant Perry: Tom Clinko. MISC TIE TIE 
1010   Huntress: 
I have a safer 01 that departed elpine at 
14:27. TIE TIE TIE 
1011   Tom Clinko: Northeast.  You want secure? IIG IIG IIG 
1012   Huntress: Hold on a minute. MISC MISC MISC 
1013   Tom Clinko: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1014   Male Speaker: We - NC NC NC 
1015   Male Speaker: Oops, sorry.   MISC MISC MISC 
1016   Male Speaker: The number you have dialed - MISC MISC MISC 
1017   Male Speaker: I got a couple of things to do first. MISC MISC MISC 
1018   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1019   Computer Voice: 
Cleveland Center, Mr. Clinko, wants to 
know who’s safer it was that came out of 
Elpine?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
So if we can get weapons to tell him?  
Okay.   IIG IIG IIG 
1020   Male Speaker: Open line.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1021   Male Speaker: 
Sergeant Perry, this is Major Bridges from 
the Air Traffic Services Cell, the 
command center for the FAA in Virginia.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’ve got the attorney general in aircraft 
November 4 about 40 minutes south of 
Washington and he’s demanding a 
military escort in to Washington National. TKS TIE TKS 
      
If you can maybe scramble somebody to 
go in and intercept the aircraft and escort. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
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1022   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  We’ll put the MCC for you and we 
can check that out. TIE TIE TIE 
1023   Sergeant Perry: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
1024   Major Bridges: Go.  This is the MCC, Major Nasypany. MISC MISC MISC 
1025 [01:40]     Sergeant Perry: 
Hello, this is Major Bridges with the Air 
Traffic Services cell in the command 
center for the FAA in Virginia.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
The attorney general is in November 4, 
about 40 minutes out of Washington and 
he’s requesting a military escort in to 
Washington National Airport.   TKS TIE TKS 
      
Is there any way we can do a scramble 
going? IIG IIG IIG 
1026   Major Bridges: We’ve got aircraft in the area already.   TIE TIE TIE 
      What’s his code? IIG IIG IIG 
1027   Major Nasypany: Standby.  Let me find out.   MISC TIE TIE 
      Are you still there?  Hello? MISC IIG MISC 
1028   Major Bridges: - Frequency? IIG IIG IIG 
1029   
Major 
Nasaypany: No, right now we got an attorney general - TIE TIE TIE 
1030   Major Bridges: Still there? IIG IIG IIG 
1031   Male Speaker: Yeah, still here. TIE TIE TIE 
1032   
Major 
Nasaypany: 
Okay.  Their code is 65127 and the 
Washington Center frequency is 13365. TIE TIE TIE 
1033   Major Bridges: 13365? IIG IIG IIG 
1034   
Major 
Nasaypany: Right. MISC TIE MISC 
1035   Major Bridges: 
Okay.  We don’t have any victor - I can 
possibly get a uniform for us? TIE TIE TIE 
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1036   
Major 
Nasaypany: Northeast, this is Sergeant McCain. MISC MISC MISC 
1037   Major Bridges: 
Hi, this is Sergeant Lucas calling from 
Otis.  MISC US MISC 
      Is someone manning the EA booth?   IIG IIG IIG 
      I didn’t get an answer in there. TIE TIE IIG 
1038   
Major 
Nasaypany: 
There should be.  Let me send somebody 
up there. TSOG TIE TSOG 
1039   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  I’m gonna call them on this 23. TIE TIE TIE 
1040   Sergeant Lucas: 
I’m gonna go up to the EA booth and Otis 
is gonna call you on this 23. TIE TIE TIE 
1041   Sergeant McCain: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1042   Sergeant Lucas: 
No one’s up there.  They’re not getting an 
answer up there.   TIE TIE TIE 
1043   Sergeant McCain: That’s 605, correct?   IIG IIG IIG 
1044   Sergeant Lucas: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1045   Sergeant McCain:
600 ________ off of Atlantic City.  They 
don’t know who that one - TIE TIE TIE 
1046   Female Speaker: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1047   Sergeant McCain: That is 6579. TIE TIE TIE 
1048   Female Speaker: 
6579.  Do you know what the registrar of 
this vessel is? IIG IIG IIG 
1049   Sergeant McCain:
We don’t know yet.  That’s why we’re all 
doing all that and - TIE TIE TIE 
1050   Male Speaker: Is it a cruise ship or - IIG IIG IIG 
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1051   Sergeant McCain: Is that a cruise ship?  IIG IIG IIG 
      It’s a cruise ship.   UR US UR 
      Yeah, we’re collecting ID and all.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Standby. MISC US MISC 
1052   Male Speaker: - where the aircraft is.  6527.   MISC TIE TIE 
1053   Sergeant McCain: 6522 TIE TIE TIE 
1054   Male Speaker: 22? IIG IIG IIG 
1055   Male Speaker: Washington Center, can you confirm that? IIG IIG IIG 
1056   Male Speaker: Okay.  His squawk is 6522 not 27.  6522. UR TIE UR 
1057   Male Speaker: What position do you have him on? IIG IIG IIG 
1058   Male Speaker: 
Also, Sir, do you have a lat and long if 
possible or give me a -  IIG IIG IIG 
      
Oh, I found it.  I got it.  We have it 
monitored on screen now, Sir. IIS TIE IIS 
1059   Male Speaker: Oh, you got him?   IIG IIG IIG 
      He’s about 15 miles - Okay.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Do you happen to have a - IIG IIG IIG 
1060   Male Speaker: 
We’re working on it right now.  We have 
fighters airborne in the area.   TIE TIE TIE 
1061   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1062   Male Speaker: 
And we’re gonna see if we can get to him 
out there to escort him. TSOG TIE TSOG 
1063   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Please give me a call at 725-3330. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1064   Male Speaker: 
Standby.  Can you give me the number 
again? IIG IIG IIG 
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1065   Sergeant McCain: 725 - TIE TIE TIE 
1066   Male Speaker: 25 - TIE TIE TIE 
1067   Sergeant McCain: -3330 TIE TIE TIE 
1068   Male Speaker: -30 TIE TIE TIE 
1069   Sergeant McCain: Commercial is 703-904 - TIE TIE TIE 
1070   Male Speaker: 904 - TIE TIE TIE 
1071   Sergeant McCain: 4436 TIE TIE TIE 
1072   Male Speaker: 4436.  And who am I speaking to? IIG IIG IIG 
1073   Sergeant McCain: Major Bridges. TIE TIE TIE 
1074   Male Speaker: Major Bridges.  Got it.  Okay, Sir.  MISC US MISC 
      We’ll try to get back to you when we can.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
You understand that we’re really hectic 
here.   ISA US ISA 
1075   Sergeant McCain: I understand. MISC MISC MISC 
1076   Major Bridges: We’ll try to get back to you. TIE TIE TIE 
1077   Sergeant McCain: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1078   Major Bridges: Okay.  On this track, make it special.   DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
1079   Sergeant McCain:
I’m gonna go ahead and forward intel just 
so they know.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Major Evans?   MISC US MISC 
      Bravo 545.   TIE US TIE 
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Tell CONAR that’s the attorney general.  
Airborne special.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      
We haven’t - I don’t know what special 
yet.  TIE US TIE 
      
 Call it special 7.  Bravo 545 special 7, the 
attorney general.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      
I’ve already made it a special.  I’ve 
already made it a special.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
I’m just letting you know that’s who it is.  
Okay?  MISC US MISC 
      
He’s going to Dulles.  Washington 
International, I’m sorry.  Washington 
International.   TKS US TKS 
      
I made it a special 7 just so we can keep 
an eye on it.  TIE TIE TIE 
      He’s requesting - Listen to me.  MISC US MISC 
      
He’s requesting two armed fighter escorts 
in to International.  TIE US TIE 
      We’re working that right now, okay?   TIE TIE TIE 
1080   Major Bridges: 
Bravo 557, the Delta, 1200, we do not 
know who it is. TIE TIE TIE 
1081   Male Speaker: Bravo 557? IIG IIG IIG 
1082 [01:45]  Sergeant McCain: Correct.  We got it - MISC TIE TIE 
1083   Male Speaker: 
Be advised that we had a swordfish up 
that was coming back that way so it 
maybe him.  Maybe.  TSOG TKS TKS 
      You think you could find out for me?  IIG IIG IIG 
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Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain, how may I help you? MISC US MISC 
1084   Sergeant McCain: Yeah, hi Sergeant McCain.   MISC US MISC 
      Lt. Colonel Myers at Fido.  TIE US TIE 
      
Can you give me the number of your - I 
can get a hold of your fighter there? IIG IIG IIG 
1085   Male Speaker: Fighter Officer Number? IIG IIG IIG 
1086   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1087   Lt. Col. Myers: Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      I’ll work it for you. TIE MISC MISC 
1088   Sergeant McCain: The second ship - the second two ships?   IIG IIG IIG 
      Okay.  What would be the delay?   IIG IIG IIG 
      Press them up there and load them up.   DTA(COA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
      Whoa, 6601 - MISC US MISC 
1089   Lt. Col. Myers: 6601, 02 or 04. Either one of those. TSOG TIE TSOG 
1090   Sergeant McCain: 6601, 02 or 04? IIG IIG IIG 
1091   Lt. Col. Myers: That’s correct. TIE TIE TIE 
1092   Sergeant McCain: All right.  Great, thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1093   Lt. Col. Myers: You bet.  Anyone on line?   IIG MISC MISC 
1094   Sergeant McCain:
Hey, we’ve been asked to do some 
airborne command and control.  We’re 
just waiting for launch authority with one 
of our 130’s.   ISA TIE ISA 
      Were wondering what’s the COMM plan?  IIG US IIG 
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      Are there frequencies?   IIG US IIG 
      Are they secure?   IIG IIG IIG 
      What’s going down? IIG IIG IIG 
1095   Lt. Col. Myers: 
I got controllers all over up and down the 
east coast right now.  TIE US TIE 
      You can contact us if need be on AICC. TIE TIE TIE 
1096   Sergeant McCain: AICC? IIG IIG IIG 
1097   Male Speaker: Yep.  We should be listening up on that. IPK TIE IPK 
1098   Male Speaker: What frequency is that? IIG IIG IIG 
1099   Male Speaker: 364.2 TIE TIE TIE 
1100   Male Speaker: 364.2? IIG IIG IIG 
1101   Male Speaker: Yep.  Hey, do you got the - call 64 - NC NC NC 
1102   Male Speaker: I’m sorry?   IIG US IIG 
      
The special 7 is the attorney general of the 
United States.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I made it a special 7 because that’s a 
dignitary special that 19 use.   TKS TKS TKS 
      Give you a departure and destination?   IIG US IIG 
      I know his destination.   TIE US TIE 
      Do you need departure?   IIG IIG IIG 
1103   Male Speaker: How are you doing, Joe? MISC MISC MISC 
1104   Male Speaker: I’m all right. MISC MISC MISC 
1105   Sergeant McCain: Are you sure? MISC MISC MISC 
1106   Male Speaker Yep.  I’m hanging in there.  Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
1107   Sergeant McCain:
No, because they won’t push over to 
different frequencies. TIE TIE TIE 
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1108   Male Speaker: 
They should be over here somewhere. I 
don’t know where you’re going but what 
are you gonna do?   IIS TIE IIS 
      Off the coast of Atlantic City? IIG IIG IIG 
1109   Sergeant McCain: Yep. TIE TIE TIE 
1110   Male Speaker: 
That’s a cruse ship.  That came through 
the line about 5 minutes ago.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Ain’t this some shit?   MISC US MISC 
      
Yeah, I’m all right.  I’m all right.  I’m all 
right.  MISC US MISC 
      Send them to Bermuda.   MISC US MISC 
      Fuck them.  MISC US MISC 
       I hope that got recorded.  MISC US MISC 
      
 I haven’t been writing shit in there since 
________.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
Okay.  We have a ship that was right 
outside of Atlantic City.  Turns out it was 
a cruise ship.  Okay? TKS TKS TKS 
1111   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Suspicious though? IIG IIG IIG 
1112   Male Speaker: 
Yeah.  Well, they’ve got helicopters above 
it watching it.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We have Bravo 545 is a special 7.  It’s the 
attorney general of the United States 
requesting fighter escort - armed fighter 
escorts in to Washington National.  TKS TIE TKS 
      Oh, fuck.  MISC US MISC 
      Yeah, we’re working it. TIE TIE TIE 
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1113   Sergeant McCain: We’re working it. TIE TIE TIE 
1114   Male Speaker: 
Here’s the information for the attorney 
general.  He left Milwaukee going to 
Washington National citation 560, 
requesting armed fighter escorts.  55 - 
correction - 6522 and CONAR knows.  
That was put in to the chat. TKS TIE TKS 
1115   Sergeant McCain: Are we sending the F fighters on them? IIG IIG IIG 
1116   Male Speaker: They’re working on it through weapons. TIE TIE TIE 
1117   Sergeant McCain:
So 626 has got the attorney general and 
they’re in route to the - TKS TIE TIE 
1118   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  That’s the fighters that are going to 
the attorney general? IIG IIG IIG 
1119   Sergeant McCain: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
1120 [01:50]  Male Speaker: Roger that.  Thank you.  Roger that.   MISC MISC MISC 
1121   Sergeant McCain: What was their call sign? IIG IIG IIG 
1122   Male Speaker: You know what?  I don’t know.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 Can you give me a call sign on it?  Bravo 
545.   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain, can I help you? MISC US MISC 
1123   Sergeant McCain:
Yes, this is Lt. Col. Hayes, the fighter 
officer at the 177th.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Is the mission director available or could 
you pass a message to him? IIG IIG IIG 
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1124   Male Speaker: I can, yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1125   Sergeant McCain:
I have two more aircraft loaded with 
offensive capability.  I’m stepping two 
pilots to run the airplanes.  TKS TIE TIE 
      
 Do you know what he would like to do 
with it?   IIG US IIG 
      
Would he like to launch those or have 
them go - IIG IIG IIG 
1126   Lt. Col.  Hayes: Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      Where are you from, Sir? IIG IIG IIG 
1127   Sergeant McCain: Atlantic City. TIE TIE TIE 
1128   Lt. Col. Hayes: 
Atlantic City.  Let me pass this up.  I’ve 
got to put you on hold.   MISC TIE MISC 
      Ma’am?   MISC US MISC 
      
Atlantic has got two more aircraft 
uploaded with offensive capabilities.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Got two pilots standing by and wants to 
know what you want to do with them. IIG IIG IIG 
1129   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  Tell them the airplanes are not - 
they’re gonna start and before they shut 
down do they want to shut down or 
launch. IIG IIG IIG 
1130   Lt. Col. Hayes: 
As soon as I get word from the 
commander I will let you know. TIE TIE TIE 
1131   Sergeant McCain: Okay, thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1132   Male Speaker: Just stay on the line, Sir. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
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1133   Sergeant McCain: Oh, okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1134   Male Speaker: This is the MCC.   TIE US TIE 
      
What do you have uploaded on those 
guys? IIG IIG IIG 
1135   Sergeant McCain: I believe it’s only AGI right now. TIE TIE TIE 
1136   Male Speaker: Okay.  What’s the call signs? IIG IIG IIG 
1137   Major Nasypany: I don’t have call signs.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I can put a call sign - a local one if you 
like or if you’d like to give me one - TSOG TIE TSOG 
1138   Lt. Col. Hayes: 
We had snakes originally.  We had snake 
11 and 12 and we - TIE TIE TIE 
1139   Major Nasypany: Okay, Sir? MISC MISC MISC 
1140   Lt. Col. Hayes: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
1141   Major Nasypany: 
The commander wants you to keep them 
on standby on the ground right now.  DTA(RTA) TIE TIE 
      
Shut them down and stay on alert with 
them. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1142   Sergeant McCain: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1143   Lt. Col. Hayes: 
I’m about to call my wife and tell her to 
get to the school pronto and get the kids 
out and go home and lock the doors.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I don’t want her to panic, but I tell you 
what.   MISC MISC MISC 
1144   Sergeant McCain: It’s probably safer in the school. MISC MISC MISC 
1145   Lt. Col. Hayes: No, they’re hitting public places.   MISC MISC MISC 
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1146   Sergeant McCain: Let me know if you need anything. MISC MISC MISC 
1147   Male Speaker: 
I know.  I’m using you for phone calls and 
I know you’re not qualified but at this 
point I really don’t give a fuck. MISC MISC MISC 
1148   Sergeant McCain: I don’t either. MISC MISC MISC 
1149   Female Speaker: Not like I don’t have the experience. MISC MISC MISC 
1150   Sergeant McCain:
Exactly.  I know you know how to make 
phone calls.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Oh, by the way.  You’re on orders.   MISC MISC MISC 
1151   Male Speaker: What’s up?   MISC MISC MISC 
1152   Female Speaker: 
I’m serious.  There’s car bombs reported 
and if they’re gonna be hitting public 
places then I don’t want my kids in 
school. MISC MISC MISC 
1153   Sergeant McCain: What should we do? IIG IIG IIG 
1154   Male Speaker: 
Why did we turn off the - There should be 
no civilian aircraft airborne.   IIS TIE IIS 
1155   Sergeant McCain:
That’s correct.  That way if we make a 
friendly, we know who it is because we’ve 
ID it.  If it’s not friendly - TKS TIE TKS 
1156   Female Speaker: 
Gotcha.  Can you give me a call sign on 
the special 7? IIG IIG IIG 
1157   Sergeant McCain: November 4.   TIE TIE TIE 
1158   Male Speaker: November 4?   IIG US IIG 
      13365 Victor?   IIG IIG IIG 
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We can be lax with the criteria because 
you’re supposed to be - There’s not 
supposed to be any aircraft flying.   TKS US TKS 
      
What you’re gonna see is possibly a lot of 
helicopters, all right?  A lot of civilian - 
Yeah. TKS TKS TKS 
1159   Sergeant McCain: Only one guy at the FAA - NC NC NC 
1160   Male Speaker: 
And they’ve all shut down.  All the FAA 
centers are shut down.  Until you can get 
it identified - He’s being lateral - TIE TIE TIE 
1161 [01:55]  Sergeant McCain: We can go with it?   IIG IIG IIG 
1162   Male Speaker: I don’t know now.  He was being lateral.   TIE TIE TIE 
      646? IIG IIG IIG 
1163   Sergeant McCain: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1164   Male Speaker: I don’t know.  I can’t tell you that for sure. TIE TIE TIE 
1165   Sergeant McCain: - Air force one is? IIG IIG IIG 
1166   Male Speaker: 
Tell them we need to know where Air 
Force One is. DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
1167   Sergeant McCain:
And we want to know if they’re 
controlling the flight or - out of Langley 
as an escort. DTA(RTA) IIG IIG 
1168   Male Speaker: Air Force One. NC NC NC 
1169   Sergeant McCain: Also, are they working a fighter escort?   IIG IIG IIG 
      We already asked you twice. ISA TIE ISA 
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1170   Male Speaker: You need to go back and change that.  DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
      You got exclamation point instead of 1.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Where?  Where? IIG IIG IIG 
1171   Sergeant McCain: Right there. TIE TIE TIE 
1172   Male Speaker: In area 2, Sir.   TIE TIE TIE 
1173   Sergeant McCain:
There are two of them out there.  They’ve 
turned the auto IDs off, too. IIS TIE TIE 
1174   Male Speaker: Yeah.  You want me to tell this one also?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
As far as I know on the Ops floor 
everybody’s been reported that were okay.  ISA TIE ISA 
1175   Sergeant McCain: I need to find out about - NC NC NC 
1176   Male Speaker: What do you need to know? IIG IIG IIG 
1177   Sergeant McCain: They should be getting back to us on that.  TIE TIE TIE 
1178   Male Speaker: No shit.  Fucking moron.  MISC MISC MISC 
      
Drop it.  Go ahead and drop it.  Go ahead 
and drop it.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      Bravo 607 and the unknown are bad.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
E3 is not paying  - We still have another 
one out there, 633, it’s just southwest - 
just southeast of J50. TIE TIE TIE 
1179   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
1180   Male Speaker: 
All the sectors have reported in but the 
units haven’t. TIE TIE TIE 
1181   Sergeant McCain: You have call in a status to the EA group. DTA(RTA) TKS DTA(RTA) 
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1182   Male Speaker: Admiral Perry should be up there.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain. MISC MISC MISC 
1183   Sergeant McCain:
___________ calling looking for 
Huntress.   MISC MISC MISC 
1184   Male Speaker: You got Huntress. MISC MISC MISC 
1185   Sergeant McCain:
You’re working with some of the flyers in 
the Washington DC airspace and 
everybody is kind of wondering if we can 
hand them off to you and let you take over 
control or do you want control? IIG IIG IIG 
1186   Male Speaker: Who are you talking about?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
What’s - You got a call sign on the 
aircraft? IIG IIG IIG 
1187   Sergeant McCain:
We have - You know the call signs that 
we work over there. IPK TIE IPK 
1188   Male Speaker: 
Are you talking about the attorney 
general? IIG IIG IIG 
1189   Sergeant McCain:
I’m talking about your fighters in the 
Washington DC area. TIE TIE TIE 
1190   Male Speaker: 
I’m gonna put you on the line with my 
MCC. TIE TIE TIE 
1191   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1192   Male Speaker: 
He’s looking for control of the fighters in 
the DC area, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
1193   Sergeant McCain: Okay, who’s - NC NC NC 
1194   Male Speaker: This is Washington Center.  MISC US MISC 
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      Gary?  What do you got?  I’m sorry? IIG IIG IIG 
1195   Sergeant McCain: 6,500 feet?  Where is he? IIG IIG IIG 
1196   Male Speaker: In the airspace that - NC NC NC 
1197   Sergeant McCain: Give me an arrow, bud.  DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
       Scope 2, scope 1.  There.   IIG IIG IIG 
      Is that the Z track? IIG IIG IIG 
1198   Sergeant McCain: They Z’ed him because he disappeared TIE TIE TIE 
1199 [02:00] Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1200   Sergeant McCain: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
1201   Male Speaker: Can you work that?   DTA(RTA) IIG DTA(RTA) 
      
They want to intercept on that guy.  I got a 
cruiser that wants an intercept.   TKS TIE TKS 
      What?   IIG US IIG 
      
You do know, Gary, you do know that we 
got an E3 station 100 miles south of 
Washington - 100 miles south of Chicago 
and we also have another one over 
Washington DC.  TKS US TKS 
      You know that? IIG IIG IIG 
1202   Sergeant McCain: No. TIE TIE TIE 
1203   Female Speaker: 
Well, I’m telling you.  I’m trying to keep 
you up - We’ve been at this since 8:00 this 
morning.   TIE TIE TIE 
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So - If you can find a runner, I could use a 
bottle of water.   MISC MISC MISC 
      We’re working it.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Thank you guys for coming in.  I 
appreciate it very much.  I just want to let 
you guys know that - Thank you very 
much.  It’s appreciated.  All you guys that 
showed up.  Thanks, Sam.   MISC US MISC 
      
I’ve got to get - I’ve got to call my wife or 
have somebody call her for me.   MISC MISC MISC 
1204   Sergeant McCain: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1205   Gary: Hi, this is Colonel Piscano.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Is this NEADS? IIG US IIG 
1206   Sergeant McCain: Yes, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1207   Sergeant Perry: Is Colonel Marr there? IIG IIG IIG 
1208   Colonel Piscano: Standby, Sir.  MISC MISC MISC 
       He’s up in __________. TIE US TIE 
1209   Sergeant Perry: 
Listen, let me ask you a - Go ahead.  I 
need to talk to him. MISC MISC MISC 
1210   Colonel Piscano: Okay.  Thank you.  706. MISC MISC MISC 
1211   Sergeant Perry: 
You’re about the only one I can get 
through to.  Everyone else is busy.   TIE TIE TIE 
1212   Colonel Piscano: 706 if you get disconnected.   TIE US TIE 
      Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      Her line is busy.   TIE TIE TIE 
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1213   Sergeant Perry: 
Listen, here’s what I need.  I need to know 
- I need to know if the FAA - We want to 
launch an airplane from - NC NC NC 
1214   Colonel Piscano: 
Let me put you on with the MCC.  Hold 
on. MISC MISC MISC 
1215   Sergeant Perry: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
1216   Colonel Piscano: MCC on - go. MISC MISC MISC 
1217   Sergeant Perry: This is Colonel Piscano, Headquarters. MISC MISC MISC 
1218   Colonel Piscano: Yes, how are you doing, Sir? MISC MISC MISC 
1219   MCC: 
Good.  Let me put you on speaker here, 
okay? MISC MISC MISC 
1220   Colonel Piscano: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1221   MCC: Can you hear us? MISC MISC MISC 
1222   Colonel Piscano: Yes, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1223   MCC: 
We’re kind of worried about flying an 
airplane.  TIE US TIE 
      
Can we fly an airplane from Syracuse 
connected to Stewart? IIG TSOG TSOG 
1224   Colonel Piscano: Okay.  Syracuse connected to Stewart?  IIG IIG IIG 
      Okay.  That should be no prob -  TIE TIE TIE 
      
Do you need an escort or do you need - 
What are you looking for, Sir? IIG IIG IIG 
1225   MCC: We just don’t know if we’ll be able to fly. ISA ISA ISA 
1226   Colonel Piscano: Who is it? IIG IIG IIG 
1227   MCC: This is a military aircraft, correct?   IIG IIG IIG 
1228   Colonel Piscano: We want 30 to support this disaster.   DTA(RTA) TSOG TSOG 
1229   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  I don’t see any problem with you 
flying, Sir.   ECA TKS ECA 
1230   MCC: Okay.  So we just do a flight plan? IIG IIG IIG 
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1231   Colonel Piscano: 
Do a normal flight plan saying it’s for this 
and you can head out - Let’s see - DTA(RTA) TIE TIE 
1232   MCC: 
Do you have any specific call signs that 
you are giving airplanes priority or 
whatever? IIG IIG IIG 
1233   Colonel Piscano: No, we’re not.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Let’s see.  It’s a C130 connecting, 
correct?   IIG IIG IIG 
      Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      
We’ll get you a call sign.  Sir, we’re 
trying to get you a good call sign so we’ll 
know who it is.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I would say file a normal flight plan in 
coordination with FAA.   TIE TSOG TSOG 
      
Sir, be advised that Boston is gone.  They 
have evacuated.  We have Cleveland 
evacuating at this time as well.   TIE TIE TIE 
1234   MCC: FAA centers? IIG IIG IIG 
1235   Colonel Piscano: Yes, the FAA centers. TIE TIE TIE 
1236 [02:05]  MCC: 
We just wanted to be sure that when we 
get an airplane that launches here - TIE TIE TIE 
1237   Colonel Piscano: That’s no problem.  MISC US MISC 
      Just make sure its squawking.  DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
      
 Do you have mode 4 capabilities on the 
jet and mode 2?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
On your mode 2, make sure that’s 
standard and also make sure you’re mode 
4 is all loaded up as well.   DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
1238   MCC: And you’re gonna give us a call sign? IIG IIG IIG 
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1239   Colonel Piscano: Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      
We’re looking that up right now, Sir.  We 
can’t get it right now.  TIE TIE TIE 
       I’m gonna give you a call sign.   TIE US TIE 
      
Geez - What’s a good call sign for you 
guys?  How about - IIG IIG IIG 
1240   MCC: Skier is our normal call sign. TIE TSOG TSOG 
1241   Colonel Piscano: Skier?  IIG IIG IIG 
      That sounds good to me.  Skier.   MISC US MISC 
      
I got a lot of people talking at me right 
now, Sir.  Skier 01.   TIE TIE TIE 
1242   MCC: Steel 72.  This is - Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      We need a code on steel 72.   IIS IIS IIS 
      364.2. Hello? 364.2 TIE TIE TIE 
1243   Colonel Piscano: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1244   MCC: Yeah, Sergeant Kelly at Otis.  MISC MISC MISC 
      How are you doing? MISC MISC MISC 
1245   Male Speaker: Good. MISC MISC MISC 
1246   Sergeant Perry: Hey, we got two jets on status. TIE TIE TIE 
1247   Sergeant Kelly: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1248   Sergeant Perry: Are you guys gonna need us or anything?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
If you want the loads we can pass the 
loads. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1249   Sergeant Kelly: Standby.  MISC US MISC 
       Yes, we are very concerned about that. ISA TKS TKS 
1250   Sergeant Perry: 
Okay.  Can you come up on the in of us or 
- NC NC NC 
1251   Sergeant Kelly: 
Our battle station is manned so maybe I 
can transfer you up there - TSOG TSOG TSOG 
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1252   Sergeant Perry: 
If we come up on the NEADS MCC in the 
private, we’ll patch the loads that way.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
      How does that sound? MISC MISC MISC 
1253   Sergeant Kelly: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
1254   Sergeant Perry: Okay?  MISC  MISC  MISC 
1255   Sergeant Kelly: Sure. MISC MISC MISC 
1256   Sergeant Perry: All right.   MISC MISC MISC 
1257   Sergeant Kelly: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1258   Sergeant Perry: 
Hi, this is Colonel Piscano from 
Headquarters again. MISC MISC MISC 
1259 [02:10]  Sergeant Kelly: Yes, Sir.   MISC MISC MISC 
1260   Sergeant Perry: 
Yes, I don’t know who I talked to but I 
was talking to someone about launching 
some planes from - IIS TIE IIS 
1261   Colonel Piscano: 
Yeah, you started with me and then I 
patched you to Major Nasypany.  ISA ISA ISA 
      
 He’s standing right here but he’s on the 
other phone.  TIE TIE TIE 
       What can I help you with, Sir? IIG US IIG 
1262   Sergeant Perry: 
He told us that he is using skier 01 as a 
call sign? IIG IIG IIG 
1263   Colonel Piscano: He’s on the line now. TIE TIE TIE 
1264   Sergeant Perry: Go ahead, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1265   Colonel Piscano: 
Our call sign will be skier but probably a 
different number.  TIE US TIE 
      
 They’re used to using the first and the last 
number of the plane.  They’re maybe up 
to 3 airplanes. TKS TKS TKS 
1266   Sergeant Perry: Yeah, maybe.  We’ll know better later.   MISC TIE TIE 
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Do you have any codes or are you gonna 
be squawking 1200? IIG IIG IIG 
1267   Major Nasypany: 
Do you want the number from the 
command post on the 109?  I’ll give it to 
you. IIG IIG IIG 
1268   Colonel Piscano: 
Sir, can you have them call me here with 
the codes.   DTA(RTA) IIG DTA(RTA) 
      Call over to my ID section.   DTA(RTA) US DTA(RTA) 
      Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      I’ll get you a number. TIE TSOG TSOG 
1269   Major Nasypany: You guys are hard to get to by the way. MISC MISC MISC 
1270   Colonel Piscano: BSN 5876368 or 69?   TIE TIE TIE 
      Just give them the command post codes.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      
The tower there will have codes to give 
my ID section so we can track you guys.  
Mode 3 codes.   TKS TKS TKS 
1271   Major Nasypany: Okay.  Will do. MISC MISC MISC 
1272   Colonel Piscano: Your pilots should be loading  IPK IPK IPK 
      
and just make sure your pilots load up 
their mode 2 and mode 4. DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(COA) 
1273   Major Nasypany: 
Okay.  They’ll call you with the mode 3 
numbers.  Okay.  Bye. MISC TSOG TIE 
1274   Colonel Piscano: Okay.  Yes, Sir.  Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
1275   Major Nasypany: Yes, this is Lake AFC.  MISC US MISC 
      
 We have pending southwest of J55 - or 
southwest of J55 data. TIE TIE TIE 
1276   Colonel Piscano: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1277   Major Nasypany: 
You got your radial switch on for some 
reason.  TIE TIE TIE 
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      You want to see the radial spec? IIG IIG IIG 
1278   Male Speaker: Yeah. MISC TIE TIE 
1279   Major Nasypany: Boston Center?  Boston Center? IIG MISC MISC 
1280   Male Speaker: 
It doesn’t fit the profile.  It doesn’t fit the 
profile.  Whiskey 105 - PRTA TIE PRTA 
1281   Male Speaker: No. TIE TIE TIE 
1282   Male Speaker: Is it that one right now? IIG IIG IIG 
1283 [02:15] Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1284   Male Speaker: 
Yes, this is Samantha Thompson with the 
138th Fighter Wing and I’m calling to let 
you know that the take off time of our 
alert set out of Michigan.  He just wanted 
you to know that. TKS TKS TKS 
1285   Female Speaker: I’m sorry, ma’am.  I can’t hear you. MISC MISC MISC 
1286   Male Speaker: I said that the take off time is 10:23. TIE TIE TIE 
1287   Sergeant Perry: 10:23? IIG IIG IIG 
1288   
Samantha 
Thompson: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1289   Sergeant Perry: Is that Zulu time? IIG IIG IIG 
1290   
Samantha 
Thompson: I’m not sure.  14:23. TIE TIE TIE 
1291   Sergeant Perry: 14:23?  What type of aircraft? IIG IIG IIG 
1292   
Samantha 
Thompson: A 16. TIE TIE TIE 
1293   Sergeant Perry: Where are they heading? IIG IIG IIG 
1294   
Samantha 
Thompson: It’s circling over Detroit and Chicago. TIE TIE TIE 
1295   Sergeant Perry: Yep.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
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1296   
Samantha 
Thompson: Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
1297   Sergeant Perry: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
1298   
Samantha 
Thompson: You got a mode 3? IIG IIG IIG 
1299   Sergeant Perry: Weapons, Sergeant Powell. MISC MISC MISC 
1300   
Samantha 
Thompson: 
Alpena just called.  They have 311 
airborne at 14:23.  It’s an F-16 and it’s 
gonna be operating in the Detroit and 
Chicago area.   TKS TKS TKS 
1301   Sergeant Perry: Saber what? IIG IIG IIG 
1302   Female Speaker: 
Saber 111.  I don’t know how many 
aircraft.  Airborne at 14:23 Z.   TIE TIE TIE 
1303   Sergeant Powell: 14:23? IIG IIG IIG 
1304   Sergeant Perry: That’s what she said, yeah. MISC TIE TIE 
1305   Sergeant Powell: Okay.  Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
1306   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1307   Sergeant Powell: Hi, this is Lt. Col. Christian at CONAR.  MISC MISC MISC 
      
 Is there a phone that I can talk securely to 
security forces people on? IIG IIG IIG 
1308   Sergeant Perry: I can patch you out to -  NC US NC 
      Hold on, let me see if - NC TSOG NC 
1309   Sergeant Powell: 
Can you just give me their phone number 
and I’ll call that then? DTA(RTA) TSOG TSOG 
1310   Sergeant Perry: Okay.  6830. TIE TIE TIE 
1311   Lt. Col. Christian: 6830.  Thank you. MISC TIE MISC 
1312   Sergeant Perry: Okay, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
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1313   
Lt. Col. 
Christian: Not right now.  011 is out there right now. TIE TIE TIE 
      
 I know who this one is but I don’t know 
who the second military is.   ISA TKS ISA 
      What’s his track number like? IIG IIG IIG 
1314   Sergeant Perry: How long? IIG IIG IIG 
1315   
Lt. Col. 
Christian: 
Do we have any information as to where 
that 57 and the hot metal - IIG IIG IIG 
1316   Sergeant Perry: 
The New York guys are surveying 
helicopters and - TIE TKS TKS 
1317   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1318   Male Speaker: 
Hey, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at 
Langley. MISC MISC MISC 
1319   Female Speaker: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
1320   Male Speaker: 
Can you tell us what frequency you need 
us to be on? IIG IIG IIG 
1321   Sergeant Perry: 
Yes, ma’am.  I’ll patch you through to the 
weapons guys.   TIE TSOG TSOG 
      Hold on. MISC US MISC 
1322   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1323   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Perry.  Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1324   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: Mike? MISC MISC MISC 
1325   Sergeant Perry: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
1326   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: 
Yeah, we’re trying to get a hold of the 
weapons shop.   ISA ISA ISA 
1327 [02:20]  Sergeant Perry: Who’s this? IIG IIG IIG 
1328   Operator: This is the operator.  TIE TIE TIE 
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We got a call that somebody called 
weapons and they put them on hold and 
then they got forwarded over here. IIS TKS IIS 
1329   Sergeant Perry: I tried to patch them to 631.   TIE US TIE 
      Let me try it again. TIE TSOG TIE 
1330   Operator: 
Okay.  Ma’am, are you still here?  Hello, 
ma’am? MISC MISC MISC 
1331   Sergeant Perry: Is it Langley? MISC MISC MISC 
1332   Operator: Ma’am?  Ma’am?   MISC MISC MISC 
1333   Sergeant Perry: 
I’ll patch them back up.  I’m trying to 
patch you up there again, okay?   TIE TSOG TIE 
      Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC US MISC 
1334   Operator: 
Hey this is Sergeant Bernowski here 
again. MISC MISC MISC 
1335   Sergeant Perry: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
1336   Operator: Can you patch me to your weapons unit? IIG IIG IIG 
1337   Sergeant Perry: I’m attempting to. TIE TIE TIE 
1338   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1339   Sergeant Perry: Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
1340   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: 
We got Atlantic City on the line wanting 
to know - dispatch - TIE TKS TIE 
1341   Sergeant Perry: Open line. Northeast, can I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1342   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: 
Yes, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at 
Langley.  We were trying to find out - MISC MISC MISC 
1343   Sergeant Perry: 
They need a frequency for the aircraft and 
I can’t get them up for it.  I tried to patch 
them up. TIE TKS TIE 
1344   Male Speaker: Standby. MISC MISC MISC 
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1345   Sergeant Perry: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is 
Sergeant McCain, can I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1346   
Sergeant 
Bernowski: Hi, this is Captain Ainsly.   MISC MISC MISC 
      How are you? MISC MISC MISC 
1347   Sergeant Perry: I’m busy.   MISC MISC MISC 
      How are you doing? MISC MISC MISC 
1348   Male Speaker: 
I’m looking for a good number to talk to 
Huntress on.   TIE IIG IIG 
      We tried 4.2 and couldn’t get through.   ISA ISA ISA 
1349   Sergeant McCain: You can call 6313.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Let me forward you to 6313 and they 
should be able to give you a frequency. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1350   Captain Ainsly: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1351   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
1352   Captain Ainsly: Yes, I’m still here.   MISC MISC MISC 
1353   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Standby.   MISC US MISC 
      Okay, ma’am.  That line is busy. TIE TIE TIE 
1354   Captain Ainsly: We’re about to launch some aircraft.  TIE TIE TIE 
       I need a good frequency. DTA(RTA) IIG IIG 
1355   Sergeant McCain: Right.  Standby. MISC MISC MISC 
1356   Captain Ainsly: 
It’s gonna be a first call sign.  Two are 
airborne and we’re gonna launch two 
more.   TKS TKS TKS 
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1357   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  Our weapons section is asking for 
a call sign on those - IIG IIG IIG 
1358   Captain Ainsly: First 01. TIE TIE TIE 
1359   Sergeant McCain: First 01?   MISC US MISC 
      Okay.  First 01 and I apologize.   MISC TIE TIE 
1360   Captain Ainsly: 
How do we know that they went and did 
that?   IIG IIG IIG 
1361   Sergeant McCain: What are we talking about? IIG IIG IIG 
1362   Captain Ainsly: Continental or whatever? IIG IIG IIG 
1363   Sergeant McCain: Oh.  Where did they take off from? IIG IIG IIG 
1364 [02:25]  Female Speaker: We don’t know. TIE TIE TIE 
1365   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1366   Female Speaker: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1367   Sergeant McCain: Ma’am, we’re still working that.  TIE ISA ISA 
      Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      372.9, 372.9. TIE TIE TIE 
1368   Female Speaker: 372.9? IIG IIG IIG 
1369   Sergeant McCain: That’s correct. TIE TIE TIE 
1370   Captain Ainsly: Okay.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1371   Sergeant McCain: You bet. MISC MISC MISC 
1372   Captain Ainsly: Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
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1373   Sergeant McCain:
This is Sergeant McCain, Northeast Air 
Defense Sector.  I was listening in on the 
other line.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Thanks for showing up.   Sorry.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I show you secret also.  Brian Daniels, 
okay? IIG IIG IIG 
1374   Captain Ainsly: Northeast, Sergeant Perry.   MISC MISC MISC 
      How can I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1375   Sergeant McCain:
I need to talk to a weapons director or 
somebody like that regarding tasking. TIE TIE TIE 
1376   Captain Ainsly: Okay.  Let me see what I can do for you. MISC MISC MISC 
1377   Sergeant McCain: Thank you very much. MISC MISC MISC 
1378   Sergeant Perry: Hold on,  MISC US MISC 
      6313 if you get disconnected.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Sir?  Sir?   MISC MISC MISC 
      The line is busy right now. TIE TIE TIE 
1379   Male Speaker: Okay.  Do you want me to hold on? IIG MISC MISC 
1380   Sergeant Perry: Call back at 6313 in a couple of minutes. TIE TIE TIE 
1381   Male Speaker: I’ve been trying that.  I can’t get through.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Is that the only one your on? IIG IIG IIG 
1382   Sergeant Perry: That’s the only one they’ve got. TIE TIE TIE 
1383   Male Speaker: You want me to keep calling back then? IIG IIG IIG 
1384   Sergeant Perry: Yeah.  Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
1385   Male Speaker: Okay, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1386   Sergeant Perry: Thank you.   MISC MISC MISC 
1387   Male Speaker: Go ahead, sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1388   Sergeant Perry: Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Craig. MISC MISC MISC 
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 I was unable to get through on 6403 for 
the last hour.  TIE TKS TIE 
      
Do you have another number or a number 
for the DO?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
This is about - I need to talk about what 
you need us to do so that we can figure 
out if we need other people.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
      We’re normally not manned here. TIE TIE TIE 
1389   Male Speaker: Sir, can you standby a just a moment?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We had battle staff in here anyway and I 
want to talk to them and see if they have a 
point for you. TIE TSOG TSOG 
1390   Sergeant Perry: 
Hey, you got a flight out of Richmond at 
22 out of Richmond, Virginia so when 
they pop up they’re friendly.  Just letting 
you know. TKS TKS TKS 
1391   MCC: Out of Richmond? IIG IIG IIG 
1392   Lt. Col. Craig: 
Out of Richmond, Virginia.  You should 
see them airborne now.   TIE TIE TIE 
1393   Female Speaker: Do they have a code yet? IIG IIG IIG 
1394   Sergeant McCain: I haven’t got a code on it.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Continental.  How long have you been in 
here? IIG IIG IIG 
1395   Male Speaker: Half hour or 45 minutes. TIE TIE TIE 
1396   Sergeant McCain:
You probably need to - No one needs to 
spend more than 45 minutes to an hour at 
a time in here anymore.   MISC MISC MISC 
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Everybody needs to blow off steam and 
relax a little bit so if you want to take a 
break then go ahead.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I’ll get Sam up here and work you guys in 
teams of two.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I am just trying to keep everybody alert 
and nerves frazzled so that we can do the 
job.  MISC MISC MISC 
       Lyle?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
Let’s work out a plan of hour on hour off.  
Me and you go and then Harry and 
Bianchi will be the other pair.  Okay?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We can do it right now at 12:30.  Do it 
right now at 12:30 because I just sat down 
so if you want to take it then we’ll have 
those other two come in and take it at 
1:30.  MISC MISC MISC 
       Let Bianchi know.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Come back in about 1:30.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
That way we keep everybody fresh.  
That’s what I’m worried about more than 
anything.  MISC MISC MISC 
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We’re not doing anything for night shift.  
As far as I know we’re here all the time 
until - We actually need 3 more other than 
him.  Okay.  We need two more besides 
that.  We still got Nora, Juanita Sheppard.  
He’s here.  He’s working with 
surveillance.  He’s working with 
surveillance.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
If you get Nora and Juanita to come in 
along with Mike Mateland and John 
Detro, they’ll make up for it and everyone 
can work.  MISC MISC MISC 
       I can’t hear you.  I can’t hear you. MISC MISC MISC 
1397   Male Speaker: Did you hear that? IIG IIG IIG 
1398   Sergeant McCain: No, I didn’t.  TIE TIE TIE 
      Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      
Northeast Air Defense sector, this is 
Sergeant McCain.   MISC MISC MISC 
1399   Male Speaker: 
Yes, this is Lt. Col. Craig calling again 
looking for the MCC or the DO. MISC MISC MISC 
1400 [02:30] Sergeant McCain: Where the hell is Josie Bon?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
Give me a track number on that bomb - 
that guy going by Cleveland.   DTA(RTA) DTA(COA) DTA(RTA) 
      
He was just made friendly.  He was just 
made friendly.   TIE TIE TIE 
1401   Male Speaker: 
No, he was made friendly before.  We’re 
gonna make him - TIE TKS TIE 
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1402   Sergeant McCain:
Is that the one that’s supposed to be going 
in to Cleveland?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Okay.  Okay, so they don’t know if that’s 
- Do we know who that aircraft is?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
I’m just trying to keep us sane with 
everything that’s going on.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
What I really want to know is where the 
intel community was during all of this?  IIG MISC MISC 
       I realize it’s a tough job and you got to -  MISC MISC MISC 
      
Gary, update me on the two aircraft from 
Canada.   IIG IIG IIG 
      One of them is down?  Is that right?   IIG IIG IIG 
1403   Lt. Col. Craig: I’m sorry? MISC IIG MISC 
1404   Sergeant McCain:
Update me with the two aircraft out of 
Canada.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      One of them is down? IIG IIG IIG 
1405   Male Speaker: 
One was turned back to Paris.  This one 
here is - TIE TIE TIE 
1406   Sergeant McCain: All right.  That’s what I need to know.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Just you and - I’m sorry.  I think Cruz 
pretty much called in.   TIE MISC MISC 
      
Who told you that? Who told you that?  
Major Evans?  IIG MISC IIG 
      
Have you had a chance to get out of here 
for a while? IIG MISC MISC 
1407   Male Speaker: No, not yet.   MISC MISC MISC 
1408 [02:35]  Sergeant McCain: Why don’t you go ahead?   MISC MISC MISC 
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He’s not had a chance to get out of here 
yet so - MISC MISC MISC 
1409   Male Speaker: Yeah, sure.  Yeah, go ahead. MISC MISC MISC 
1410   Sergeant McCain: I have a speaking code also if you want it. TIE TIE TIE 
1411   Major Evans: Yes. MISC TIE TIE 
1412   Sergeant McCain: When is he airborne? IIG IIG IIG 
1413   Female Speaker: Well, he’s not airborne yet.  He will be. TIE TIE TIE 
1414   Male Speaker: For what? IIG IIG IIG 
1415   Female Speaker: To return to base. TIE TIE TIE 
1416   Male Speaker: 
I understand but everything’s been 
grounded for the most part. TKS TKS TKS 
1417   Male Speaker: Unless you’re on a mission. TIE TIE TIE 
1418   Female Speaker: He’s got approval - He’s got approval. TIE TIE TIE 
1419   Male Speaker: Through who?   IIG IIG IIG 
1420   Male Speaker: Through the CO of this base. TIE TIE TIE 
1421   Female Speaker: 
Okay.  Can the CO of your base call the 
CO of our base?   IIG IIG IIG 
1422   Male Speaker: She’s breaking up. TIE TIE TIE 
1423   Male Speaker: 
Unless he is in a misunderstanding of 
what’s going on, we need to stay 
grounded.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
What you guys should do is have your CO 
call our CO.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1424   Male Speaker: 6300 - TIE TIE TIE 
1425   Female Speaker: Are you copying that? IIG IIG IIG 
1426   Male Speaker: That would be 6300.   TIE TIE TIE 
1427   Female Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
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1428   Male Speaker: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
1429   Male Speaker: 
Unless they are in a search and rescue 
mode they need to remain grounded 
unless otherwise approved. TKS TKS TKS 
1430   Female Speaker: Okay.  This is Andrews? IIG IIG IIG 
1431   Male Speaker: Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1432   Female Speaker: Okay.  Don’t hang up.  Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
1433   Male Speaker: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
1434   Male Speaker: Okay.  I told them that they can’t take off.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
I have a question for you.  We have a 
possibility of having a couple of F-18s to 
be used as an asset for CAP. TKS TKS TKS 
1435   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1436   Male Speaker: Basically, for your protection. TIE TIE TIE 
1437   Male Speaker: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
1438 [02:40] Male Speaker: 
How do you want to go about 
coordinating them if you guys need them? IIG IIG IIG 
1439   Male Speaker: 
Okay.  This is what you have to do.  You 
have to call that number, 6300. TSOG TIE TSOG 
1440   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1441   Female Speaker: He’s approving all assets.  Okay? TIE TIE TIE 
1442   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1443   Female Speaker: 
He will let you know who can be airborne 
and who can’t. TIE TIE TIE 
1444   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1445   Female Speaker: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
1446   Male Speaker: Yep. MISC MISC MISC 
1447   Female Speaker: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1448   Male Speaker: Bye. MISC MISC MISC 
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1449   Female Speaker: Way to go, Mo. MISC MISC MISC 
1450   Male Speaker: 6301 could do it.  6301 going to 72. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1451   Female Speaker: Go ahead.   MISC MISC MISC 
      He can’t hear you. TIE TIE TIE 
1452   Male Speaker: Can you have him call me at - IIG IIG IIG 
1453   Sergeant McCain: Hold on.   MISC US MISC 
      He’s right here.  I’ll get him on the line.     TIE TIE TIE 
1454   Male Speaker: Hello, this is Commander Gates.   MISC MISC MISC 
      May I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1455   Sergeant McCain: Hello, this is the CCO of CONAR.   MISC US MISC 
      Are you the fighter officer? IIG IIG IIG 
1456   Male Speaker: I’m one of them. TIE TIE TIE 
1457   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Can we go secure? IIG IIG IIG 
1458   
Commander 
Gates: We don’t have secure on this yet do we?  IIG IIG IIG 
      
Yeah, we got 3303.  I don’t know how we 
got on this line.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Stand by. MISC MISC MISC 
1459   Male Speaker: Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
1460   
Commander 
Gates: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant 
McCain,  MISC MISC MISC 
      how can I help you? IIG MISC MISC 
1461   Male Speaker: Colonel Goldstein.  MISC US MISC 
      
 I was just wondering if I could go secure 
with someone from fighter duty? IIG IIG IIG 
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1462   
Commander 
Gates: 6305, Sir.  Have you tried that number? IIG IIG IIG 
1463   Male Speaker: No, I have not. TIE ISA TIE 
1464   Sergeant McCain: That’s the number for a fighter officer. TIE TIE TIE 
1465   
Colonel 
Goldstein: Okay.  Got it.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1466   Sergeant McCain: You bet. MISC MISC MISC 
1467   
Colonel 
Goldstein: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
1468   Sergeant McCain: Hi, this is Bob Deluce at Chicago Center.  MISC US MISC 
      
Are you the sector that’s going to be 
taking over the airspace over Chicago 
Center? IIG IIG IIG 
1469   
Colonel 
Goldstein: Chicago Center?  IIG IIG IIG 
      Hold on.  Let me check. MISC MISC MISC 
1470   Sergeant McCain: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1471   Sergeant Bianchi: We haven’t been notified here yet. TIE TIE TIE 
1472   Bob Deluce: 
Okay.  Somebody’s gonna be taking it 
over and I’m just trying to find out who. IIG TKS IIG 
1473   Sergeant Bianchi: We’ve got an E3 heading up your way.   TIE TIE TIE 
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1474   Bob Deluce: 
Well, we got some aircraft that want to 
reposition and there’s a medivac unit that 
needs to test some of their airplanes this 
afternoon if they need to use them.  TKS TKS TKS 
      
I need to know who we need to get 
approval from for them. IIG IIG IIG 
1475   Sergeant Bianchi: 
I tell you what.  I can put you up to our 
fighter officer? TSOG TIE TIE 
1476   Bob Deluce: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1477   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Okay?  Hold on and I will try to transfer 
you to the number there -  MISC US MISC 
      
The same as this number but the last four 
digits are 6800.  I’ll try to transfer you. TIE TIE TIE 
1478   Bob Deluce: Thank you very much. MISC MISC MISC 
1479   Sergeant Bianchi: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
1480   Bob Deluce: Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1481   Sergeant Bianchi: Yes? MISC MISC MISC 
1482   Bob Deluce: 
Hello, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling 
from the 1st Fighter Wing.  TIE TIE TIE 
       How are you? MISC MISC MISC 
1483   Sergeant Bianchi: Not too bad, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1484   Lt. Colonel Bear: 
Can I talk to your duty officer or someone 
like that, please? IIG IIG IIG 
1485   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Our fighter officer is at extension 6300 or 
6305, either one. TIE TIE TIE 
1486 [02:45]  Lt. Colonel Bear: 6300 or 6305? IIG IIG IIG 
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1487   Sergeant Bianchi: Yes, Sir. MISC TIE MISC 
1488   Lt. Colonel Bear: 
And there is no one on this line right now 
that I can talk to like that? IIG IIG IIG 
1489   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Not for a fighter officer.  We have our 
Mission Crew Commander, that’s all.   ISA TIE TIE 
      Do you want to talk to them? IIG TSOG TSOG 
1490   Lt. Colonel Bear: Yeah, that would be fine. MISC TIE MISC 
1491   Sergeant Bianchi: Ma’am, you need to pick up on line one. MISC MISC MISC 
1492   Lt. Colonel Bear: Major Deskins. MISC MISC MISC 
1493   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Hi, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from 
the - We’re just trying to get an idea - MISC MISC MISC 
1494   Lt. Colonel Bear: We heard conversation on both lines.   TIE US TIE 
      You’ll have to call back.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Fuck, Sam, I don’t remember.   MISC MISC MISC 
      I’ve taken so many phone calls today.   MISC MISC MISC 
      He’ll call back if it’s important.   MISC MISC MISC 
      There he is. TIE US TIE 
1495   Sergeant Bianchi: There he is. MISC MISC MISC 
1496   Major Deskins: 
He wants to go secure but we can’t.  I 
can’t go secure.  I don’t have it available 
right now to go secure.   TKS TKS TKS 
1497   Lt. Colonel Bear: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
1498   Sergeant McCain:
Yeah, this is Sergeant Gaber from the 
178th Op.  I’d like to go secure. TIE TIE TIE 
1499   Male Speaker: Hold on a second.   MISC US MISC 
      Are you still on the line? IIG IIG IIG 
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1500   Sergeant McCain: I’m still on the line. TIE TIE TIE 
1501   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1502   Sergeant Gaber: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is 
Sergeant McCain,  MISC MISC MISC 
      may I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1503   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Hey listen, I got an aircraft that’s flying 
from San Angelo in to Boston.  - FCI 
Counter Terrorist Team.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
We need to get a BPR so the plane can 
land in Boston. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1504   Sergeant Gaber: 
Counter terrorist team?  And you need a 
what? IIG IIG IIG 
1505   Sergeant Bianchi: 
A BBR so that the airplane can land in 
Boston. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1506   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  I need you to stay on the line for 
just a minute.  Okay, Sir?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I need you to stay on the line just a few 
more minutes.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We’re up channeling all that information 
you just asked me and hopeful we’ll get 
you the permission or at least point you in 
the right direction of who you need to 
contact.   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1507   Male Speaker: Outstanding. MISC MISC MISC 
1508   Sergeant McCain:
I need you to hold this line just a few 
more minutes. MISC MISC MISC 
1509   Male Speaker: Go for it.  Go for it. MISC MISC MISC 
1510   Sergeant McCain:
Okay, Sir?  I’m gonna forward you to 
6305, just in case you get cut off. TIE TIE TIE 
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1511   Male Speaker: 6305?  What’s that? IIG IIG IIG 
1512   Sergeant McCain:
6305.  You’re gonna be speaking to Lt. 
Colonel Daniels.  He’s our fighter officer. TIE TIE TIE 
1513   Male Speaker: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1514   Sergeant McCain: Okay? MISC US MISC 
1515   Male Speaker: Okay.  Thank you. MISC US MISC 
1516   Sergeant McCain: Standby. MISC US MISC 
1517   Male Speaker: Probably that guy. MISC US MISC 
1518   Sergeant McCain: Americans are stupid. MISC US MISC 
1519   Male Speaker: Hi, this is Reggie Davis at CONAR.  MISC MISC MISC 
       Are you guys up on the CONAR CO jet? IIG IIG IIG 
1520   Sergeant McCain: Say again?   IIG US IIG 
      We’re in a regular CONAR chat window. TIE TIE TIE 
1521   Male Speaker: Who’s your FIDO right now?  Iceman? IIG IIG IIG 
1522 [02:50]  Male Speaker: Yes. MISC MISC MISC 
1523   Reggie Davis: 
Can you forward me up to him or give me 
his number? DTA(RTA) IIG IIG 
1524   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  Hold on.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
6300 or 6305.  I’ll patch up to one of 
them.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
1525   Reggie Davis: Okay.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1526   Sergeant Bianchi: Busy.  His line is busy.  TIE TIE TIE 
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      6300?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
It’s in my - That one rings up in the 
washroom.  Nope, no such luck.   TIE TIE TIE 
1527   Reggie Davis: 
We’re gonna launch two 860s in the next 
15 minutes.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
We were advised to provide you with 
mode 2, mode 4, squawk and call signs.   TIE TIE TIE 
1528   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  Do you need to go secure? IIG IIG IIG 
1529   Reggie Davis: 
No, because the mode 4 is just gonna be 
today. TIE TIE TIE 
1530   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  Your call sign, Sir? IIG IIG IIG 
1531   Male Speaker: Air Force Rescue 67 Flight.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 It’s a flight of two 860 helicopters.  02 
squawks will be 60.  Mode 4 is Day 11 A 
and B.  That will do it.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
You will probably hear from them in 
about 30 minutes I guess. TIE TIE TIE 
1532   Sergeant Perry: Okay, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1533   Male Speaker: What was your name again? IIG IIG IIG 
1534 [02:55] Sergeant Perry: Sergeant Perry.   TIE TIE TIE 
1535   Male Speaker: Okay.  Thanks.   MISC MISC MISC 
1536   Sergeant Perry: Thank you, sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1537   Male Speaker: 
We’re gonna shut down everything and 
make sure we know who is what out here. TKS TKS TKS 
1538   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
1539   Male Speaker: 
Hey, this is Major Solinas from 1st Air 
Force. MISC MISC MISC 
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1540   Sergeant Perry: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
1541   Male Speaker: 
I am trying to get in touch with Lt. 
Colonel. Daniels.   TIE TIE TIE 
1542   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah, you’re still looking for that BBR? IIG IIG IIG 
1543   Major Solinas: 
Yeah, I called 6305 and nobody answers 
the phone. TIE TIE TIE 
1544   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Try - We were told to have you call 
Hampton direct and they’ll deal with you. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1545   Major Solinas: Give me the number. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1546   Sergeant Bianchi: Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
1547   Major Solinas: Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1548   Sergeant Bianchi: 
All right.  I got someone checking to see if 
we even have one.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We don’t deal with them on a day to day 
basis. TIE TIE TIE 
1549   Major Solinas: I appreciate that. MISC MISC MISC 
1550   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Okay.  We don’t have a phone number for 
them.   TIE TIE TIE 
1551   Major Solinas: 
Do you have an area code that’s roughly 
in the same area? IIG IIG IIG 
       I can call the 555 information. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1552   Sergeant Bianchi: Area code?  IIG IIG IIG 
      I don’t think anyone’s working in there.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Boy, let me see.   MISC MISC MISC 
1553   Major Solinas: Don’t worry.  I’ll find another way.   MISC MISC MISC 
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1554   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Yeah.  We were told to have you call 
them.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 Maybe you have a DSN phone listing 
there anywhere?   TSOG TSOG TSOG 
      
Do you have a world wide directory type 
thing? IIG IIG IIG 
1555   Major Solinas: No, I don’t. TIE TIE TIE 
1556   Sergeant Bianchi: Oh, shit.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I was looking for them here.  I can’t - I 
can’t find anything.   IIS IIS IIS 
      
Let me see.  Langley, Andrews - That’s 
the only place I don’t have. TIE TIE TIE 
1557   Major Solinas: Is it an Air Force Base? IIG IIG IIG 
1558   Sergeant Bianchi: 
It’s the one just north of Boston.  That’s 
all I know.   TIE TIE TIE 
1559   Major Solinas: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1560   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
1561   Major Solinas: I’ll give them a call. TIE TIE TIE 
1562   Sergeant Bianchi: Sorry about that. MISC MISC MISC 
1563   Major Solinas: No problem. MISC MISC MISC 
1564   Sergeant Bianchi: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. MISC MISC MISC 
1565   Major Solinas: 
Yes, Sir.  This is Sergeant Baker calling 
from Langley Air Force Base. TIE TIE TIE 
1566   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah. MISC MISC MISC 
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1567   Major Solinas: 
Just letting you know that quit 25 
downtime is 17:19. TIE TIE TIE 
1568   Sergeant Bianchi: 17:19.  Single ship? IIG IIG IIG 
1569   Sergeant Baker: Ship of two waiting on one more. TIE TIE TIE 
1570   Sergeant Bianchi: You’re waiting on 26? IIG IIG IIG 
1571   Sergeant Baker: Right. TIE TIE TIE 
1572   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1573   Sergeant Baker: Okay? MISC MISC MISC 
1574   Sergeant Bianchi: Yep.  No problem. MISC MISC MISC 
1575   Sergeant Baker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1576   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Sergeant Perry, this is Lt. Colonel Bear 
calling from the fighter wing.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
I talked to your duty officer about 30 
minutes ago.  ISA ISA ISA 
      
Do you have an idea of the schedule of 
events as far as cap measurement and 
those things are gonna happen? IIG IIG IIG 
1577   Sergeant Baker: 
No idea, Sir, but I could put you through 
to someone who may know. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1578   Sergeant Bianchi: Okay.  Thanks. MISC MISC MISC 
1579   Sergeant Perry: 
Let me get you through to the person that 
has the knowledge.  Hold on.  Let me put 
you up to 6300, Sir.  Standby. TIE TIE TIE 
1580   Lt. Colonel Bear: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
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1581   Sergeant Perry: 
Yes, this is Lt. Colonel Hayes from 
Atlantic City. TIE TIE TIE 
1582   Lt. Colonel Bear: Yes, sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1583 [03:00]  Sergeant Perry: 
We’ve got two airborne for almost 4 
hours.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
We’re wondering if we could try to work 
a swap out with the - IIG IIG IIG 
1584   Sergeant Perry: 
Let me put you through to the weapons 
guys.  Standby.   TIE TIE TIE 
      6313 if you get disconnected. TIE TIE TIE 
1585   
Lt. Colonel 
Hayes: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1586   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. TIE MISC MISC 
1587   
Lt. Colonel 
Hayes: 
This is Sergeant Christopher with the 
Indiana National Guard.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Can you please standby for Colonel Peters 
to go secure? IIG IIG IIG 
1588   Sergeant Perry:  Colonel Peters. TIE TIE TIE 
1589   
Lt. Colonel 
Hayes: 
Yes, Sir.  Standby.  WE need to switch to 
secure frequency.  Okay?   TIE TIE TIE 
      Here we go.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1590   Sergeant Perry: 
Hi, Lt. Tracy here from the Maryland 
State Police Aviation.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
I’m trying to work through a problem so I 
can get the Medivac back in service down 
here.   IIS IIS IIS 
      
We generally operate in the Baltimore 
airspace and the Washington airspace.   TIE TIE TIE 
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I got approval for operations in the 
Baltimore airspace.  Washington is 
working on it.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
When I get up to Western Maryland and 
Frederick, Maryland, my guys are like - MISC MISC MISC 
1591   
Sergeant 
Christopher: Let me give you to our MCC. TIE TIE TIE 
1592   Colonel Peters: Sure. MISC MISC MISC 
1593   Sergeant Perry: MCC here. TIE TIE TIE 
1594   Lt. Tracy: 
Hi, Lt. Tracy here from Maryland State 
Police.   TIE US TIE 
      
We’re calling about medivac service up in 
our state.   TIE US TIE 
      
We generally deal with Baltimore airspace 
and Washington airspace.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
At this point, I can’t operate in 
Washington.   ISA ISA ISA 
1595   Sergeant Perry: When your aircraft take off - MISC MISC MISC 
1596   Lt. Tracy: 6313 IIG IIG IIG 
1597   MCC: 6313, yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1598   Lt. Tracy: What are you looking for? IIG IIG IIG 
1599   MCC: Open line.  Northeast, Sergeant Perry.   MISC MISC MISC 
1600   Male Speaker: 
Ramp one, ramp two.  Airborne at 18:43.  
Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
1601   Male Speaker: 18:43.  Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1602   Male Speaker: Two birds airborne, Grant one and two. TIE TIE TIE 
1603 [03:05] Sergeant Perry: Two? IIG IIG IIG 
1604   Male Speaker: That’s what he said. TIE TIE TIE 
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1605   Sergeant Perry: 
For the duration of the - This exercise has 
been cancelled.   TIE TIE TIE 
      What can I say?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
This exercise has been cancelled for the 
duration of the crisis.  Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1606   Male Speaker: 
Does ID know that anybody from outside 
should be calling this place at this point?   IIG IIG IIG 
1607   Male Speaker: I’ll give you the number.   TIE TIE TIE 
1608   Male Speaker: Are they up? IIG IIG IIG 
1609   Male Speaker: Got it? IIG IIG IIG 
1610   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1611   Male Speaker: How are you doing?   MISC MISC MISC 
      This is Chief Cooper from _______.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Who am I speaking with? IIG IIG IIG 
1612   Male Speaker: Sergeant Perry. TIE TIE TIE 
1613   Male Speaker: Sergeant Perry, how are you? MISC MISC MISC 
1614   Sergeant Perry: Very good, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1615   Chief Cooper: 
We have some birds that need to get out to 
a carrier so that that asset can start moving 
strategically the way it’s supposed to start 
moving in the grand scheme of things.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
What’s the hold up on - Someone said that 
those guys weren’t allowed to launch out 
of Louisiana. IIS IIS IIS 
1616   Sergeant Perry: Let me find out about that for you, Keith. TIE TIE TIE 
1617   Chief Cooper: Okay.  I’m talking to NORAD. TIE TIE TIE 
1618   Sergeant Perry: Okay.  Okay.  Hold on.   MISC MISC MISC 
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Okay. Do they have their flight plans filed 
and everything like they’re supposed to?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
We’ve got some instructions for you here, 
Chief.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Give me a second.   MISC MISC MISC 
1619 [03:10]  Chief Cooper: 
Okay.  I’m talking to NORAD on the 
phone right now. TIE TIE TIE 
1620   Sergeant Perry: 
Okay.  Your instruction is to call the 
initial command center at are code 703-
904-4423. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1621   Chief Cooper: Do you know who Colonel Marr is? IIG IIG IIG 
1622   Sergeant Perry: Yes, he’s our commander. TIE TIE TIE 
1623   Chief Cooper: 
All right.  We have permission from 
Colonel Marr - TIE TIE TIE 
1624   Sergeant Perry: Right.  I found that out that its - NC NC NC 
1625   Chief Cooper: 
- these five planes.  There’s gonna be two 
per hour. TIE TIE TIE 
1626   Sergeant Perry: 
How many aircraft and can you give me 
codes? IIG IIG IIG 
1627   Chief Cooper: 
They’re gonna be on codes 2010 through 
2030. TIE TIE TIE 
1628   Sergeant Perry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1629   Chief Cooper: 
That’s the blocks of codes.  They’re 
getting to launch from Louisiana now.  
Colonel Marr knows about it  TKS TKS TKS 
      
and just tell whoever you need to tell that 
this is happening. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1630   Sergeant Perry: Thank you for the call. MISC MISC MISC 
1631   Chief Cooper: All right. MISC MISC MISC 
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1632   Sergeant Perry: Hey, ID? MISC MISC MISC 
1633   Chief Cooper: Yeah? MISC MISC MISC 
1634   Sergeant Perry: 
I have a series of Navy aircraft on block 
2010 through 2030 coming out of 
Louisiana.   TKS TKS TKS 
      
Permission from Colonel Marr?  Was it 
given?   IIG IIG IIG 
      They’re going. TIE TIE TIE 
1635   Chief Cooper: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1636   Sergeant Perry: What kind of Navy aircraft?  Carriers.   IIG IIG IIG 
1637   Female Speaker: FAA - 250? IIG IIG IIG 
1638   Sergeant Perry: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
1639   Female Speaker: Who are you guys checking out? IIG IIG IIG 
1640   Sergeant Perry: I’m sorry. MISC MISC MISC 
1641   Male Speaker: Right here.  I don’t know. MISC MISC MISC 
1642   Female Speaker: Are they friendly? IIG IIG IIG 
1643 [03:15] Male Speaker: Yeah - TIE TIE TIE 
1644   Female Speaker: Any alert on those two airliners?   IIG IIG IIG 
      Two airliners out of Chicago are missing?  IIG IIG IIG 
1645   Male Speaker:  - two hours ago. TIE TIE TIE 
1646   Male Speaker: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1647   Male Speaker: 
Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Anderson with 
Langley.   TIE MISC MISC 
      Do you copy? MISC MISC MISC 
1648   Male Speaker: Hello, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1649   Male Speaker:  
Hold on, Sir.  I’ll patch you up to 
someone that can take care of that. TIE TIE TIE 
1650   Sergeant Perry: Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
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1651   
Lt. Colonel 
Anderson: 
Okay.  I believe it’s 6300 if you get 
disconnected.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Hold on. MISC MISC MISC 
1652   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Perry. MISC MISC MISC 
1653   
Lt. Colonel 
Anderson: 
Sergeant Perry, Lt. Colonel Anderson at 
Langley.    MISC MISC MISC 
      
I’m wondering if there’s any kind of game 
plan yet on whether or    not you’re gonna 
need more jets on status or in the air from 
Langley. IIS IIS IIS 
1654   Sergeant Perry: Yes, Sir. TIE TIE TIE 
1655   
Lt. Colonel 
Anderson: No one is answering there at 6300.   TIE TIE TIE 
      
Is there anyone in that mission plan that I 
can be able to talk to? IIG IIG IIG 
1656   Sergeant Perry: Standby, Sir. MISC MISC MISC 
1657   Sergeant Perry: Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.  Hello? MISC MISC MISC 
1658   
Lt. Colonel 
Anderson: 
I’m sorry.  I was trying to call Fort Worth. 
Thanks. TIE TIE TIE 
1659   Sergeant Perry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1660   
Lt. Colonel 
Anderson: Hey it’s Boston Center. TIE TIE TIE 
1661   Sergeant Perry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1662   Sergeant Bianchi: Yeah I got a guy from Rhode Island.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Can you tell me who I need to call?  IIG IIG IIG 
       What line? IIG IIG IIG 
1663   Female Speaker: What code? IIG IIG IIG 
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1664   Sergeant Bianchi: Do you know what BPA is?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
Actually that’s a location on Long Island.  
This guy is on a 51, 40, 47 miles north of 
BPA at 1,500 feet. TKS TKS TKS 
1665   Boston Center: Standby.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
Are all military aircraft with Black Hawk 
Air Force? IIG IIG IIG 
1666   Sergeant Bianchi: 
We’re just going off the line real quick.  
I’ll be right back. TIE TIE TIE 
1667   Boston Center: Yeah, we ID it and it’s a low wing 107. TKS TKS TKS 
1668   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Actually, no.  This is north at Boston.  
Landed near Boston and they said it was - TKS TKS TKS 
1669   Boston Center: 
Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is 
Sergeant McCain, may I help you? MISC MISC MISC 
1670   Sergeant Bianchi: 
Hi, this is Major Cherry at the SOA 
Command Center.  TIE TIE TIE 
      
 I need to coordinate some life support 
flights and whatnot to - I’m told that we 
need to do it through each individual air 
defense sector.   IIS US IIS 
      Is that correct? IIG IIG IIG 
1671   Boston Center: 
Are you doing it - Is this military or 
civilian? IIG IIG IIG 
1672   Male Speaker: Civilian. TIE TIE TIE 
1673   Boston Center: 
Okay. I’m gonna give you a number to 
call and they will help you out.  It’s 
commercial number area code 703-904-
4423. TKS TKS TKS 
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1674   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  That’s us.   MISC MISC MISC 
      
We need to get these released and we 
want to make sure the military knows 
about it so that they can be released.   IIS IIS IIS 
      
We were told by NORAD that the 
individual defense sectors need to get the 
information on the aircraft released. IIS IIS IIS 
1675   Major Cherry: Can I give you some call signs? IIG IIG IIG 
1676   Sergeant McCain:
Sure.  Tell me when you’re ready to copy 
or what I can do is I can fax them to you - TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1677   Major Cherry: 
I would rather you tell me over the phone 
and then fax them later. TSOG TSOG TSOG 
1678   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  Okay.   MISC MISC MISC 
1679 [03:20]  Major Cherry: Go ahead, ma’am. MISC MISC MISC 
1680   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  Call sign is November 127 Kilo 
Charlie departing out of Alpha Foxtrot 
Whisky.  Destination is Capa Delta Kilo. TKS TKS TKS 
1681   Major Cherry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
1682   Sergeant McCain: And the agency is CDC and it’s doctors. TIE TIE TIE 
1683   Major Cherry: Okay. MISC MISC MISC 
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1684   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  The next call sign is November 
1218 Charlie departing out of Kennison 
going to same destination and its CDC 
and its doctors.  The next call sign is 
November 802 Alpha Bravo departing out 
of Kennison, destination is Capa Delta 
Kilo and same thing CDC and doctors.  
The next one is November 325, departure 
Delta Foxtrot and its pharmaceuticals but 
we don’t have the destination.   TKS TKS TKS 
      Do you need that? IIG IIG IIG 
1685   Major Cherry: It would help.  Yeah. TIE TIE TIE 
1686   Sergeant McCain: Okay.  We’ll standby on that one.   MISC MISC MISC 
      Do you want the rest of these? IIG IIG IIG 
1687   Major Cherry: How many do you have total, ma’am? IIG IIG IIG 
1688   Sergeant McCain: I have about 20 in front of me. TIE TIE TIE 
1689   Major Cherry: Go ahead and fax it to me.   DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
      The area code is 315 - TIE TIE TIE 
1690   Sergeant McCain: This is a commercial fax? IIG IIG IIG 
1691   Major Cherry: Yes. TIE TIE TIE 
1692   Sergeant McCain: 315 - TIE TIE TIE 
1693   Major Cherry: 334-6772. TIE TIE TIE 
1694   Sergeant McCain: 6772? IIG IIG IIG 
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1695   Major Cherry: 
That’s correct.  That’s our fax and you 
need permission to fly these guys;  IIS IIS IIS 
      is that correct? IIG IIG IIG 
1696   Sergeant McCain: Yes  TIE TIE TIE 
      
and how do we know when they’re 
approved to go? IIG IIG IIG 
1697   Major Cherry: 
Hold this line and I will get you 
permission here in just a few minutes.. TIE TIE TIE 
1698   Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  I’ll hold the line and I’ll go ahead 
and put these on the fax machine.   TIE TIE TIE 
      Who should I address it to it? IIG IIG IIG 
1699   Major Cherry: Sergeant McCain.  Major Nasypany?   IIG IIG IIG 
      
I got this lady from the - they’re calling us 
back now with a bunch of these aircraft 
that want to take off that have doctors and 
pharmaceuticals on it.  They need 
permission to take off.   IIS IIS IIS 
      Who do we get that through? IIG IIG IIG 
1700   Sergeant McCain: Sergeant Dooley.   TIE TIE TIE 
1701   Major Cherry: That phone number is calling me.   TIE TIE TIE 
      These guys have filed flight plans, okay?   TIE TIE TIE 
      Now they want permission to take off.  TIE TIE TIE 
       Yes, they did.   TIE TIE TIE 
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Now this organization is calling back to us 
wanting permission for these guys to take 
off.  They’re all doctors and 
pharmaceuticals and medical teams and 
stuff.  This lady here is out of NORAD 
calling from that commercial number that 
we were given for commercial flight for 
them to file flight plans for because we 
couldn’t handle that, right?   IIS IIS IIS 
      
Now these guys have called her, they’ve 
files, she’s calling us now with permission 
to call back them and say that they’re 
clear to go.   IIS IIS IIS 
1702   Sergeant McCain:
Ma’am, are you there?  Hello?  Hello?  
Ma’am, are you there?  Ma’am, are you 
there?  Hello?  Ma’am, are you there? MISC MISC MISC 
1703   Major Cherry: 
Attention in the area.  Attention in the 
area.  This is the MCC tech with a public 
service announcement.  MISC MISC MISC 
      
 If you are having a child care problem 
due the emergencies in the city limits of 
Rome, I have a phone number available 
for you to call.  We have some people that 
are willing to go by and get your kids and 
take care of them for you until this is over.  MISC MISC MISC 
      
If you have child care problems within the 
city limits of Rome, please come to the 
MCC tech and I’ll give you a phone 
number you can call to have your kids 
taken care of.   MISC MISC MISC 
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      Thank you. MISC MISC MISC 
1704   Sergeant McCain:
Ma’am, are you still there?  Ma’am?  Are 
you on the line?  366-2497. Okay?   MISC MISC MISC 
      
You got Debbie Spiker is the one that’s 
coordinating this all.  They’ll take care of 
it all.   TIE TIE TIE 
      You need to pick one of them. DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) DTA(RTA) 
1705   Major Nasypany: 
I’ve got a whole bunch of civilian flights 
right here. TIE TIE TIE 
1706 [03:25] Sergeant McCain:
Okay.  Great.  Here she is right now.  I 
just saw the phone off the hook and 
picked it up. TIE TIE TIE 
1707   Sergeant McCain: I need to talk to her. ISA ISA ISA 
1708   Male Speaker: 
He wants to talk to you.  He wants to talk 
to you. TIE TIE TIE 
1709   Sergeant McCain: Sergeant McCain? MISC MISC MISC 
1710   Male Speaker: 
Yes, ma’am.  I got your fax.  I got four 
pages here. TIE TIE TIE 
1711   Major Cherry: 
Let me see.  I faxed you one, two, three, 
four, five, six.   IIS IIS IIS 
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